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1     Introduction and Research Questions
1.1 Introduction
The scope of public consent to welfare policies constitutes an important topic in
the political and social scientific debate about the welfare state.  In all Western
democracies, the idea that the preferences of the majority - how vaguely these may
be in practice - should have at least some bearing on actual policy developments has
become self-evident (Taylor-Gooby,   1995,  p. 11). Furthermore, all welfare states
are confronted with severe challenges: the ageing population, family instability and
the labour market consequences of globalization and technological change. These
have led to the almost universal claim that the welfare state has become unsustainable
and therefore incapable of satisfying expressed social needs (Esping-Andersen,  2000).
These more recent challenges have led to considerable reforms of welfare state
arrangements in mature as well as in immature welfare states. Consequently, against
the background of these developments, critics of the welfare state have reconsidered
the chances of survival and the adverse consequences of welfare state arrangements
(see, for example, Zijderveld, 1999; Schmidtz & Goodin, 1998). The question of
the extent to which the general public is, in spite of this criticism, still committed
to the solidary foundations  of the welfare state has, since the 197Os, increasingly
become the subject matter of empirical research (Coughlin, 1980; Wilensky, 1975;
Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Svallfors, 1997; Kluegel & Miyano, 1995; Peillon, 1996;
Taylor-Gooby,  1998). The study of popular commitment to welfare state solidarity
has been particularly intensified in the wake of large-scale projects for the collection of
survey data on opinions, values and attitudes. In general, it has become increasingly
recognised that this fundamental knowledge is valuable, as these orientations may be
essential in guiding human behaviour. However, as Svallfors states "we are now rich
on data, while qualified analyses and interpretations lag considerably behind" (1995a,
P. 7).
This study can be situated in the latter tradition of cross-national research on
attitudes and opinions. Specifically, it is concerned with a description and explanation
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of public attitudes towards welfare state solidarity and distributive justice in Western,
Antipodean and South East Asian welfare states. In addition, this study investigates
the relationship between public commitment to welfare State solidarity and fairness on
the one hand, and the different welfare state regimes - as they have been conceived by
Esping-Andersen (1990) and, later on, extended and amended by his critics - on the
other. Citizens of different welfare states can be expected to be committed differently
to welfare state solidarity and to differ in their choices of justice principles.  One of
the main objectives is therefore to investigate the extent to which tile level of public
commitment to welfare state solidarity and fairness are related to the institutional
context that constitutes the welfare state  of a country. Svallfors (1995b,  pp.    118-
119)  argues  that "in trying to explain national differences in attitudes a focus  on
institutions can be very fruitful". According to him, "comparative research has shown
that institutions have a substantial impact on things such as the income distribution,
the standard of living, social mobility, and voting behaviour. What comparative
attitude research should aim at is to study variations and similarities in attitudes
across national contexts, and explain, or at least interpret, these as the outcome of
institutional arrangements. The attitudes we may register in our surveys are, at best,
today's traces of yesterday's history.  They are remnants of historical processes that
have been structured by national institutions. National differences in attitudes could
be explained as the outcome of the lived experience and interpretations of national
institution".  One of the main objectives is therefore to answer Svallfors' call, and
to investigate the ways in which welfare state arrangements may matter for people's
commitment to welfare state solidarity and distributive justice.
Moreover,  not only,  as we have stated above, will citizens of different welfare states
show different levels of commitment to welfare state solidarity, but also, within welfare
states, these attitudes will differ among social groups. The first objective of this study
is to examine the determinants of people's commitment to welfare state solidarity
and their choices of justice principles. This study not only investigates whether or
not these variations reflect differences in institutional context created by differing
welfare state arrangements, but also whether or not they reflect individual differences.
In particular, we investigate the relevance of self-interest and ideology for people's
commitment to welfare solidarity and fairness. All studies on this topiC have shown
that people in different social locations and with differing socio-political orientations
are indeed committed differently to welfare state solidarity and that they have different
preferences with respect to justice principles, (see, for example, Papadakis, 1993;
Svallfors, 1997; Kluegel & Miyano, 1995).
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1.2 Research questions
The central problematic dealt with in this study concerns the following questions:
To what extent are citizens of different welfare states and with different social
characteristics committed differently to welfare state solidarity and certain principles
of social justice; how can these differences can be explained. More specifically, five
research questions have been formulated. The first one addresses the discussion on
the variety in and clustering of welfare state arrangements at the national level.  The
remaining four research questions consist of two parts. The first part addresses how
and why there may be differences among welfare state regimes in their population's
endorsement of welfare state solidarity and particular justice principles. The second
part raises the question of how and why individuals may differ in their commitment
to welfare state solidarity and distributive justice.
With respect to the differences among welfare states, and specifically among
welfare state regimes, it has been proposed that public attitudes will tend to reflect
varying traditions of characteristic welfare governance. This proposition is based on
the assumption that these welfare state regimes each have been influenced by different
historical circumstances, political frameworks and social values (Taylor-Gooby, 1995).
According to Ullrich (2000), this is one of the more promising lines of research
to explain national consensus and national particularity. However, thus far, only
a limited number of studies have systematically investigated, with varying results,
the impact of welfare state arrangements on people's commitment to welfare state
solidarity, apart from their individual-level determinants (Svallfors, 1997; Gundelach,
1994; Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Mau, 1997). This study is also focused on assessing
the impact of both individual-level (social characteristics and socio-political beliefs)
and group-level variables (type of welfare state regime and structural characteristics
of the national health and pension system) on an outcome at the individual level,
namely people's commitment to welfare state solidarity and distributive justice.
An important contribution of this study to previous such research is that explicit
propositions concerning the impact of the institutional context are formulated and
specific information on group membership is included into the analytical framework.
Essentially, attitudes are related to aspects of the social context and to indicators of
location in the social structure and of socio-political beliefs. In Figure  1.1, we present
the structure of explanation which is followed in this study.
As far as the relevance of societal institutions is concerned, we examine the extent
to which the institutional conditions created by welfare state arrangements have an
impact on people's commitment to welfare state solidarity and their choices of justice
principles. Here, the point of departure is Esping-Andersen's well-known classification
ofwelfare states into liberal, conservative and social-democratic regime-types (Esping-
Andersen, 1990) . These three ideal-typical worlds of welfare capitalism constitute





state arrangements    x\
Outcome:
Structural positions  \ Public opinion




Figure  1.1: The structure of contextual explanation.
different models of welfare provision. However, this study will not be limited to welfare
states which can be placed under these headings. Esping-Andersen's classification of
welfare states has not only been applauded, but it has also been heavily criticised,
which has resulted in important extensions of his original classification. Basically, his
critics argue that more than just three types of welfare provision exist in the real world,
and that classifications of welfare states should also take these alternative modes into
account. Depending on the data available, we will investigate the extent to which
these different styles of welfare provision relate to people's attitudes towards welfare
state solidarity and distributive justice.
However, real welfare states are only empirical approximations of ideal-typical
constructs. Therefore, they may have limited relevance with respect to better un-
derstanding people's commitment to welfare state solidarity and fairness. Structural
aspects of specific sectors of the national system of social protection may show a
stronger association with attitudes towards welfare solidarity, as these particular in-
stitutional arrangements relate more concretely to the acceptance of specific styles
of welfare provision (Ullrich, 2000). Therefore,   not   only the contextual effect  of
belonging to a certain type of welfare state regime is investigated here, but also the
extent to which structural characteristics of specific sectors of the national system
of social protection relate to people's commitment to welfare state solidarity.  For
example, we examine the extent to which people's endorsement of particular national
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(health) care systems is dependent on structural characteristics of these systems.
The contextual approach which we follow in this study requires both the examina-
tion of these differences and similarities across welfare states, but also within welfare
states. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, the extent to which individuals are supportive  of
their welfare system and prefer certain principles of justice are seen as the result of
their location in the social structure and their socio-political beliefs, controlling for
contextual effects.
1.2.1      Worlds  of welfare capitalism
In the last decades, interest in comparing the welfare states of modern societies has
grown fast. To grasp the differences and similarities which exist among the welfare
state arrangements of different countries, the use of theoretical models has become
both a widely accepted, and sometimes strongly disputed activity (see, for example,
Baldwin, 1996). Goodin  et  al.   (1999,  p. 37) argue in favour  of the classification
endeavour of welfare states, saying that the institutions of the welfare state are the
result of many political tugs-of-war over a long period of time.  As they point out,
in the course of all this bickering over the design and redesign of these institutions,
however, patterns have emerged and clusters have been formed. To some extent, the
characteristics of welfare states within these clusters reflect certain intentions, ideas
and values.  This is partially because there are only a limited number of ways of
pursuing any given social objective. Those who are - from a policy-making perspective
- involved in the shaping and reshaping of institutional arrangements, will in particular
cling to old intellectual routines to further serve their intentions and principles.
Moreover, these routines are real in the sense that there is, to some extent, an internal
'regime logic' that dictates what institutional options can fit together coherently and
work together well.
This idea that qualitatively different regime logics have crystallised in real welfare
states has gained momentum since the appearance of Esping-Andersen's ground-
breaking book The 77:ree IForlds of welfare Capitalism (1 990). In this book, Esping-
Andersen combines Marshall's (1950) definition of social citizenship with Titmuss's
(1958; 1974) classification of three different principles  for the organization of welfare
provision: residual, industrial-achievement and institutional-redistributive welfare
state models. By distinguishing qualitatively different ways of welfare provision,
Esping-Andersen aims to exemplify how specific constellations of political power have
led to the development of historically different welfare state regimes. For this purpose
he relates social citizenship and welfare (Boje, 1996, p. 19). Esping-Andersen defines
social citizenship by the number of social rights attributed to individuals in the welfare
state or by their ability to maintain a livelihood in the society without reliance on
the market-level of de-commodification. He argues that, as we examine international
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variations in the substance of social citizenship and welfare state stratification, we
find qualitatively different arrangements among the state, the market and the family.
These cluster into a liberal, conservative and social-democratic regime-type (Esping-
Andersen, 1990, pp. 22 & 26), which are influenced by their historical roots, political
systems and social values.
It is not surprising that Esping-Andersen's claim of 'three worlds of welfare
capitalism' has been contested by other students of the welfare state. Although his
effort was much acclaimed, a great many alternative endeavours have been undertaken
to categorise real welfare states into different welfare state regimes. Although the
basic division into 'liberal'/'social-democratic'/'conservative' has, by now, become
customary, opinions differ about whether these three regime-types are sufficient to
classify welfare states which were not included in Esping-Andersen's original account.
In addition, as the act of typologiSing iS a matter of deciding that some features are
important in a certain respect and others not (cf. Baldwin, 1996), dispute has arisen
about the proper classification of real welfare states. In the end, the explanatory value
of Esping-Andersen's typology Was questioned. The first research question relates to
the discussion concerning the robusmess of the Esping-Andersenian working typology.
It reads as follows:
1.  Are  there families  of real welfare states or are  all welfare states rather unique
specimens?  If the former is the case, are there three or more ideal-typical worlds
of welfare capitalism?
To answer this question, we first review Esping-Andersen's original classification;
we then consider the various criticisms which have been levied against the typolOgiCal
approach, in general, and the theoretical underpinnings of Esping-Andersen's typol-
ogy, in particular. In addition, we offer a survey of welfare state classifications which
have been proposed to extend and amend Esping-Andersen's original classification.
We also offer a compilation of real welfare states and their classification according to
the various typologies. Finally, we also discuss the various attempts which have been
undertaken to test the goodness-of-fit of Esping-Andersen's classification.
1.2.2     Popular support for the welfare state
The second research question asks whether or not public opinion towards the welfare
state tends to reflect the distinctive corporatist, social-democratic and liberal-leaning
frameworks that are supposed to characterise the governance of different European
welfare states. Roller (1992) has argued that attitudes towards government interven-
tion in the area of social policy can be divided along three dimensions, which refer to
the goals, means, and outcomes of government intervention to achieve socio-economic
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security and justice. The second research question is limited to the public's prefer-
ences with respect to the goal-dimensions of government intervention. Roller divides
this into extensiveness (whether individuals actually hold the state responsible for the
provision of social protection) and intensity (the degree to which government should
intervene  in a certain  area of social protection). Both kinds of preferences  are  put
under the general heading of the public's preference for institutionalised solidarity, as
welfare state solidarity is achieved here by means of state intervention. Apart from an
examination of the extent to which the different styles of government intervention are
echoed in public opinion, several contextual factors are thought to affect the level of
support for institutionalised solidarity: the level of social protection, income inequality
and tax policies. The research question is as follows:
2. To what extent do citizens of different welfare states support institutionalised
solidarity? To what extent can differences among individuals and societies in this
support be explained by differences among welfare state regimes, social protection
level, income inequality, and tax regime, and, at the individual level, by social
position and socio-political beliefs?
To answer this question, people's preferences for an extensive and intensive
welfare state are compared among France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark,
West Germany, Ireland, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Using
the technique of multilevel-analysis, we estimate the effects of belonging to a certain
welfare state regime. The effects of welfare effort, income inequality, and tax regime
are also estimated. In addition, we estimate the effects of an individual's social position
and his or her socio-political beliefs, as these characteristics can be expected to explain
within-country variations in levels of support.
In previous research, cross-national variations and similarities in public commit-
ment to the welfare state have been studied extensively (see, for example Svallfors,
1997; Taylor-Gooby, 1995; Papadakis & Bean, 1993). However, most studies are
restricted to an analysis of one or only a few countries. Moreover, they usually do not
explicitly include contextual conditions alongside of individual social characteristics in
their analytical framework, although the impact of welfare state arrangements is often
emphasised. Consequently, this presumed association has not really been empirically
established (however, see Svallfors, 1997; Roller, 1995). One major contribution
of this study is that it extends the previous research on popular commitment to
the welfare state, in the sense that it analyses a relatively large number of countries
simultaneously, while adding comparative measures of contextual and individual  char-
acteristics.  In this way, we estimate the impact of each type of welfare state regime,
welfare state effort, income inequality and the tax-regime on people's preferences for
an  extensive or intensive welfare state  in  11  countries  in 1992, controlling for the
effects of individual-level characteristics.
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1.2.3    Notions of solidarity and choices of justice principles
The third research question is concerned with the problem of whether or not classi-
fications of welfare states matters for people's notions of solidarity and their choices
of justice principles. This research question is an extension of the previous research
question. Specifically, we investigate, first of all, people's notions of solidarity in terms
of the preferred broadness of government intervention to provide social protection
which are intended to benefit citizens. Secondly, we examine the cross-national
differences in preferences for the equality, need, and equity principle of distributive
justice (Deutsch,   1975).   But why focus on these two dimensions? As Goodin  et  al.
(1999, pp. 22-23) argue, welfare states can, to a certain extent, be ranked on the basis
of certain "external standards of assessment" such as the promotion of economic ef-
ficiency, social equality, social integration and stability, autonomy, and the reduction
of poverty. These values have - in one way or another and to a greater or lesser
extent - traditionally been served by various welfare state arrangements. Moreover,
they emphasise that a broad consensus exists concerning these moral values across all
welfare regimes. These values are the moral embodiments through which all welfare
state regimes, of whatever type, are legitimised by their citizens. This broad consensus
indicates that in the pursuit of these values certain similarities among welfare states
may exist. However, the fact that welfare states quite often substantially differ in the
allocation and distribution of welfare is a consequence of differences among them
concerning which particular egalitarian justice principles they emphasise and which
specific notions of solidarity they embrace. Variations in both the level of support
for government responsibility in guaranteeing certain social rights and preferences for
certain justice principles will be related to the type of welfare state regime a country's
welfare state belongs to. In this way, we investigate whether certain moral under-
pinnings of welfare state regimes are echoed in the public's attitudes. The research
question is as follows:
3.    To  what   extent   do  citizens   of  different   welfare   states   have   different  notions
of solidarity and do they choose different justice principles?  To what extent
can differences among individuals and societies in these notions and choices
be explained by differences among welfare state regimes, social position and
socio-political beliefs?
We compare popular notions of solidarity and choices of justice principles among
Canada, the United States, Great Britain, Ireland, France, West Germany, Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy,
Australia, New Zealand, Japan and The Philippines. After classifying these welfare
states into liberal, conservative, social-democratic, Mediterranean, Radical or East-
Asian Communitarian, the explanatory value of this welfare State typolOgy iS assessed.
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Moreover, we also estimate the effects an individual's social position and his or her
socio-political beliefs.
As far as the explanation of cross-national differences in people's notions of
solidarity are concerned, we mainly follow Taylor-Gooby (1998) and Kluegel and
Miyano (1995) . These studies compared people's notions of solidarity in terms of
their consent to government responsibility for different aspects ofwelfare provision. In
both studies, only a limited number of countries could be compared, as data on public
attitudes towards government intervention were not available for all welfare states.
Specifically, Taylor-Gooby (1985) only compared attitudes among West Germany,
Great Britain, Italy and Sweden. Based on this limited number of countries, Taylor-
Gooby concluded that "public attitudes, though in some respects still distinctively
'national', seem obstinately to resist conforming to the dominant policy themes of the
welfare states they inhabit". Kluegel and Miyano (1995) compared public support for
government intervention to reduce inequalities and the effects of justice beliefs on the
endorsement of government intervention among Great Britain, Japan, West Germany,
The Netherlands, and the United States. They found that Japan is characterised by a
especially high level of support and the United States, as is also found in other studies
(for example Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Svallfors, 1997) by an especially low level of
support.
One major contribution of our approach is the replication and extension ofprevious
research by Taylor-Gooby (1998), Svallfors (1997), and Papadakis and Bean (1993).
This is a replication in the sense that the type of welfare state regime is explicitly
included to assess the explanatory power of the regime-typology for people's notions
of solidarity and their choices of justice principles.  It is an extension in the sense that
this study includes significantly more countries. It enables us, firstly, to include more
different welfare state regimes than the original tripartite classification by Esping-
Andersen (1990), and secondly, to take into account that, also within welfare state
regimes, significant variation may exist among welfare states in the public's consent to
government intervention. Moreover, this study contributes to the literature about the
relationship between welfare state arrangements and public attitudes by investigating
whether particular egalitarian justice principles, emphasised by welfare state regimes,
are reflected in the preferences of citizens for certain justice principles.
1.2.4     Public support for health care systems
The latter two research questions relate to the public's general commitment to the
welfare state, encompassing the whole gamut of welfare provisions. However, findings
may differ when attitudes towards specific policy areas are considered. Here, we have
chosen to examine more closely attitudes toWards tWO policy areas which lie at the
heart of welfare states everywhere: the provision of health care and old-age pensions.
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The following two research questions deal with the cross-national variations in public
support for government provision of these two policy areas.
The fourth research question is concerned with the explanation of cross-national
variations in levels of public support for national health care systems.  This will be
done by studying the effects  of the  type of welfare state regime to which welfare states
considered can be assigned, the structural characteristics of the national health care
systems, and the individual social and demographic characteristics. The research
question is formulated as follows:
4.   To  what  extent  are  citizens  of  different  welfare  states  supportive  of  their  health
care systems? To what extent can differences among inditiduals and societies
in their coni,nimie,it to natioiial health care systems be explained by dWerences
among welfare state regimes, structural characteristics of the health care systems,
social position and socio-political beliefs?
To answer this question, the 1996-level of public support for the national health
care systems is compared among Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain,
France, Ireland, The Netherlands, Portugal, Great Britain, Finland, Sweden, and
Austria.
Only a limited number of studies have examined public attitudes towards
health care and their relationships to institutional characteristics of welfare states
(Pescosolido, Boyer, & Tsui, 1985; Ardig6, 1995; Elola, 1996). Pescosolido et al.
(1985) found that evaluations of welfare policies in health varied across 8 countries
with patterned differences between welfare laggards and welfare leaders. Ardig6
(1995)  found that citizens of seven European countries and the United States consid-
ered good medical care 'very important' and its provision an 'essential' responsibility
of the government.  He also showed that the way health care services are financed
affects the degree of responsibility attributed to the government for providing good
medical care. Finally, Elola (1996) found that public satisfaction with the health care
system is lower in countries with a National Health System, than in countries with
social security based health systems.
The analyses in this study follow the lead of these previous studies, but extend
them in significant ways. For one thing, more countries are included. This enables
us to assess whether a relationship exists between the amount of emphasis placed on
universality and collective responsibility in the institutional arrangements of a specific
type of welfare state regime and the level of support for the national health care
system. Moreover, this study adds to previous research by examining the impact of
several structural characteristics of the national care system while, at the same time,
controlling for individual-level social characteristics.
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1.2.5       Responsibility  for  old-age  pensions
The fifth and final research question tackles the explanation of variations in public
consent to government intervention in another social policy area: old-age pensions.
Research on cross-national variations in attitudes about old-age pensions is relatively
scarce. The informed studies that do exist are mainly descriptive. In a survey of
Elite opinion on retirement pensions in Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, The
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, George and Taylor-Gooby (1996) found
only a few variations in opinions, which neither fell into any pattern nor correlated
with pension typologies. Walker and Maltby (1997) and Walker (1993) presented
an overview of the opinions of EU-citizens concerning intergenerational relationships,
pensions and living standards of the elderly, employment and older workers and
health and social care for the elderly. Among these many issues, one of their
more notable findings was that the pension contract (i.e. those working accept the
responsibility of financially contributing to the provision of pensions for the elderly),
- often seen as the basic expression of intergenerational solidarity between those in
employment and older people - is in good health. Consensus on this topiC is found
everywhere. However, Walker and Maltby (1997, pp. 53-59) also found that most
national pensions systems do not succeed in providing pensions which are evaluated
as adequate by their beneficiaries. Eventually, this raises the question of how pensions
should be financed and who should be responsible for the provision of pensions.
In this study, we focus on the latter tWO iSSUeS. We will examine the extent of
differences and similarities in public attitudes about the provision of old-age pensions.
Specifically, we expect that several contextual factors affect popular views concerning
the responsibilities for the provision of pensions:  the type of welfare state regime and
the features of the national pension systems.  We also assess the effects of individual
level social characteristics. In other words, the final research question is stated as
follows:
5.  To  what  extent  do  citizens  of  different  welfare  states  endorse  different  ways  of
providing old-age pensions? To what extent can differences among individuals
and societies in these preferences be explained by differences among welfare state
regimes, structural characteristics of the national pension system, social position
and socio-political beliefs?
To answer this question, people's views on who should be responsible for the
provision of pensions are compared  in   1992   and 1996 among France, Belgium,
The Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece,
Spain, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and Austria. We estimate the impact ofwelfare state
regimes on public attitudes concerning the responsibility for pensions. In addition, we
estimate effects of structural characteristics of the national pension systems. Finally,
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controlling for country-differences, the effects of social characteristics of individuals
are assessed.
In our analyses, we explicitly focus on the collectivist and market selectivist
features which can be distinguished in different welfare state regimes. According to
Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 80), these features are especially important where old-age
pensions are concerned. This is because pensions constitute "a central link between
individualism and solidarity". The impact of the regime-classification on public
attitudes is tested against the impact of characteristics of the national pension system.
Again, the approach taken in this study will augment previous research by comparing
a relatively large number of countries, and in particular by simultaneously including
contextual conditions and individual level social characteristics. In this way, we try to
achieve a better understanding of the foundations of public attitudes concerning the
responsibility for the provision of pensions.
1.3 Data
As  we  noted in Section 1.1 comparative research on values, attitudes and opinions
has become rich in data during the last two decades. The most important data-sets
for comparative purposes now come from projects such as the International Social
Survey Project, the EuropeaniWorld Values Study, the International Social Justice Project
and the Eurobarometer Suruey Series. The contextual nature of our study calls for
data which consist of two levels of units - hierarchically arranged - where individuals
are the primary or micro-level units and a grouping of the individuals constitutes
the second macro-level (Ringdal,   1992,  p.    235  ). All data-sets  used  in this study
meet this requirement; they are hierarchically structured as opinions of citizens within
countries. In this study we draw on data from the International Social Survey Program,
the Eurobarometer survey series and the European Values Study. In the following, we
offer a short description of these cross-national survey-projects.
1.3.1     International Social Survey Program
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) is an ongoing, annual programme of
cross-national collaboration, in which the collaborating organizations jointly develop
topical modules dealing with important areas of social science. These modules are
fielded as fifteen-minute supplements to the regular national surveys (or a special
survey if necessary) and include extensive common cores of background variables.
Since  1984,  the ISSP has grown to include 31 nations, the founding four - Germany,
the United States, Great Britain, and Australia - plus Austria, Italy, Ireland, Hungary,
The Netherlands, Israel, Norway, the Philippines, New Zealand, Russia, Japan,
Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Sweden, Spain, Cyprus,
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France, Portugal, Slovakia, Latvia, Chile, Bangladesh, Denmark and South Africa.
In addition, East Germany was added to the German sample upon reunification.
The ISSP researchers concentrate in particular on developing questions  that  are   1)
meaningful and relevant to all countries and 2) can be expressed in an equivalent
manner in all relevant languages. The questionnaire is firstly drafted in British English
and then translated into other languages using standard back translation procedures.
In this study,  we  use  the 1996 module  on  the  role of government which covered
attitudes towards a) civil liberties, b) education and parenting, c) welfare and social
equality and d) the economy (for more detailed information about the ISSP, see
http://www.issp.org) .
1.3.2        Eurobarometer  suruey  series
The Eurobarometer survey series is a programme ofcross-national and cross-temporal
comparative research, which is designed to provide regular monitoring of the social
and political attitudes of the public in the European Union. The Eurobarometer public
opinion surveys have been conducted on behalf of the European Commission since the
early 1970s. Currently, the target-population for sampling includes the population of
any EU member country, aged 15 years and over, resident in any of the Member States.
The regular sample  size in standard Eurobarometer surveys  is 1000 respondents  per
country except the United Kingdom (N=1000 in Great Britain and N=300in Northern
Ireland). Since 1995, the survey series have covered all European Union Member
countries: France, Belgium, The Netherlands, West Germany, East Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Greece, Spain,
Portugal, Finland, Sweden and Austria. In all Member States, fieldwork is conducted
on the basis of equivalent basic bilingual (French and English) questionnaires which
are translated into the other languages. The basic sampling design in all Member States
is a multi-stage, random probability one, and selected respondents are interviewed
face-to-face in their homes.  In this study, we use data from Eurobarometer 37.1
(conducted in April and May, 1992), 44.0 (conducted in October and November,
1995) and 44.3 (conducted in February and April, 1996). These include questions to
measure the public's general endorsement of the welfare state (Eurobarometer 37.1),
preferences regarding the provision of pensions (Eurobarometer 37.1  and  44.0)  and
support for the national health care system (Eurobarometer 44.3). See Saris and
Kaase (1997) for more information. Information about the Eurobarometer survey
series is also available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epoO.
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1.3.3   European Values Study
The European Values Study is a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey
research programme on basic human values, initiated by the European Value Systems
Study Group (EVSSG)  in  the late 1970s. The major  aim  of the  EVS  is to design
and conduct an empirical study of the moral and social values underlying European
social and political institutions and governing conduct. Two waves were fielded in 26
countries  in  1981   and  in  1990.   Here,  we  will  use  data  from  the most recent third
wave during which the fieldwork was conducted in  1999 or 2000 throughout Europe.
Each national survey consisted  of a large representative sample of citizens  aged   18
or over. The observational method used was face-to-face interviews based on largely
standardised questionnaires. The current research population consists of the following
34 countries which participated in the EVS 1999: Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway,
The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and the USA. The 1999-survey,
used in this study, included, for the first time, questions about people's preferences
for certain justice principles (for more information about the European Values Study,
see the EVS-homepage at http://cwis.kub.nl/ fsw_2/evs/index.htm).
1.4    Scope and limitations of this study
The present study is among the first to systematically investigate the ways in which
the specifics of welfare state regimes might affect public commitment to welfare
state solidarity and distributive justice. Moreover, this study examines the ways in
which other contextual factors such as welfare state effort, methods of financing
the welfare state, income inequality and structural characteristics of the national
pension and health care system are associated with these public attitudes. However,
the comparative and contextual approach which we use in this study raises some
important methodological issues which we will discuss in the following sections. In
particular, these issues relate to 1) the cross-national comparability of attitudes and
opinions, 2) the selection of countries for analysis and 3) the problem of estimating
statistical contextual-effects models based on small sample sizes.
1.4.1        Cross-national  comparability  of  attitudes
An important guideline in cross-national research on values, attitudes and opinions is
that scores on a scale can be compared across populations only when their equivalence
has been established  (van de Vijver and Leung,  1997). In studies on public attitudes
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about the welfare state, surprisingly little attention is paid to this issue, although
several students of public opinion have underscored the importance of establishing
equivalence of scales (see, for example Kangas, 1997; Svallfors,  1997;  1999).  This
is partly because, often, only single-item instruments are available to indicate consent
to a specific social policy aspect. This makes the construction of multi-item scales
and, consequently, the empirical testing of equivalence of scales across populations
nearly impossible. Often, the researcher simply has to trust that the cross-national
questionnaire was designed meticulousnessly and that it takes into account different
meanings and connotations of various concepts. Therefore, equivalence is only
implicitly assumed.
However, if we follow the guideline given by van de Vijver and Leung (1997), the
latter approach is highly unsatisfactory.  It does not establish equivalence of measures
empirically.  In this study, we will - depending on the available data - follow this
guideline and test the equivalence of scales across populations. To achieve this, we
apply Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in several instances. In order to make
valid cross-national comparisons, it is necessary to demonstrate that the manifest
variables (the items used) are similarly related to the same latent belief, attitude or
value in the countries being studied (Petterson, 1995). Within the framework of CFA
models, two important hypotheses can be tested (Halman & Moor, 1993): First of all,
the hypothesis that the same structure applies (i.e. only the same manifest variables
are related to the same belief, attitude or value) and, secondly, the hypothesis of
invariance of factor loading paths. This expresses the strength of the relations between
the manifest variables  and the latent belief, value or attitude: Using this approach,
we extend previous research on public endorsement of the welfare state, as we try
to establish empirically cross-national comparability of concepts whenever possible,
instead of simply assuming that they are comparable.
1.4.2    Selection of countries for analysis
The primary objective of this study is to assess the extent to which different welfare
regimes relate to the public's commitment to welfare state solidarity and distributive
justice. Therefore, the choice of countries to study - and consequently the comparisons
we made - were mainly dictated by Esping-Andersen's typology and its later extensions.
Apart from that, the choice of countries was largely opportunistic and data-driven.
For example, cross-national surveys such as the Eurobarometer-survey series are
necessarily restricted to the member states of the European Union, making it possible
to compare, at most, 15 countries. Although these data contain interesting measures
tother hypotheses might ask for the testing of invariance of error variances/covariances across groups.
Except for particular instances when such a teSt might be useful, it is widely accepted that it is overly
restrictive (Byrne, 1998, p. 261).
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of public attitudes towards aspects of the welfare state, important comparisons with
other countries, such as the United States, could not be made due to the scope of
data collection. This means that conclusions reached by comparative analyses are very
much dependent on the countries considered, which necessitates careful interpretation
of the results.
The most important criterion for including a country was that it could be classified
according to an extended, senary version of Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare
states. However, the comparison of only six countries - one for each regime type -
would be highly unsatisfactory because differences will always exist among different
countries (cf. Svallfors, 1997, p. 286). Therefore, we aimed at including at least two
countries for each regime type. The availability of relevant attitudinal data forced us,
at times, to include borderline cases - for example The Netherlands or Great Britain
- which are not that easy to classify. This makes the interpretation of results more
difficult. However, if one uses a typology, hybrid cases will irrevocably emerge.  No
specific case can ever perfectly embody a particular ideal type (Goodin et al., 1999,
p. 56). By omitting countries simply because they cannot be classified beforehand,
the researcher is not able to understand the peculiarities of these specific cases.
Eventually, if we accept that there are limits to the empirical power of discernment
of classifications, inclusion of borderline cases is warranted, but should be done with
caution.
In addition, countries were selected on the basis that similar and equal numbers
of indicators (items) be available to construct the dependent variables which measure
people's attitudes about welfare state solidarity and their choices of justice principles.
Therefore, we strove for a similar basic construction of the dependent variables in
order to assess the cross-national comparability of the constructs.
1.4.3      Contextual-effects  models  and  the  small  N  Problem
In this study, we use contextual-effects models, which generally can be defined as "an
effort to explain individual-level dependent variables using combinations of individual
and group-level independent variables" (Blalock,   1984). A general characteristic  of
these models is that they allow for the impact of macro-level characteristics on an
individual actor, controlling for the impact of individual-level social characteristics.  In
this study, both individuals and countries are the units of analysis.  In the latter case,
where the line of approach is the comparison of attitudes among countries and the
assessment ofthe impact of the institutional and structural context, this study analyses
significantly more countries than were included in previous investigations. However,
as has been clarified above, the study is still limited  by the number of countries which
can be used to test the relevance of the Esping-Andersenian classification for the
explanation of public attitudes, and of other contextual determinants. Therefore, we
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must take into account what is commonly known as 'the small N problem'.
As Goldthorpe (2000, p. 49) explains, the small N problem occurs whenever
countries or other macrosocial entities are taken as the units of analysis. In those
instances, the number available for study is likely to be quite limited. When individuals
are the units, populations can be sampled which give Ns of several hundreds or
thousands. However, when countries are the units N, in the most ideal case, cannot
rise much above one hundred, even if all available cases are taken. Often, there are
far fewer available cases. Goldthorpe further points out that in applying techniques of
multivariate analysis, serious difficulties then tend to be encountered when the sample
size  at the macro-level is not much greater than the total number of variables involved.
Statistically, this means that there are too few degrees of freedom, that models
become 'overdetermined', that intercorrelations among independent variables cannot
be adequately dealt with and that results may not be robust. Substantively, it means
that competing explanations of the dependent variable may not be open to any decisive
evaluation. As Goldthorpe (2000, p. 52) correctly argues, this is essentially not a
problem of the method used, but "a problem ofinsufficient information relative to the
complexity of the macrosociological questions that we seek to address". Eventually,
both a qualitative and a quantitative approach may suffer from the small N problem.
As we mentioned in Section  1.4.2, the number of countries included in this study is
generally larger than in previous studies. However, given the scope of welfare state
typologies and the available survey-data, the number of countries to be analysed is
still relatively limited. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the consequences which
the small N problem might have for this study.
In this study, we use a statistical modelling-approach. Two techniques ofmultivari-
ate analysis will be used to assess the impact ofregime-types, structural characteristics
of the national care and pension system and individual-level social characteristics. In
most analyses, a random coefficient model, the most general type of a hierarchical
linear or multilevel model (Bryk & Raudenbusch, 1992; Snijders & Bosker, 1999),
will be estimated. According to Snijders and Bosker (1999, p. 43), the random
coefficient model should be used if the groups are regarded as a sample from a  (real or
hypothetical) population and the researcher wishes to draw conclusions pertaining to
this population, or if the researcher wishes to test effects of group-level variables. The
advantage of using these models is that it explicitly takes into account the clustered
structure of the data. Specifically, these models enable us to estimate the effects of
contextual variables on people's commitment to welfare state solidarity, controlling
for effects ofindividual-level characteristics. The advantage, compared to an Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression approach - in which effects of contextual variables
are estimated by disaggregating these contextual variables to the individual level - is
that the sample size at the contextual level is not exaggerated. As Snijders and Bosker
(1999, p. 15-16) point out, in the study of between-group differences, disaggregation
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often leads to a serious risk of committing type I errors (asserting on the basis of
the observations that there is an effect, whereas in the population there is no such
effect). Because the country-level  part  of the model takes into account the correct
number of observations (i.e. countries), the probability of committing a type I error is
significantly reduced2. Another advantage of these models is that explained variances
can be calculated separately for both the individual and the contextual-level. This
makes it possible to assess the explanatory value of contextual factors, apart from the
explanatory value of individual-level characteristics.
The random coefficient model is used in cases where the dependent variable can
be seen as continuous. However, when the dependent variable is categorical, we use
the multinomial logit model to asses the impact of individual and contextual-level
explanatory variables. In these models, contextual factors are disaggregated to the
individual-level. As we discussed above, this approach leads to the problem that the
sample size of contextual factors is dramatically exaggerated. It is therefore necessary
to realise that the data are clustered by countries. Therefore, we specify that the
observations are independent across groups (clusters), but not necessarily within
groups. This procedure affects the estimated standard errors, but not the estimated
coefficients. This significantly reduces the probability of committing a type I error in
the evaluation of contextual-level effects.
1.5 Outline ofthe book
Chapters 2 through 6 present the results of this study. The research questions
formulated in Section 1.2 are dealt with in these five chapters. Each chapter addresses
one of the research questions. The chapters are written as separate articles, of which
Chapters 2,3,5 and 6 have been previously published, and Chapter 4 has been
submitted to an international journal for publication :
·  Chapter 2 is an extended version of an article which was published in Me,ts &
Maatschappij (Arts & Gelissen,  19998).  The augmented version of this chapter
has been submitted for publication to an international journal.
· Chapter 3 is an extended version of an article published in the International
Journal of Social Welfare (Gelissen,   200Ob).    An  earlier  version,  in  Dutch,  was
published in Sociale Wetenschappen (Gelissen,  1999).
· Chapter 5 appeared as an article published in the International Journal of Social
IFefare (Gevers, Gelissen, Arts, & Muffels,  2000).
2Of course, committing a type Il error (asserting on the basis of the observations that there is no effect,
whereas in the population a relationship exists) also becomes more likely.
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•  Chapter 6 is the revised version of an article published in Mens & Maatschappij
(Gelissen, 2000a). The version   of this chapter  has   also been submitted   for
publication to an international journal.
There is an advantage and a disadvantage to presenting the results as separate
articles. The advantage is that each chapter can stand on its own. The disadvantage is
that there may be some overlap among the articles.
Chapter 2 starts with a review of the literature regarding Esping-Andersen's
typology of welfare states and its modified versions.  Here, the focus is especially
on his critics' extended and amended classifications of welfare states; this in order
to cope with the alleged shortcomings which have been identified in his seminal
work. This approach sets the scene for the following chapters that empirically address
the question: To what extent are public commitment to welfare state solidarity and
preferences for justice principles systematically structured by distinctive welfare state
regimes?
Chapter 3 addresses variations among welfare state regimes and social categories
as  far as public endorsement  of the welfare state is concerned (research question  2).
To answer this research question, data from Eurobarometer 37.1,1992, are analysed.
Chapter 4 elaborates on Chapter 3 by investigating not only the extent to which
people from different welfare states are committed to welfare state solidarity, but also
whether the type of welfare state regime people live under actually matters for their
choices of justice principles (research question  3).  For this purpose,  data are analysed
from the 1996 module of the International Social Survey Program(ISSP)  on the Role
of Government, and from the European Values Study  1999.
In Chapters 5 and 6 attention is shifted from the more general level of public
commitment to welfare state solidarity to public support for two more concrete
areas at the heart of most welfare states. These are the provision of health care
and old-age pensions. Specifically, Chapter 5 deals with the explanation of citizens'
preferences for solidary health care arrangements, by relating them to the specific
welfare state regime they live under, structural characteristics of the health care system
and differences among social categories. To this end, data from Eurobarometer
survey 44.3, conducted  in  1996, are analysed. Chapter 6 examines the association
between the public's commitment to state provision of old-age pensions on the one
hand, and their belonging to a specific welfare state regime on the other. Structural
characteristics of national pension systems and individual social characteristics are
also taken into account. For that purpose, data from Eurobarometer 37.1, which was
conducted in 1992, and from Eurobarometer 44.0, for which data were collected in
1995, are analysed.
Chapter 7 evaluates the answers to the specific research questions obtained in this
study and combines its findings. Finally, it also discusses the scientific and societal
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relevance of the findings of this study, as well as the prospects for future research in
the field of public commitment to welfare state solidarity.
2 Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or more?
In Search of Ideal Types and Real Forms
Abstract. In this chapter we give an overview of the literature regarding Esping-Andersen's
typology of welfare states and modified versions of it. We especially focus on classifications
which have been developed by Esping-Andersen's critics in order to cope with the following
alleged shortcomings which have been identified in his work: (1) The misspecification of
the Mediterranean welfare states as immature Continental ones, (2) the labelling of the
Antipodean welfare states as belonging to the 'liberal' regime type, (3) a neglect of the
gender-dimension in social policy, and (4) a misconception about the position of East-Asian
welfare states, in particular Japan. We reconstruct several typologies ofwelfare states in order
to establish, first, whether real welfare states are quite similar to others or whether they are
rather unique specimens and, second, whether there are three ideal-typical worlds of welfare
capitalism or more. We come to the conclusion that real welfare states belong to specific
types and that the number of ideal-typical welfare states is rather five or even six, instead of
the original three identified by Esping-Andersen.
2.1 Introduction
For a long time, it was customary for social scientists to let the history of the welfare
state start  at a particular point in space  and time: Great-Britain  in the early 1940's.
They considered Beveridge, the author of the ground-breaking British committee
report on social insurance and allied services (1942), not only to be the auctor
intellectualis and chief architect of the British welfare state, but also of the welfare
state as a societal type sui generis.  The main proposals incorporated in his famous
committee report were, namely, not only largely to be realised in post-Second World
War Britain, but also somewhat later - to at least some degree - in several other
capitalist democracies in Western Europe. In explaining Beveridge's conception of the
welfare state, it is enough to mention the five long-term aims that he deemed crucial:
1) security for those who had lost their jobs or, for other reasons, couldn't be absorbed
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into employment (elderly people, sick persons and the disabled, pregnant women) 2)
health care 3) housing 4) elementary education 5) full-employment.
Within the social science community, it has long been customary not only to let
the history of welfare state development begin in Great Britain in the 1940's, but also
to take the British experience as the prototype for developments elsewhere (Janowitz,
1976,  p. 32). Theoretical endeavours to interpret and explain the emergence  and
developments of welfare states have, therefore, long been dominated by the British
experience, chronicled in particular by T.H. Marshall and Richard Titmuss. In his
many treatises on the welfare state, Marshall (1950, 1963, 1965, 1981) applied -
paradoxically - a very general evolutionary approach. The welfare state was, in his
opinion, the third stage of the struggle within modern capitalism to institutionally
resolve - or at least reduce - the tension between economic inequalities and demands
for popular participation. Marshall argued that political development in Great Britain
could be reconstructed as a problem-solving process. It had caused the realization that
citizenship can be divided into rights, with civil rights becoming universalised in the
eightteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth and social rights in the twentieth.
Social citizenship - comprising the whole range from the right to a modicum of
economic welfare and security to the right to share totally in the social heritage and to
live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society - is
what we mean now by the welfare state. Marshall's was a reasonably accurate, stylised
description of how the welfare state emerged in Great Britain, but not necessarily of
developments elsewhere. In his early publications, there was an implicit understanding
that this British sequence could be generalised to other countries, but he provided
no evidence from them. In his later essays and books, he did introduce this kind of
evidence, but only to illustrate variations on a common, British theme.
Titmuss (1958) was also originally predominantly interested in the vicissitudes of
the British welfare state. Later on, however, he (Titmuss, 1974) argued that one
could distinguish different models of social policy to reduce inequality in capitalist
democracies.  Only one of them, however, solved the tension between inequality
and democracy more or less satisfactorily: the so-called institutional redistributive -
or universalist - model of social policy. This universalist model aims to meet the
primary needs of all citizens. It was, in his opinion, a necessary means for evoking the
subordination of self-interest to the common interest under the conditions of modern,
industrial-urban capitalism. Such a society - read: Great Britain - could not, even in
principle, be organised in such a way that the pursuit of self-interest is a sufficient basis
for social integration and social harmony as was the case with classical capitalism. So,
in his opinion, 'real' welfare states are the institutional kind. They are pro-active and
committed to the welfare needs of all strata of the population. 'Alleged' welfare states
are the residual kind. They limit assistance to marginal - or especially deserving -
social groups.
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In the 1970s and 1980s, several social scientists came to realise that intensive study
of the British case was not the optimal way to gain an understanding of the general
characteristics of welfare state development (Flora & Heidenheimer,  1981, p.  21).
They made a plea for studies that would transcend the British orientated accounts
so prevalent thus far. They themselves suited the action to the word and several
comparative studies resulted (e.g. Wilensky, 1975; Flora & Heidenheimer, 1981;
Mommsen, 1981). Especially Peter Flora (1983, 1986) gathered and disseminated
an impressive amount of information about the development of European welfare
states in several handbooks and source books. What social science at that time was
still waiting for was a comprehensive theory, or heuristic model, that would make
it possible to explain adequately - or at least interpret systematically - variations
among welfare states. It was not, however, till 1990 that such a theoretical feat was
accomplished.
2.2 Research questions
When Esping-Andersen (1990) published his Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,
it was received with applause.  Offe (1991, pp. 1555-1557), for example, spoke
about  "...    a  rich and stimulating account  of the internal institutional mechanics  of
contemporary welfare states", Cnaan (1992, p. 69) congratulated him "for both
his vision and his willingness to postulate and empirically test some new theoretical
formulations", and Hicks (1991, pp. 399-401) called the book a "seminal work",
that "offers a design richer than any since the 1980ish classics ...". Since publication,
Esping-Andersen's book has itself become a modern classic.
The tenet of Esping-Andersen's treatises of the welfare state is that, for a long
time in both the theoretical and the empirical literature, too little attention has been
given to cross-national differences in welfare state structures. He argues, however,
that we are entering upon better times because "the most intensive activity of welfare
state theorising, at the moment, has become identifying diversity, specifying welfare
state typologies" (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 715). Research now has to follow
theory's lead because "only comparative empirical research will adequately disclose
the fundamental properties that unite or divide modern welfare states" (Esping-
Andersen, 1990, p. 3). In his 'seminal' book he suited the action to the word by
constructing, on the one hand today's best-known and most frequently used typology
of welfare states and by empirically and cross-nationally testing, on the other hand,
whether distinct welfare states that resemble his ideal typeS can be observed (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). For accomplishing this feat, he not only received wide critical
acclaim and constructive criticism, but also some negative criticism.  If we confine
ourselves to the theoretical part of his endeavour, we notice that the more amicable
critics argue that his typology has merits but is neither exhaustive nor exclusive and
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therefore needs mending.  Some of them have even elaborated on his scheme to
construct a more satisfactory typology.  The more hostile critics  are of the opinion that
typologies, as such, have practically no explanatory power at all and, therefore, his
scheme does not contribute to proper theorising about what is happening with and
within welfare states.
In this chapter, we want to address the discussion about Esping-Andersen's
typology as it has been pursued during the last decade. It is not our intention to go
off into a different direction. Our objective is to settle affairs, by giving an overview of
what we think is the giSt of the discussion on the one hand, and by weighing the most
important arguments on the other.  We will heed the call of the amicable critics and
offer, firstly, a review of the state of affairs with respect to Esping-Andersen's typology
and modified versions of it. Secondly, we will try to reconstruct those typological
exercises in order to establish whether there are three - or many more - ideal-typical
worlds of welfare capitalism.  The plan of this chapter is as follows: First of all, in
Section 2.3 we will, from the vantage point of philosophy of science, answer the
question of the theoretical status of ideal typeS, in general, and Esping-Andersen's
ideal types of welfare states, in particular.  Next, in Section 2.4, Esping-Andersen's
ideal-typical 'theory' of variations in welfare states is succinctly reproduced.  In
Section 2.4.2, we present concisely elaborations of Esping-Andersen's typology by
other authors. In this section we will offer two tables. The first one contains eight
typologies ofwelfare states. The second includes a classification of countries according
to these eight typOlogieS, and a synthesis of these typologies that contains six different
types. Finally, in Section 2.7, we present our conclusions.
2.3 Ideal types
Do ideal-types have explanatory value? The conclusion emerging from the literature
on scientific theory is clear: Not if ideal-types are goals in themselves, but only if they
are the means to a goal; namely, the representation of a reality which cannot (yet)
be described using laws (Klant, 1972). This means that typologieS are fruitful to an
empirical science which is only in a developing stage. In contrast, a mature empirical
science emphasises the construction of theory and not the formulation of typologies.
Thus, the crucial question is whether sociology is an immature or a mature science.
We believe that sociology is somewhere between these two extremes (cf. Ultee, Arts,
& Flap, 1996). At best, it is a maturing discipline and, therefore, dispute sometimes
arises concerning the explanatory value of typOlogieS. Lenski (1994, pp.  1-2), for
example, argues that - assuming they are grounded in careful observations - typologieS
provide both a foundation for the formulation of basic theory and a spur to innovative
research. They invite the question of why some entities are similar to one another
but different from others. In short, they raise the question of why things are as they
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are. Opp (1995, p. 132), on the other hand, is more reluctant. He argues that the
question of whether typologieS are theoretically fruitful can only be decided when
a connection between a typology and a theory has been established and when that
theory has been empirically corroborated. In the end, it is not easy to answer the
question whether typologies based on ideal-types could have explanatory value, is not
easily given. Let us, therefore, first consider what Esping-Andersen himself says about
the methodological status of his typology.
Esping-Andersen   (1994,   p. 712) addresses the question of whether the welfare
state is merely the sum total of a nation's social policy repertoire, or whether it is an
institutional force above and beyond a given policy array. His answer is straightforward:
The welfare state cannot be regarded as the sum total of social policies; it is more
than a numerical cumulation of discrete programmes. Therefore, he (1990, p.  2)
defines welfare state regimes as a complex of legal and organizational features that are
systematically interwoven in the relationship between state and economy. He (1990,
pp. 3,26 & 32) boldly suggests that, when we focus on the principles embedded in
welfare states, we discover that variations are not linearly distributed around a common
denominator. They are clustered by three highly diverse regime-types, each organised
around its own discrete logic of organization, stratification and societal integration.
Therefore, we can identify three models, or ideal types of welfare states: conservative,
liberal and social-democratic. These ideal types owe their origins to different historical
forces and they follow qualitatively different developmental trajectories. Contrary to
the ideal world of welfare states, the real world is likely to exhibit hybrid forms. There
are no one-dimensional nations in the sense of a pure case. Today, every country
presents a system mix. He argues (Esping-Andersen, 1997, p.  171) that, in spite
of this, it is fruitful to construct ideal-types for the sake of economy of explanation:
To be able to see the forest rather than the myriad of unique trees. However, he
appends to this recommendation the warning that the danger of generalization is that
the resulting forest bears little resemblance to reality.
Looking for a more detailed answer to the question of the theoretical status of
ideal types and typologieS we must return to the locus classicus of treatises of ideal
types: Weber's methodological essays. Weber (1922/1968, p. 190) argues that an
ideal type is no 'hypothesis' but offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses.  It
is not a description of reality, but it aims to give an unambiguous means of expression
to such a description.  Thus, the construction of ideal typeS recommends itself, not
as an end but as a means. There is only one criterion for deciding whether they
are scientifically fruitful, and that is success in revealing concrete phenomena in their
interdependence, their causal conditions and their significance (Weber, 1922/1968,
pp. 193-194). Ideal types are, therefore, invoked as a specific device for the explanation
of social phenomena. Since they are intended to provide explanations, they must be
construed as theoretical systems embodying testable general hypotheses or, at least,
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an interpretative scheme (Hempel, 1952/1965, pp. 160-161, 166). Weber deals with
tWo different kinds of ideal types: the individualistic and the holistic (cf. Rogers,
1969; Watkins, 1953/1969). Esping-Andersen's ideal types of welfare state regimes
are holistic, which proposes to give a bird's eye view of the broad characteristics of a
social or historical situation. The advantage of such types lies in their simplification
and aloofness from detail. They emphasise the essential tracts of a situation considered
as a whole. By comparing an impure welfare state with an ideal typical one - both
considered as a whole - the deviations of the former from the latter are thrown into
relief.  It is the simultaneous knowledge of both the ideal type and the real type
which enables holistic ideal types to be used, as Weber mentioned, "as conceptual
instruments for comparison with and measurement of reality" (Watkins, 1953/1969,
pp. 458-459).
From a logical point of view (Kempski,  1972) the general term 'welfare state' is an
indicator of a certain class of societies, characterised by certain properties. According
to Esping-Andersen, this collection of societies consists of a set of three subsets
with specific characteristics. According to him, the most important features are de-
commodification and stratification, which define a two-dimensional property-space.
Because real welfare states are almost always impure types, they can be assigned to
different subsets. However, they can be arranged by assessing which ideal-type -
the extreme borderline cases - in this ranking they approximate best. By comparing
impure real welfare states to an ideal-type, the deviations of the former are contrasted
with the latter. This simultaneous distinguishability of both the ideal and the real type
make it possible to use holistic ideal-types as conceptual instruments for comparison
and  for the empirical determination of reality (Watkins, 1953/1969).   But this  is  not
yet sufficient. After all, ideal-types are also instruments for providing explanations. If
they want to satisfy this objective, they should not only be understood as a conceptual
system, but also as a system of theoretical statements. These should encompass
testable, general hypotheses or, at least, provide a framework for interpretation
(Hempel, 1952/1965).
To which conclusion does the preceding reflection lead? To his fiercest critics,
we can say that their criticism is unjust if, at least, certain conditions are met. The
first condition is that the typology is a means to an end and not an end in itself.
Esping-Andersen complies with this condition when he states the necessity of no
longer using the types as dependent variables, but rather treating them as independent
variables. They could be used to explain cross-national variations in dependent
variables such as social behaviour and social attitudes. A second condition is that
theory-construction on welfare states must still be in an early stage. This is also true.
After all, few theoretical alternatives are available. At the most,  one can think of more
orthodox historical-materialist explanations (see, for example Therborn (1995) and
De Swaans' (1988) synthesis of rational-choice theories and ideas from the sociology
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of figuration). That means  that the construction of ideal-types  can be fruitful under
the condition that these will eventually lead to theories. We will return to this issue in
the final section.
2.4 Three worlds of'welfare capitalism' or more?
The central explanatory questions Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 4& 105) asks are
.,Why is the world composed of three qualitatively different welfare-state logics?
Why do nations crystallise into distinct regime-clusters?" These questions demand a
theoretical answer. Since he is of the opinion that the existing theoretical models of
the welfare state are inadequate, reconceptualization and re-theorization are necessary
(1990,  p.    2). The statement he proposes gives a provisional and tentative answer
to these questions: The historical characteristics of states, especially the history of
political class coalitions as the most decisive cause of welfare-state variations, have
played a determinate role in forging the emergence of their welfare-statism (1990, p.
1).
What are, specifically, the historical forces behind the regime differences? Accord-
ing to Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 29), three interacting factors should be significant:
the nature of class mobilization (especially of the working class), class-political action
structures, and the historical legacy of regime institutionalization.  One does not
have to go back in history, however, in order to typify 'real' welfare states. We can
characterise them by looking at their positions on two fundamental dimensions of
welfare statism:
1.   the  degree of de-commodification,  i.e. the degree to which a (social) service is
rendered as a matter of right, and the degree to which a person can maintain a
livelihood without reliance on the market;
2. the kind of social stratification and solidarities, i.e. which social stratification
system is promoted by social policy and does the welfare state build narrow or
broad solidarities?
What are the characteristics ofthe three distinct regime-types to which the historical
forces lead? To answer this question, Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 73) argues that,
although the afore-mentioned dimensions are conceptually independent, according to
his 'theory' he should expect that there is sufficient co-variation for distinct regime
clusters to emerge. In accordance with this theoretical expectation, he succeeded in
empirically identifying three closely parallelled models - ideal typeS - of regime-types
on both the stratification and the de-commodification dimension. There appears to
be a clear coincidence of high de-commodification and strong universalism in the
Scandinavian, social-democratically influenced welfare states. There is an equally
28                                             Chapter 2
clear coincidence of low de-commodification and strong individualistic self-reliance in
the Anglo-Saxon nations. Finally, the continental European countries group closely
together as corporatist and etatist, and are also fairly modestly de-commodifying
(Esping-Andersen,  1990, p.  77).
2.4.1 Three types
This empirical success is all the more reason to offer, at this time, a more extensive
description of these three worlds of welfare capitalism. First, there is the liberal type
of welfare capitalism, which embodies individualism and the primacy of the market.
The operation of the market is encouraged by the state, either actively - subsidising
private welfare schemes - or passively - by keeping (often means-tested) social benefits
to a modest level for the truly and demonstrably needy. There is little redistribution of
incomes within this type ofwelfare state and the realm of social rights is rather limited.
This welfare regime is characterised by a low level of de-commodification.  The
operation of the liberal principle of stratification leads to division in the population:  on
the one hand, a minority of low-income state dependents and, on the other, a majority
of people able to afford private social insurance plans.  In this type of welfare state,
women are encouraged to participate in the labour force, particularly in commercial
personal services.
Secondly, there is a world of conservative-corporatist welfare states, which is
typified by a moderate level of de-commodification. Hemerijck and Bakker (1994, p.
13) describe this type of welfare state as "a quasi-private system of rather generous
means-tested social security provisions which is intimately related to previously earned
income and family status". This regime type is shaped by the twin historical legacy
of Catholic social policyl,  on  the  one  side, and corporatism and etatism,  on  the
other. This blend had two important consequences in terms of stratification.  In
the first place, the direct influence of the state is restricted to the provision of
income maintenance benefits related to occupational status. This means that the
sphere of solidarity remains quite narrow and corporatist. Moreover, labour market
participation by married women is strongly discouraged, because corporatist regimes
- influenced by the Church - are committed to the preservation of traditional family
structures. Another important characteristic of the conservative regime type is the
principle of subsidiarity: The state will only interfere when the family's capacity to
service its members is exhausted (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 27).
Finally, Esping-Andersen recognises a social-democratic world of welfare capi-
talism.  Here, the level of de-commodification is high, and the social-democratic
'The importance of Catholicism is emphasised by van Kersbergen (1995) in his discussion including
Christian democratic nations such as Germany, Italy, and The Netherlands in mainstream welfare state
typologies
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principle of stratification is directed towards achieving a system of generous universal
and highly distributive benefits not dependent on any individual contributions. In
contrast to the liberal type of welfare states, "this model crowds out the market and,
consequently, constructs an essentially universal solidarity in favour of the welfare
state" (Esping-Andersen,   1990,   p. 28). Social policy within  this  type of welfare
state is aimed at a maximization of capacities for individual independence. Women,
in particular - regardless of whether they have children or not - are encouraged to
participate in the labour market, especially in the public sector. Countries that belong
to this type of welfare state regime are generally dedicated to full-employment.  Only
by making sure that as many people as possible have a job, is it possible to maintain
such a high-level solidaristic welfare system.
2.4.2   ...or more?
In the introduction, we already indicated the tremendous impact ofEsping-Andersen's
work on comparative social policy analysis. Since then, several authors have developed
alternative typologies or added one or more types to existing classifications in order to
achieve more empirical refinement. From this vast array ofwelfare state typologies, we
have selected seven classifications, which we think draw attention to interesting char-
acteristics of welfare states not directly included in Esping-Andersen's classification.
All these typologies and their main characteristics are summarised in Table  2.1.
These alternative classifications relate to four important criticisms of Esping-
Andersen's classification: The misspecification of the Mediterranean welfare states,
labelling the Antipodean welfare states as a 'liberal' welfare state regime, the neglect
of the gender-dimension in social policy and, finally, the misconception about the
position of the East-Asian welfare states, in particular Japan.  In the following sections,
we will discuss these criticisms in more detail and present some of the alternative
classifications developed by his critics.
2.4.3   The Mediterranean
One important criticism of Esping-Andersen's classification concerns the fact that he
did not systematically include the Mediterranean countries. Specifically, in The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism only Italy belongs - according to him - to the family
of the corporatist welfare state regimes, whereas Spain, Portugal and Greece are not
covered by his typology. Although he admits that these countries have some important
characteristics in common - i.e. a Catholic imprint (with the exception of Greece) and
a strong familialism (Esping-Andersen, 1997, p. 180) - he seems to include them in
the continental/corporatist model.
Table 2.1: An overview of typologies of welfare states.                                                                                                        g
Types of welfare states and their characteristics Indicators/dimensions
Esping-Andersen (1990)
1.    Liberal: Low level of de-commodification; market-differentiation of welfare - De-commodification
2. Consemative. Moderate level of de-commodification, social benefits mainly dependent on former - Stratificationcontributions and status
3. Social-Democratic: High level of de-commodification;  universal benefits and high degree of benefit
equality
Leibfried (1992)
1.    Anglo-Saxon (Residital). Right to income transfers; welfare state as compensator of last resort and -  Poverty, social
tight enforcer of work in the market place insurance and
2.    Bismarck (I,istitutionaD: Right to social security; welfare state as compensator of first resort and poverty policy
ernployer of last resort
3.    Scandi,tavian (Modern): Right to work for everyone; universalism, welfare state as employer of first
resort and compensator of last resort
4.    Luti,i Rim (Rudimentary) Right to work and welfare proclaimed; welfare state as semi-institutionalised
promise
nCastles & Mitchell (1993)
1.   Liberal.· Low social spending and no adoption of equalising instruments in social policy - Welfare expenditure         -2. Conservative: High social expenditures, but little adoption of equalising instruments in social policy - Benefit
equality                 3.    Non-Right   Hegemony: High social expenditures and use of highly equalising instruments in social - Taxespolicy                                                                                                                                               N
4. Radical: Achievement of equality in pre-tax, pre-transfer income  (adoption of equalising instruments
in social policy), but little social spending
Siaroff (1994)
1.   Protestant Liberal: Minimal family welfare, yet relatively egalitarian gender situation in the labour -  Family welfare
market; family benefits are paid to the mother, but are rather inadequate orientation
2.  Advanced Christian-Democratic: No strong incentives for women to work, but strong incentives to -  Female work
stay at home desirability3.    Protestant Social-Democratic: True work-welfare choice to women; family benefits are high and always -  Extent of familypaid to the mother; importance of protestantism
4.    Late  Female Mobilization: Absence of protestantism; family benefits are usually paid to the father; benefits being paidto womenuniversal female suffrage is relatively new
continued on next page
Table 2.1: continued
Types ofwelfare states and their characteristics Indicators/dimensions
Becker (1996)
1. Liberal: Poverty as a result of individual failing; economic individualism -  Regulatory principles
2.    TraditionalCorporatistic: Ascriptive elitism, etatism, paternalism and striving for social harmony based
on inequality
3. Social-Democratic: Social policy targeted at greater equality and universal social security
4.  East-Asian Commimitarian: Primacy of the group (family, private firms etc.)  and social security is
also mainly expected from the group; paternalism and self-reliance play an important role
Ferrera (1996)
1. Anglo-Saxon: Fairly high welfare state coverage, means-tested social assistance; mixed system of -  Rules of access
financing; highly integrated organizational framework entirely managed by a public administration (Eligibility)
2. Bismarkck: Strong link between work position (and/or family state) and social entitlements; benefits -  Benefit formulae
proportional to income; financing through contributions; reasonably substantial social assistance
- Financing           jbenefits; insurance schemes mainly governed by unions and employer organizations
3. Scandinavian: Social protection as a citizenship right; universal coverage; relatively generous fixed regulations            1
benefits for various social risks; financing mainly through fiscal revenues; strong organizational - Organizational-
integration managerial arrange-   4
4. Southern: Fragmented system of income guarantees linked to work position; generous benefits without ments                        2articulated net of minimum social protection; health care as a right of citizenship; particularism in                                                        payments of cash benefits and financing; financing through contributions and fiscal revenues
Bonoli (1997)                                                                                                                                                                           M
1.    Bntish: Low percentage of social expenditure financed through taxes (Beveridge); low social -  Bismarck and                    B
expenditure as a percentage of GDP Beveridge model               2.   Continental: High percentage of social expenditure financed through contributions (Bismarck); high -   Quantity of welfare                 ·vsocial expenditure as a percentage of GDP state expenditure3.    Nordic: 'Low percentage of social expenditure financed through taxes (Beveridge); high social
expenditure as a percentage of GDP
4. Southern. High percentage of social expenditure financed through taxes (Bismarck), low social
expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Korpi & Palme (1998)
1.   Basic Security: Entitlements based on citizenship or contributions; application of the flat-rate benefit -   Bases of entitlement
principle - Benefit principle2. Co,poratist: Entitlements based on occupational category and labour force participation; use of the -   Type of governing aearnings-related benefit principle
3. Encompassing: Entitlement based on citizenship a,id labour force participation; use of the flat-rate social programme
and earnings-related benefit principle
4. Targeted: Eligibility based on proved need; use of the minimum benefit principle
5.    Voluntary   State Subsidised: Eligibility based on membership or contributions; application of the
flat-rate or earnings-related principle
W
./
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This omission ofa systematic treatment ofthe Mediterranean countries has brought
about a lively debate about the existence of a 'Southern' or 'Latin Rim' model of
social policy. For example, Katrougalos (1996) supports Esping-Andersen's position
by arguing that the Mediterranean countries "do not form a distinct group but rather
a sub-category, a variant of the Continental model. They are merely immature species
of the Continental model, welfare states in their infancy, with the main common
characteristics being the immaturity of the social protection systems and some similar
social and family structures" (Katrougalos, 1996, p. 43). However, according to
other commentators (Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Trifiletti, 1999)
it seems logical to see the South European countries as a separate cluster. They have
developed classifications of European welfare states which try to  show the existence of
a separate 'Southern model' of social policy. Below, we will review some of the more
influential alternative classifications which distinguish a fourth, Mediterranean world.
First of all, Leibfried's categorization distinguishes among four social policy or
poverty regimes within the countries ofthe European Community. He labels these: the
Scandinavian welfare states, the 'Bismarck' countries, the Anglo-Saxon countries and
the Latin Rim countries. According to Leibfried, all of these policy regimes are based
on different policy models - modern, institutional, residual and rudimentary - in which
social citizenship has developed in different and sometimes incomplete ways. Within
these policy regimes, welfare state institutions have a different function in combating
poverty. However, it is particularly important to the current research question that
Leibfried adds a fourth category - the 'Latin Rim' countries - to Esping-Andersen's
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. He emphasises  that an important characteristic
of these countries is the virtual non-existence of an articulated social minimum and a
right to welfare. It is essentially this feature which led Leibfried to argue for a separate
cluster of the Mediterranean countries. Ferrera (1996) in particular has argued for
a systematic inclusion of the Latin countries in the literature on comparative social
policy. According to him, there are four institutional configurations of European
systems for social protection and he explicitly argues for the inclusion of a 'Southern
model' of social policy  (1996,  pp.    4-7). In order to classify the European welfare
states, he concentrates on four dimensions of social security systems: the rules of access
(eligibility rules), the conditions under which benefits are granted, the regulations to
finance social protection and, finally, the organizational-managerial arrangements
to administrate the various social security schemes. Based on these dimensions, he
makes a distinction among the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, Bismarckian and Southern
Countries. The Scandinavian countries are characterised by universal coverage for
the risks of life. Moreover, the right to social protection is attributed on the basis
of citizenship. The Anglo-Saxon family of welfare states is also characterised by a
highly inclusive social security coverage, but only in the area of health care can one
speak of fully universal risks coverage. Also, in these social security systems, flat-rate
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benefits and means testing play an important role. In the third group of countries, the
relationship between social security entitlements and the position in the labour market
and the role within the family is still clearly visible. Contributions play an important
role in financing the various schemes. Almost everybody has social insurance coverage
through their own or derived rights. Finally, the social protection systems of Southern
countries are highly fragmented and, although there is no articulated net of minimum
social protection, some benefits levels   are very generous   (like   old age pensions).
Moreover, in these countries, health care is institutionalised as a right of citizenship.
However, in general, there is relatively little state intervention in the welfare sphere.
Another important feature of these countries is the high level of particularism with
regard to the payment of cash benefits and financing, expressed in high levels of
clientelism.  The most important features of each type are summarised in Table 2.1.
The final classification discussed here, which includes the Mediterranean welfare
states, is by Bonoli (1997).  In his work, he combines two approaches to the
classification of welfare states. One concentrates on the 'how much' dimension
(emphasised in the Anglo-Saxon literature) and the other on the 'how' dimension
of social policy (emphasised  in the continental-European or French tradition).  With
regard to the work of Esping-Andersen, Bonoli is especially critical of the de-
commodification approach. According to him, it does not allow one to discriminate
effectively between the Bismarkian and the Beveridgean approaches to social policy.
To overcome this flaw - and in accordance with the two-dimensionality mentioned
above - Bonoli argues that "European welfare states can be classified according
to the quantity of welfare they provide and according to where they stand on the
Beveridge versus Bismarck dimension" (1997, p. 359). As an empirical indicator
of the first dimension, he uses social expenditure as a proportion of GDP, while a
larger percentage of social expenditure, financed through contributions, indicates that
countries tend to adopt the Bismarkian approach to SOCial poliCy. This is in contrast
to Beveridge-type welfare states, where tax-financing predominates. These indicators
lead him to identify four typeS of countries: the British countries, the Continental
European countries, the Nordic countries and the Southern countries, thus giving
credit to the proposal of a 'Southern model' of social policy.
Upon examining the combined arguments of Leibfried, Ferrera and Bonoli, as
presented in Table 2.1, it appears that a strong similarity exists between their first three
types and the three types ofEsping-Andersen. However, all three authors add a fourth
- Mediterranean - type of welfare state regime to the original Esping-Andersenian
classification. Using argumentation, they argue that this is a prototype, rather than a
subcategory of the continental/corporatist model.
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2.4.4    The Antipodes
In his Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen also discusses the
Antipodean countries (i.e. Australia and New Zealand) as representatives of the
liberal welfare state regime.  This is because of their marginal commitment to public
welfare and strong reliance on means testing. However, according to Castles (1996,
p.  88), "Australia and New Zealand have been the clearest examples of a particular
approach to social protection. That approach rests on guaranteeing minimum levels
of social protection to those who meet certain conditions.  One such condition is need,
with the emergence, in these countries, of the world's most comprehensive systems
of means tested income support benefits. Means testing is not, of course, unique
to the Antipodes, but what has been unique is a further set of guarantees providing
minimum income levels for those in employment also supposedly related to a social
policy definition of need. Together, these guarantees have underpinned a model of
the welfare state quite unlike those of Western Europe and North America". Income
guarantees, which are built into the market itself, thus play an important role in the
institutional set-up of these welfare states. It therefore seems that the welfare policy
of the Antipodean countries represents a separate social policy model.  It led Castles
and Mitchell to advance the question of whether "social spending is the only route to
greater income distribution"  (1993). This implies that there  may be other ways  than
income maintenance policies by which states may mitigate the effects of market forces.
In a discussion of their study, Hill (1996) points out that Castles' and Mitchell's
critique of Esping-Andersen's work essentially follows two lines.  In the first place,
Castles and Mitchell draw attention to the fact that political activity from the left
may have been introduced into those countries rather to achieve equality in pre-tax,
pre-transfer income, than to pursue equalization through social policy.
Castles and Mitchell also make the second point - again about Australia but
also with relevance to the United Kingdom - that the Esping-Andersen approach
disregards the potential for income-related benefits to make an effective contribution
to redistribution. Australian income maintenance is almost entirely means-tested. It
uses an approach which does not simply concentrate on redistribution to the very
poor, and is rather different than the more universal and solidaristic one highlighted
in Esping-Andersen's study  (Hill,  1996,  p.  46).  With this criticism  in mind, Castles
and Mitchell develop an alternative, four-way classification of welfare states: Liberal,
Conservative, Non-Right Hegemony and a Radical World of Welfare.  It is based on
the level of welfare expenditure (i.c. household transfers as a percentage of GDP),
average benefit equality and income and profits taxes as a percentage of GDP. In
Table 2.1 these types are described.
Other evidence for the exceptional position of the Antipodean countries, specifically
Australia, is found when countries are classified according to the typology developed by
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Korpi and Palme (1998). Their classification is based on institutional characteristics
of welfare states. In their work, they try to investigate the causal factors which
influence the institutional aspects  of the welfare state  on the  one hand,  and the effects
of institutions on the formation of interests, preferences and identities - as well as
on the degree of poverty and inequality in a society - on the other. They argue
that institutional structures can be expected to reflect the role of conflicts among
interest groups, whereas, in turn, they are also likely to form important frameworks
for the definitions of interests and identities among citizens. They thereby can be
expected to influence coalition formation among citizens, which is significant for
income redistribution and poverty.  As the basis of their classification, Korpi and
Palme take the institutional structures of two social programmes: old age pensions
and sickness cash benefits. These two programmes lie at the heart of the welfare state,
because they respond to basic characteristics of human life - the certainty of ageing
and the risk of illness. Moreover, as there is very little risk-differentiation among
socio-economic categories, old age pensions and sickness insurance are important
for all citizens and households. Finally, the economic weight of these programmes
makes it likely that they are significantly relevant to the formation of interest groups.
The institutional structures of the two programmes are classified according to three
aspects.  In the first place, Korpi and Palme analyse the bases of entitlement. They
differentiate among eligibility criteria based on need determined via a means-test, on
contributions (by the insured or the employers) to the financing of the social security
programme, on belonging to a specified occupational category, or on citizenship
(residence) in a country.  Thus, the issue of targeting versus universalism lies at the
core of this dimension. A second critical dimension refers to the principles applied to
determine benefit levels: To what extent should social insurance replace lost income?
This continuous dimension ranges from means-tested minimum benefits and flat-rate
benefits giving equal amounts to everyone to benefits which - in varying degrees - are
related to previous earnings. The final dimension they concentrate on how a social
insurance programme can be governed. One indication of this dimension is whether
or not representatives of employers and employees participate in the governing of a
programme. Based on these three aspects, they discriminate among five different ideal
types of institutional structures: the targeted (empirically exemplified by the Australian
case), voluntary state subsidised, corporatist, basic security and encompassing model.
In Table 2.1, these ideal types and their most important features are delineated. Again,
the Esping-Andersenian model stands. However, a number of countries are taken as
prototype, instead of subcategories.
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2.4.5 Gender
By explicitly incorporating gender, several authors have tried to reconceptualise the
dimensions of welfare state variation in order to add to our understanding of types of
welfare states. Applying the mainstream welfare state typologies to an analysis of the
diffential place of men and women within welfare states would, according to them,
produce valuable insights. However, this does not mean that the typologies are not
fundamentally lacking (Sainsbury,  1996, p.  41). What seems to be particularly lacking
is a systematic discussion of the family's place in the provision of welfare and care.
Moreover, a profound treatment of the degree to which women are excluded from
or included into the labour market2, or the sexual division of paid and unpaid work
- especially care and domestic labour - is lacking (Lewis, 1992; O'Connor, 1993;
Orloff, 1993; Sainsbury, 1996). With respect to social care, Daly and Lewis (2000,
p.  289) argue that different styles of social policy have incorporated the key element
of social care differently. They identify certain tendencies concerning care in specific
welfare states. For example, the Scandinavian welfare states form a distinct group
in that they have strongly institutionalised care for both the elderly and children. In
the Mediterranean welfare states, care tends to be privatised to the family whereas,
in Germany, it is seen most appropriately a function of voluntary service providers.
In France, a strong distinction is made between care for children and for the elderly,
with a strong collective sector in the former and little voluntary involvement. Another
form is found in the Beveridge-oriented welfare states - Great Britain and Ireland -
where a strong distinction is made between caring for children and caring for (elderly)
adults. In the former, little collectivization has taken place. Eventually, although they
do not really classify welfare states into actual clusters, they make a strong case for
using social care as a critical dimension for analysing variations.
As far as the gender gap in earnings is concerned, Gornick and Jacobs (1998)
found that Esping-Andersen's regime-types do capture important distinctions among
contemporary welfare states. Their results showed that the size of the public sector,
the extent of the public-sector earnings premium and the impact of the public sector
on gender differentials in wages all varied more across regimes than within them. In
this way, they showed the fruitfulness of emphasising the gender perspective in Esping-
Andersen's classification of welfare states. Moreover, Trifiletti (1999) incorporated a
gender perspective into Esping-Andersen's classification by showing that a systematic
relationship exist between the level of de-cornmodification and whether the state treats
2As Gornick and Jacobs (1998, p. 691) point out, Esping-Andersen himself argues that each regime-type
is associated with women's employment levels. Specifically, he (Esping-Andersen, 1990) expects that
women's employment rates will be highest in social-democratic countries, whereas, in liberal welfare states,
moderate levels of female employment will be found. The lowest levels of women's employment will be
found in the conservative welfare states.
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women as wives and mothers or as workers. The latter is an important dimension
identified by Lewis (1989).
Finally, Siaroff also argues that the existing literature on welfare state regimes
does not pay enough attention to gender inequality, as embedded in social policy and
welfare states. In order to arrive at a more gender-sensitive typology of welfare state
regimes, he examines a variety of indicators of gender equality and inequality in work
and welfare. Basically, he compares the work-welfare choice (i.e. whether to partake
in the welfare state or to engage in paid labour) across countries of men to that of
women, by means of (1) the level of family welfare orientation by welfare states, (2)
a composite index based on male to female ratios in wages and desirable positions
(female work desirability)  and (3) the extent of family benefits paid to women within
the different welfare states. This allows him to distinguish among a Protestant social-
democratic, a Protestant liberal, an Advanced Christian-democratic and a Late Female
Mobilization welfare state regime, with their particular characteristics. Although the
denominations suggest otherwise, this typology also shows a strong overlap with the
Esping-Andersenian classification. Only the latter type, the Late Female Mobilization
welfare state regime, is an addition which resembles the previously distinguished
Mediterranean type of welfare states.
2.4.6 East-Asia
The conceptualization of types of welfare states has long been based on a Western
framework.  One of the consequences of this approach is that Japan is seen as an
exception to the rule (Vogel, 1973; Nakagawa, 1979). Lately, however, several
authors have been discussing the possibility that a distinct type of East Asian social
welfare regime, divergent from the Western pattern, could be added to mainstream
typologies (Goodman & Peng, 1996, p. 193). Moreover, it has been questioned
whether the notions of de-commodification and stratification are really the most
revealing dimensions in the case ofJapan. According to Peng (2000, p. 91), Japanese
familial obligations are structured by important legal and economic imperatives, as
well as by historical and cultural legacies. In addition, the notion of family obligation
serves as the basis for relatively generous company welfare: An individual is always
seen in relation to his familial obligations. These important differences simply stress
the exceptional position of the Japanese welfare state.
Although, according to Goodman and Peng (1996), there are significant differences
in the pattern of social welfare in Japan, South-Korea and Taiwan, they have certain
characteristics in common that differentiate them from the Western typeS. In short,
they (Goodman & Peng, 1996, p. 207) argue that Japan is characterised by (a) a
system of family welfare that appears to negate much of the need for state welfare;
(b) a status-segregated and somewhat residual social insurance based system and
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(c) corporate occupational plans for 'core' workers. According to them, a case
can be made that this pattern also applies to South-Korea and Taiwan. Becker
(1996) proposes an extension of Esping-Andersen's typology that is in accordance
with the above-mentioned arguments. He argues that welfare state regimes include
political and economic principles of regulation which correspond to welfare cultures
and with other cultural patterns within societies. For example, when a liberal
or social-democratic set of principles is dominant - i.e. when policy makers and
a large part of the population consider this set of principles self-evident - it will
also be reflected  in the welfare state's institutions   (1996,   p. 20). According  to
Becker, liberal (i.e. centrality of the market, individualization of the family and
little effort of the state with respect to the provision and distribution of welfare)
and social-democratic principles of regulation (i.e. accentuation of redistribution and
de-commodification by the state) can be easily empirically demonstrated. The United
States is a representative of the first type and Sweden of the second. With respect to
the corporatist/conservative type - as defined by Esping-Andersen - it becomes more
difficult because conservatism and corporatism do not necessarily go hand in hand.
According to Becker, corporatism is always conservative, but the reverse is not always
true. This leads Becker to define a traditional corporatist type using etatism and
paternalism as important characteristics, and The Netherlands, until the beginning of
the  1960's,  as the empirical representation. Finally, Becker identifies a fourth type  of
welfare state regime: East-Asian Communitarian. Esping-Andersen only concentrates
on Western individualised societies in his study.  This type of welfare state regime,
exemplified by Japan, is characterised by the general importance of the community or
the group, with social security mainly expected from the group. Again, we find that
Esping-Andersen's typology stands, but that a fourth type iS added.
2.5   Ideal and real types
The attentive reader will have noticed that, as much as possible, we ordered the
types in Table 2.1 in accordance with the worlds of welfare capitalism as defined by
Esping-Andersen. For example, Bonoli's Continental type is very much like Esping-
Andersen's Conservative type; in both type S contributions play a rather important role.
Equally, Castles' and Mitchell's Non-Right Hegemony type shows a large amount
of congruence with Esping-Andersen's Social-Democratic type, because of the high
degree of universalism and equalization in social policy. We could go on, but would
like to raise another issue.
One may wonder whether, if the relationship among the different typologies is as
strong as we assume, this close correspondence of typeS Will also be apparent in the
actual clustering of countries. Although not every classification developed by these
authors covers the same nations, there is a rather large overlap which makes it possible
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to answer this question. For that purpose, Table 2.2 shows the extent to which the
ideal-types - constructed by Esping-Andersen's critics - largely coincide with his own
ideal-types. We then added the ideal-types proposed by these critics, placing related
ideal-types, when possible, under one heading. This results in six - instead of the
original three - worlds of welfare capitalism and answers the question in the heading
of Subsection 2.4.2.  Next, in Table 2.2 we arranged the real types according to the
different ideal-types, thereby following the suggestions of the different authors.
It appears that, even when one uses different indicators to classify welfare
states, some countries emerge as standard examples, approximating certain ideal-
types. The United States is, according to everyone's classification, the prototype
of a welfare state which can best be denoted as liberal (with or without the suf-
fix: protestant, Anglo-Saxon or basic security). Germany approximates   tile   Bis-
marckian/continental/conservative ideal-type and Sweden approximates the social-
democratic ideal-type (Scandinavian/Nordic).
However, consensus seems to end here. For example, according to some, Italy
can best be assigned to the second, corporatist/continental/conservative type, but
belongs, according to others, - along with Greece, Spain and Portugal - to a distinctive
Mediterranean type. The same holds for Australia, which may either be classified as
liberal, or is the prototype of a separate, radical type of welfare state. Japan should,
according to Esping-Andersen, be assigned to the liberal type of welfare state regime
but, according to others, is a prime example of a separate type of East-Asian welfare
state. Nevertheless, as far as these countries and types are concerned, consensus is
stronger than was initially assumed. One must recognise, however, that discussions
are mainly concerned with whether certain types of welfare states are either separate
categories or are sub-groups of certain main types.
Hybrid cases are a bigger problem. The Netherlands and Switzerland are clear
examples of this.  If we take a closer look at the Dutch case, we see that Esping-
Andersen has assigned The Netherlands to the social-democratic type, whereas Korpi
and Palme see it as liberally oriented; the basic security type. However, most authors
place The Netherlands in the second category of corporatist/continental/conservative
welfare states.  This is also the choice of Visser and Hemerijck (1997), perhaps the
foremost specialists on the Dutch welfare state. Curiously enough, this is done using
Esping-Andersen's work as a constant, positive reference.  If we have another look
at Esping-Andersen's classic, this is not as surprising as one would expect. It is true
that The Netherlands is rated relatively high on social-democratic characteristics, but
not exceptionally low on liberal and conservative characteristics. The Netherlands is
indeed more a hybrid case than a prototype of a specific ideal-type.  If one attaches
more importance to certain attributes than to others - and adds other characteristics
or substitutes previous ones - then it is easy to arrive at another classification.
Table 2.2: Classification of countries according to 8 typologies.
Type I Type II Type III Type IV Type V Type VI
Esping-Andersen Liberal Consemative Social-Democraric
(De-Commodification)
- Australia - Italy - Austria
- Canada - Belgium- Japan
- United States - France -  The Netherlands
-  New Zealand - Germany - Denmark
- Ireland - Norway- Finland          -- United Kingdom - SwedenSwitzerland              -
Leibfried Anglo-Saxon Bismarck Scandinavian Latin Rim
- United States - Germany - Sweden - Spain
- Australia - Austria - Norway - Portugal
New Zealand - Finland - Greece
- United Kingdom - Denmark
-  Italy
- France n
Castles & Mitchell I.iberal Coilseruatiue Non-Right Hegeniony Radical                                                                        V
Ireland - Germany - Belgium - Australia
- Japan
-  New Zealand                                                   11
Italy - Denmark
- Switzerland - United Kingdom                                           N-  The Netherlands - Norway
United States
- Sweden
Siaroff Protestant Liberal Advanced Prot:stam Late Female
- Australia Christian-Demo:ran: Social-Democranc Mobilization
- Austria - Denmark - Greece
- Canada                                                            -
- Belgium - Finland - Ireland-  New Zealand
- United States - France
- Norway -  Italy
- Germany - Sweden
- United Kingdom - Japan
- Luxembourg - Portugal
The Netherlands - Spain
- Switzerland
Becker Liberal Traditional Social-Democratic East-Asian
Corporatistic - Sweden Communitanan- United States -  The Netherlands - Japan
coiltimed m itext page
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Is it possible to discover somewhat well-fitting empirical examples of the different
ideal-typical welfare state regimes in this myriad of countries? Although there is a
lot of variation in the indicators and the countries included, some countries stand
out - to a greater or lesser degree - as empirical representatives for the various typeS
of welfare state regimes. A comparison of the countries shows the United States
to be representing the Liberal (Type I), whereas West Germany identifies with the
Conservative pure type (Type II); Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland can be
seen as empirical representatives of the Social-democratic ideal-type (Type III); and
finally, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece belong to the Southern type of welfare state
(Type  IV). Thus, although many classifications  have been offered, some consensus
with regard to classifying these nations seems to exist. However, because not every
author included Australia and Japan in his classification, the empirical evidence
for the position of these countries in the ideal-typical constellation is less clear.  The
discussion of Castles' and Mitchell's, Korpi's and Palme's, and Becker's classifications
has provided some convincing arguments for a separate ideal-typical status of these
countries, based on their welfare state institutions or, as in the case of Japan, the
cultural context. Therefore, we will handle them here as separate types (Type V and
VI).  However,  for the determination  of a true separate status for these countries,  we
will have to await future research.
2.6 Empirical robustness ofthe three-way-classification
Esping-Andersen claims that, if we rate real welfare states along the dimensions of
degree of de-commodification and modes of stratification, three qualitatively different
clusters will appear. Along with the more fundamental criticism raised for his
three-way-classification - that Esping-Andersen employs faulty criteria to demarcate
a regime - the empirical fit of his three-way classification has also been questioned.
Several authors have tested the goodness-of-fit of the three-way regime typology.  In
the following, we discuss their findings which are presented in Table 2.3.
Table 2.2: continued
Type I Type II Type IV Type V Type VIType III
Ferrera Anglo-Saxon Bismarchian Scaildinavian .f„tith:171
- Ireland - Germany - Sweden -  Italy
- United Kingdom - France - Denmark - Spain
- Belgium - Norway - Portugal




Bonoli Bnrish Contmental Nordi: Southern
- Ireland -  The Netherlands -Sweden -  Italy
United Kingdom - France - Finland - Swirzerland
- Belgium - Norway - Spain
- Germany - Denmark - Greece
- Luxembourg                                                             &- Portugal
Korpi & Palme Basic Security Corporatist Encompassing Targeted                                                      
- Canada - Austria - Finland - Australia                         4
- Denmark - Belgium - Norway                                                       A
-  The Netherlands - France
-Sweden                                                                                -  New Zealand - Germany
- Switzerland
-  Italy- Ireland




Table 2.3: Empirical robustness of the Three-Worlds-Typology
Number of clusters and cluster assignment Technique
Kangas (1994)
1. Liberal. United States, Canada - Cluster-analysis
2. Conservative.· Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands
3. Social-Democratic. Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
4. Radical.- Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom
Ragin (1994)
1. Liberal. Australia, Canada, Switzerland, United States - Qualitative
2. Co,poratist.· Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy Comparative
3. Social-democran'c: Denmark, Norway, Sweden Analysis
4. Undefined: Germany, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom 0
Shalev (1996)                                                                                                                                                                                      i
:.
1. Liberal: United States, Canada, Switzerland, Japan - Factor analysis
2. Conservan've. Italy, France, Belgium, Austria, Ireland                                                                                                
3. Social-democratic: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland
4. Undefined: Germany, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand                                                               
Obinger & Wagschal (1998)
Se
1. Liberal: United States, Canada, Japan, Switzerland - Cluster-analysis           
2. European: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Ireland, United Kingdom, The Netherlands                                                            ii
3. Conservative: France, Italy, Austria
4. Social-Democratic.· Denmark, Norway Sweden
5. Radical: Australia, New Zealand
Wildeboer Schut et al. (2000)
1. Liberal: United States, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom - Principal component
2. Conservative: France, Germany, Belgium analysis
3. Social-Democratic: Sweden, Denmark, Norway
4.   Undefined The Netherlands
4.
W
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In an effort to evaluate the possible extent to which multivariate techniques -
0LS regression and cluster-analysis - suggest the same conclusions as alternative
middle-of-the-road methodological approaches - qualitative comparative analysis -
Kangas (1994) found some support for the existence of different welfare state regimes.
Specifically, cluster-analyses of data on characteristics of health insurance schemes in
OECD countries in  1950 and 1985 showed that as early as  1950, the foundations of a
Scandinavian cluster and a continental European cluster were visible. A homogeneous
liberal cluster, however, was harder to find. The findings of the cluster-analysis of the
1985 data showed a more pronounced picture of different social policy regimes.  Here,
Italy, The Netherlands, Japan, Austria and Germany clustered into a corporatist
regime, whereas Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway were combined into a
social-democratic regime cluster. Furthermore, the results showed the existence
of two subgroups within the group of liberal welfare states which were largely in
accordance with the classification of Castles and Mitchell (1993). Specifically, Kangas
identified a cluster with Canada and the United States, on the one hand, and Australia,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Ireland, on the other. In the final analysis,
Kangas' findings support the idea of different welfare state regimes. However, an
additional regime was required to describe the data sufficiently.
The Esping-Andersian claim of a three-world-classification, especially with respect
to pension programmes, was also tested by Ragin (1994). Using cluster analysis, he
determined which, if any, of the three pension worlds each country fitted best, using
predetermined values for cluster centers that corresponded to Esping-Andersen's
predetermined types. His analysis suggested the existence of four clusters, which
encompass the following countries: a liberal cluster containing Australia, Canada,
Switzerland, and the United States; a social-democratic cluster with Denmark,
Norway and Sweden; a corporatist cluster with Austria, Belgium, Finland, France
and Italy; and, finally, a rather large 'spare' cluster which accomodates cases which
do not conform to Esping-Andersen's three worlds: Germany, Ireland, Japan, The
Netherlands, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.  On the basis of his findings,
Ragin concludes that the three-worlds scheme does not capture existing diversity
adequately, even when measures reported in Esping-Andersen (1990) are used. Some
cluster assignments contradict the ad hoc assignments he made.
Shalev (1996) applied factor analysis to 14 pension policy indicators collected by
Esping-Andersen, to test for the presence of liberal, social-democratic and corporatist
regime-types. This factor analysis showed that the intercorrelations among these
social policy indicators were dependent on two dimensions. The first factor measured
the level of social-democratic features, whereas the second dimension measured
corporatist features of welfare states. Based on the assignment of factor scores to
individual nations, Shalev concluded that his findings are in close correspondence
with Esping-Andersen's characterizations of the three welfare state regimes. Shalev's
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analysis identified basically three clusters: a Scandinavian social-democratic cluster
consisting of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland; a Conservative European
cluster consisting of Italy, France, Belgium, Austria and Ireland; and a liberal cluster
with the United States, Canada, Switzerland and Japan. However, Shalev admitted
that Germany and The Netherlands, which are close to the conservative group - as
well as the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, which also share liberal
features - are more difficult to classify.
Using cluster analysis, Obinger and Wagschal (1998) have put to the test Esping-
Andersens's classification of welfare state regimes on the basis of the stratification-
criterion. After a detailed re-analysis of Esping-Andersen's original data on stratifi-
cation, they concluded that these data are best described by five regime-clusters: a
radical type consisting of Australia and New Zealand; a European cluster consisting
of Belgium, Germany, Finland, Ireland, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands;
a social-democratic cluster consisting of Denmark, Norway and Sweden; a liberal
type including Japan, Canada, Switzerland and the United States; and finally, a
conservative cluster which includes France, Italy and Austria. The classification by
Obinger and Wagschal deviates from Esping-Andersen's typology in several respects.
First, they refine Esping-Andersen's original classification of conservative welfare
states by classi ing countries into a conservative type - as Esping-Andersen envisaged
- and a European insurance states type. This takes into account the possibility that
conservative welfare states can also have characteristics of other regime-types. Thus,
they explicitly include hybrid cases. Secondly, the results of Obinger and Wagschal
make a strong case for Castles' and Mitchell's claim of a fourth world of welfare
capitalism. This finding is in accordance with Kangas' results, as well as those by
Shalev. Finally, their analysis showed that only Sweden, Norway and Denmark fully
comply with Esping-Andersen's characterization of social-democratic welfare states,
whereas countries such as Finland and The Netherlands are better characterised as
hybrid types.
The most recent attempt to empirically verify Esping-Andersen's classification has
been undertaken by Wildeboer Schut et al.  (2000). This study examined the actual
similarities and differences among welfare states  of the   11 countries, which  were
originally included in Esping-Andersen's classification. The Netherlands, Belgium,
France and Germany represented the conservative type; Australia, Canada, the United
States and the United Kingdom the liberal type; and Sweden, Norway and Denmark
the social-democratic type. Fifty-eight characteristics of the labour market, tax
regime, and social protection system of these countries were submitted to a non-linear
principal component analysis. The results largely confirmed the Esping-Andersen
three-regime typology. As expected, a liberal cluster was found which included the
United States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. The United States
appeared to be the most liberal country, with Australia a close second. Although less
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strongly residual in orientation than the welfare states of the former two countries,
Canada and the United Kingdom were also classified in this regime-type. The analyses
further showed the existence of a conservative group of welfare states, which includes
France, Germany and Belgium. The Dutch welfare state was also characterised by
conservative characteristics, but these were far less pronounced. Moreover, The
Netherlands also shared some features with the social-democratic welfare states. With
respect to The Netherlands, Wildeboer Schut et al. (2000) concluded that this is the
only one of the countries examined which cannot clearly be assigned to one of the
three groups of welfare states. Finally, Sweden and Denmark appeared to be the
purest representatives of the social-democratic regime-type, with Norway included
but somewhat less pronounced.
In summary, these goodness-of-fit tests of Esping-Andersen's original three-
worlds-typology do not undeniably corroborate his classification. Based on these
results, a strong case can be made for extending the number of welfare state regimes
to four - or even five - without considering the existence of a sixth, Mediterranean
world of welfare capitalism. Moreover, these analyses show that a significant number
of welfare states must be considered hybrid cases: No particular case can ever perfectly
embody any particular ideal-type (Goodin et al., 1999, p. 56).
2.7   Conclusion and discussion
Before we reach our conclusions, let us examine how Esping-Andersen himself has
reacted to the various attempts to amend his typology. He reacted positively to Castles'
& Mitchell's proposal to add a fourth type - a radical welfare state regime - to his
typology. He recognises that the residual character and the matter of a means-test are
just one side of the Antipodean welfare states' coin. However, he (Esping-Andersen,
1997,  p. 171) feels  that a powerfully institutionalised collection of welfare guarantees
which operate through the market itself cannot be neglected. Esping-Andersen  (1996,
p. 66; 1997, p. 171) has also given some support to the proposal to add a separate
Mediterranean type.  He has acknowledged the - sometimes generous - benefits
which are guaranteed by certain arrangements, the near absence of social services
and, especially, the Catholic imprint and high level of familialism. However, he
(Esping-Andersen,  1997) is less convinced of the existence of a separate Japanese or
East-Asian type. Japan seems to constitute a hybrid case, which encompasses both
elements of the corporatist-conservative type (occupational segmentation in care and
welfare and familialism) as well as elements of the residual model (the prevalence of
private welfare schemes) which is typiCal of the liberal welfare states. It is quite likely,
he argues, that the Japanese model will come increasingly under pressure in the near
future. The provision of care and welfare by companies as well as by kinship are
being increasingly threatened. This means that Japan will soon reach a crossroad.
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Either the residual character of public welfare arrangements will have to be shed
and conservative attributes will be strengthened, or Japan will have to follow the
American route. According to Esping-Andersen, a final decision on how to classify
the Japanese welfare state must therefore await the passage of time. However, he
(Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 92), expects that in the near future, Japan can be assigned
to the conservative regime, because its corporatist social insurance system is rapidly
maturing and its degree of familialism is still exceptional. In the end, Esping-Andersen
is very reluctant to add more regime-clusters to his original three, although he admits
that "it is inescapably true that Japan, like Australia and Southern Europe, manifest
features that are not easily compatible with a simple trichotomy of welfare regimes"
(Esping-Andersen,   1999,  p. 92). Against the benefits of greater refinement,  more
nuance  and more precision, he weighs the argument of analytical parsimony, stressing
that "the peculiarities of these cases are variations within a distinct overall logic, not
of a wholly different logic per se" (Esping-Andersen, 1999, ibidem).
However, contrary to Esping-Andersen, we conclude that there are no important
reasons for not extending the number of ideal-typical welfare state regimes to five
or six.  Both our own overview of the various classifications by other students of the
welfare state, as well as the results of the testing of the Esping-Andersenian three-
worlds-typology, suggest that the number of welfare state regimes can be increased,
while analytical parsimony can still - to a considerable degree - be achieved. Ofcourse,
this conclusion becomes more interesting when the following question is answered:
Will this extended typology lead to a theoretically more satisfying and empirically
more fruitful comparative analysis of welfare state regimes?
As far as theory is concerned, it is important that the work of some authors
- like the work of Esping-Andersen - can be set within the revisionist branch of
historical-materialism. This applies, in particular, to Korpi and Palme, but also to
some feminists. It would be worthwhile to develop a theoretical reconstruction of the
different revisionist contributions and to subsume these in a deductive-nomological
system of statements from which, with the help of additional assumptions, we could
deduce new predictions.  Only then will the heuristic value of the typology become
apparent.
The nature of the research by most of the other authors mentioned has a strong
empiricist flavour. However, if we are searching for an underlying theoretical notion,
it can be found in the rather general statement, which claims that similar causes
have similar consequences. Considering the labels used, which are predominantly
geographical or political, the most important causes are deemed to be the force
of circumstances and the ambitions of politicians. The 'force of circumstances'
factor could be translated into a functionalist 'challenge-response'-hypothesis. Similar
circumstances lead to comparable welfare state regimes. Institutional correlations
might arise under the pressure of functional exigencies. They might, however,
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arise not only through processes operating within societies, but also through cultural
diffusion among societies (Goldthorpe, 2000, p. 54). According to Boje (1996, p.
15), because most welfare states are confronted with huge social problems, politicians
must find alternative procedures to solve these problems more efficiently. Therefore,
they have recognised the possibility that much may be learned from other welfare
states. The second factor could be put in terms of diffusion. Welfare state regimes
are taken as social inventions and, therefore, a certain 'WahlverwandISchaft' should
exist between the regime-type and the dominant ideology in a particular country.
The importance of this factor is underscored by Castles (1993), who has argued that
it is very likely that policy similarities and differences among welfare states can be
attributed to two factors. These are the history, culture, and their transmission and
diffusion amongst countries as well as the immediate impact of economic, political
and social variables identified in the contemporary public policy literature. Whether
these very general hypotheses should be further developed remains to be seen. For
the moment, we can conclude that, given the empiricist nature of their work, there
should be hardly any objection to the incorporation of their findings into a revisionist
historical-materialist framework.
Finally, we arrive at empirical applications of the typology. Basically, this typology
enables us to explain cross-national variations in attitudes and behaviour - and their
consequences - by including welfare state regimes as explanatory variables in the
analyses. Therefore, within the revisionist branch of historical materialism (Esping-
Andersen & Korpi, 1984; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983), it has been proposed
that the nature of the welfare state regime would decisively influence support for
certain forms of social policy.  A type characterised by universalism would generate the
strongest support, whereas arrangements which apply only to minorities would not win
the support of majorities. Tests of this hypothesis (Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Peillon,
1996) have shown some empirical support, but the evidence is not encouraging. More
encouraging were the results of an effort (Gundelach,  1994)  to explain cross-national
differences in values with respect to welfare and care using the Esping-Andersenian
welfare state regimes. Also, Svallfors' (1997) teSt of the hypothesis that different
welfare state regimes matter for people's attitudes towards income-redistribution, was
strongly endorsed. What especially matters to us here is that Svallfors had included
not only the Esping-Andersenian regime-types, but also Castles' and Mitchell's radical
type.
It is more difficult to draw a conclusion concerning the influence that welfare
state regimes have on social behaviour.  Much of this research has bearing on the
distributive effects of welfare state regimes. Because they are often described in terms
of their intended social stratification, a tautological element easily sneaks into the
explanations. Positive exceptions are Goodin et al. (1999) and Korpi and Palme
(1998). Using panel-data, Goodin et al. (1999) show that welfare state regimes
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do not only have intended results, but also generate unintended consequences. As
intended and expected, the levelling and poverty-reducing effects of some regimes
(especially the social-democratic regime) are stronger than of others. However,
state intervention has the unintended and unwanted consequence that it reduces the
levelling and poverty-reducing operation of the labour market (which means before
the state intervenes). Korpi and Palme (1998) find that a number of institutional
arrangements characteristic of certain welfare state regimes not only have unintended
consequences, but even have consequences which are reversed. Consequently, they
speak of a paradox of redistribution.
All in all, these conclusions provide sufficient impetus to continue the work
concerning the resulting welfare state typology. Future theoretical research should
concentrate on a better formulation of the theory.  Only then can predictions be
logically deduced from theory instead of impressionalistically.  Only then is a strict test
of the theory possible and only then will the heuristic value of the typology become
apparent. However, we believe that, although the theory needs further elaboration,
it now gives us sufficient clues to put its explanatory power to an initial empirical
test. Specifically, we will examine whether the extended typology helps us to better
understand cross-national differences and similarities in public attitudes concerning
welfare state solidarity and preferences for certain justice principles. This idea will be
pursued in the following chapters.
3 Popular Support for Institutionalised Solidarity:
A Comparison among European Welfare States
Abstract. In this chapter, we study the determinants of supportiveness for the welfare state
as a system of institutionalised solidarity. We distinguish between two types of support:  1)
whether or not people hold the state responsible for achieving social-economic security and
distributive justice; 2) people's preference for the range of goals to be realised if the state is
indeed held responsible. Using data from the Euro-barometer survey series, we investigate
how, and to what extent, both kinds of support for the welfare state are related to position in
the stratification structure, demographic characteristics and social-political beliefs, as well as
to features of European welfare state regimes. The results of a two-level hierarchical model
suggest that moral commitment to the welfare state dominates at the individual level, whereas
self-interest enters the picture mainly if a person is highly dependent on the provisions of the
welfare state. Furthermore, the findings give no support to the claim that there is a systematic
variation between levels of popular support for the welfare state and its institutional structure.
3.1       Introduction and research questions
Social scientific interest in the legitimacy of the welfare state increased significantly
after its 'Golden Age', when serious doubts about the sustainability of various
kinds of welfare provision were raised. Between the mid-1970s   and the 199Os,
welfare states were faced with rising unemployment rates, high levels of inflation
and low economic growth, which led to increasing costs of welfare provisions.
Consequently, restructuring and cutbacks in social expenditures were implemented,
and a considerable fear ofpopular backlash against the welfare state was present among
students of social policy. An unsympathetic popular opinion can be detrimental to
the political health of the welfare state (Pierson, 1994, p. 146). Although some
public resentment to certain areas of state provision has since been discernible, public
opinion surveys in the two welfare states most heavily under attack by conservative
political forces during the 1980s - Britain   and the United States - suggested   a
widespread popular support for the most expensive and extensive elements of welfare
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state provision during this period (Coughlin, 1980; Pierson, 1997, p. 171; Pierson,
1994, pp. 146-149). These findings can also be generalised to include other Western
European welfare states (see, for example, Huseby, 1995, Roller, 1995).
These studies further showed that attitudinal patterns of popular support for the
welfare state were, at that time, both stable and complex despite political efforts for
retrenchment. To gain insight into the structure of public opinion, much research has
since focused on explanations of differences in popular support in general and specific
social schemes in particular - both within and among countries and welfare state
regimes (Forma & Kangas, 1999; Forma, 1997b; Kluegel & Miyano, 1995; Matheson
& Wearing, 1997; Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Peillon, 1996; Svallfors, 1997; Taylor-
Gooby,   1985). The establishment of large scale projects in which comparative  data-
sets on attitudes and values have become available - the International Social Survey
Program, the European Values Study/World Values Study and the International Social
Justice Project - has been especially conducive to broadening our understanding of
what people in the various welfare states consider to be important. With these data, it
is possible to describe national differences, as well as to test explanations for them.
The point of departure of a great deal of the research on attitudes towards the
welfare state is the work of Esping-Andersen (1990). He characterises the welfare
state as both a provider of social services and income maintenance and an agent
of stratification. According to him, "the organizational features of the welfare state
help determine the articulation of social solidarity, divisions of class and status
differentials". This points to the importance of looking at social cleavages - for
example class divisions - within society as well as at welfare state arrangements. They
create a context in which citizens' attitudes towards the welfare state are shaped
(Svallfors, 1997; Forma, 1997b,  p. 238; Papadakis  &  Bean,   1993). Most studies
assume that attitudes toWards the welfare state are dependent on both the individual
social position within income and status hierarchies and the nature of the institutional
regime of social policy.
This chapter is based on this previous research. Its main goal is to explore how levels
of popular support for the welfare state were structured across  11 European countries
in the early 1990s.    We will first  give an overview  of the levels of popular support
after the restructuring of welfare states, thereby determining its overall legitimacy as  a
societal type sui generis. The focus is more on the comparable level of popular support
for government intervention in terms of extensiveness and intensity (Roller, 1992;
Zijderveld, 1999) than on attitudes towards nation-specific welfare state programmes.
Also, this chapter attempts to provide insight into the ways in which welfare state
legitimacy is connected to individual characteristics - position in the stratification
structure, demographic characteristics and social-political beliefs - as well as features
of the particular welfare state regimes distinguished Within Europe. Specifically, the
chapter addresses the following two research questions:
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1.  What is the influence of an individual's structural location, socio-demographic
characteristics and socio-political beliefs on his or her supportiveness for the
welfare state?
2.  Is there a relationship between the type of welfare state regime and aggregate
levels of support for the welfare state?  If so, how can this relationship be
accounted for?  If not, how can cross-national variations in aggregate levels of
support be otherwise explained?
3.2   Theories and findings about welfare state support
3.2.1     Dimensions and levels of attitudes towards the welfare state
Most treatises on the welfare state assert, more or less explicitly, that one of its
objectives is the achievement of social solidarity.  In fact, the welfare state can, at
the very least, be denoted as a state system of institutionalised solidarity. In varying
degrees, it caters to the welfare needs of individuals or households.  Like the welfare
state, the sociological notion of social solidarity has been hard to define. Often,
definitions refer to properties such as: common relationships among individuals,
collective behaviour and collective attitudes of a group.  In the remainder of this
chapter, social solidarity will be defined in terms of common attitudes of individuals
who express feelings of support for a social system 1 (Johnsen,  1998, p.  264).
Roller (1992,1995) argues that these feelings of support can refer to goals, means
and outputs of government intervention to achieve social security and social justice.
With respect to the goals of state intervention, she distinguishes two dimensions:
1.   Whether   or   not the state is actually held responsible for achieving social-
economic security and justice (extensiveness or range). This dimension reflects
a preference, which varies from a minimal (night watchman state) to a universal
welfare state;
2.   The degree of social-economic security and justice that should be realised if the
state is indeed held responsible for achieving these goals (intensity or degree).
This dimension is usually operationalised in terms of preferences for more or
less spending on social security or more specific fields of social policy such as
unemployment benefits or health care.
Furthermore, she also divides the object of means into two dimensions:
1. institutions, referring to people's evaluation of long-term social policy;
1 Of  course, this definition   of the welfare state   does not cover  all its dimensions and components.
For more extensive discussions of this topic, see, for example, Zijderveld (1999), Barr (1993), and
Esping-Andersen  (1990).
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Figure 3.1: Relations between support for extensiveness and intensiveness of welfare state
interventions.
I Goals of state intervention           I
Preference for extensiveness
I
Preference for non-extensiveness      
Preference for intensiveness
I I
preference for non-intensiveness       I
2. programmes concerning attitudes towards relative short-term social policy pro-
grammes.
Lastly, with respect to the consequences of government intervention, she distinguishes
between people's evaluation of:
1. intended consequences of government intervention;
2. unintended consequences of government intervention.
Together, these concepts describe the full range of citizens' attitudes towards govern-
ment intervention. For both practical and theoretical reasons, this chapter deals with
the two goal-dimensions. On the one hand, cross-national surveys generally focus
on people's evaluation of government intervention and the degree it should embody.
They contain fewer possibilities for a systematic comparison of people's evaluations
of means and consequences.  On the other hand, it can be argued that means pre-
suppose goals and consequences presuppose the application of means. Therefore, it
seems reasonable to concentrate on the level of support for the goals of government
intervention; these are basic to the feasibility of the whole policy process.
We will now proceed with a closer examination of the relationship between the
two  goal-dimensions of social policy. Figure  3.1  depicts the theoretical relationships
between the concepts of support for extensiveness and intensity of welfare state
interventions.
On the conceptual level, people are divided on the question ofwhether one actually
holds the state responsible for achieving social-economic security and justice. These
are those who agree with state intervention and those who do not. The latter group
prefers no - or only minimal - government intervention by means of social policy.
This position reflects a classical liberal or neo-conservative stance towards the welfare
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state. It sees the welfare state as an ill-conceived and unprincipled intrusion upon
the welfare and liberty-maximising imperatives of a liberal market society (Pierson,
1997,   p. 48). Consequently, only people favouring extensiveness   will  be   able   to
express a value-judgement with respect to the preferred degree of social policy efforts.
Individuals who prefer an intensive welfare state can be counted among the social-
democratic and other left-wing parties, whereas people who show preference for a
non-intensive welfare state articulate a social-liberal or Christian-democratic view.
The concepts of a preference for extensiveness or intensity of social policy seem to
be present on two decision levels. If one prefers a broadly ranged welfare state, he or she
is confronted with the decision to choose either for an intensive or non-intensive social
policy. However, empirically it will be much more fruitful to treat these preferences
as continuous variables, instead of as dichotomies. People will probably show varying
degrees of preferences for extensiveness of the welfare state. Consequently, they will
have varying opinions about the intensity of government activity. Although, logically,
one level of options excludes the other, empirically they could be - and probably are -
positively correlated. Individuals in favour of an extensive welfare state will also prefer
an intensive welfare state. However, a person might also state that he or she prefers
both a non-extensive welfare state and an intensive welfare state, even if they are,
logically, mutually exclusive.
Another important issue concerns the effects of how the questions used to opera-
tionalise these dimensions are worded. Neglecting this problem can lead to inaccurate
conclusions. Kangas (1997, pp. 475-494) shows that responses to general level
questions show a strong commitment to social solidarity, whereas in more specific
questions this support base tends to fade away and self-interest - another motive
for giving support - comes to the forefront. Kangas also points to the fact that
situational frames - altruistic norms, self-interest and additional information given in
a questionnaire - may have an important impact on the measured preferences. As he
observes, little attention has been paid to either the level of generality or the framing
effects in studies about popular support for the welfare state. Without a critical look
at the content of a question, the actual support base may very well be overrated when
generally worded questions are used. Keeping these findings in mind, it is necessary
to examine what questions are actually asked and how, why and what the issue at
hand is.
3.2.2       Motives  to  support  the  welfare  state
Discussions of the motivational foundations of support for a social system generally
identify either simple self-interest or a moral commitment to the common good
(Kangas, 1997). According to Peillon (1996), people basically support the welfare
state either because it is largely congruent with their values and beliefs, or because
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they deem it expedient. Analogously, Taylor-Gooby (1985, pp. 77-78) identifies three
general factors that are included in most accounts: political party identification as a
proxy of beliefs and self-interest; simple self-interest mediated by people's perceptions
of the allocative impact of welfare; and, finally, welfare imagery and ideology.
Unfortunately, there is no systematic treatment of relevant motives. However,
sociological theory gives insight into the various motives people might have to support
solidary relations, in general, and institutionalised forms of solidarity in particular.
Based on a profound review ofthe work ofsuch sociologists as: Durkheim (1893/1996),
Weber, Mayhew (1971), Parsons (1951) and Hechter (1987), van Oorschot (1998b,
pp. 8-9) argues that one can identify four general motives for giving support. In the
following, we gratefully avail ourselves of his insights.
First, Mayhew (1971) emphasised the role of affectionate and emotional grounds
for supporting solidarity. The degree to which people feel attracted to one another -
and are loyal at the micro-level - and the degree to which they perceive a collective
identity - and we-feeling at the meso and macro-levels - are decisive for the level of
solidarity among them.
Culturally based convictions can be a second rationale for supporting a solidary
relationship. Both Durkheim (1893/1996) and Parsons (1951) explain that people
may also feel a moral obligation to serve the collective interest and to accept existing
relations of solidarity. The strength of this motive may vary because, for example,
institutional role obligations can vary in number and strength.
Van Oorschot identifies rational, long-term self-interest as a third motive for
supporting a solidary relationship. Both Hechter (1987) and Durkheim (ibid.) have
argued that individuals learn that they may benefit, here and now or perhaps in the
future, from contributing to the collective interest.  Note that the time frame of this
rational thinking may vary. It is generally assumed that homo economicus is guided
by enlightened self-interest to make allowance for long-term planning of action, i.e.,
strategic behaviour. People, therefore, support the institutions of the welfare state
because they expect future gains. However, people may also support the welfare state
because of opportunism. This involves seeking self-interest with guile (Williamson,
1975, p.  26).  In this case, individuals have a limited time frame of only a few
months or years, which ignores the long-term. They support the welfare state because
they expect to benefit from its institutions within a relatively short period of time.
Consequently, both kinds of self-interest may sway support for the welfare state.
However, it is often assumed that long-term considerations prevail when the issue
is partaking in a solidary relationship. For example, de Swaan (1988) argues that
rational considerations lie at the heart of a process of habit formation with respect
to the acceptance of the welfare state. According to him, most workers in modern
welfare states have become accustomed to the fact that considerable amounts of their
income are deducted in exchange for a guaranteed income in times of need.
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Accepted authority can be a final rationale for supporting a solidary relationship:
Support  is not necessarily spontaneous or completely voluntary. Parsons   (195 1)
argues that contributing to the collective interest is an act of solidarity only if it
results from institutional role obligations. In addition, Hechter (1987) contends - in
his theory on solidarity - that, in order to avoid the free riding of group members,
coercion and control of contributions to the common good are necessary. Thus, when
the previous three motives are not strong enough to provide sufficient support for a
solidary relationship, enforcement by a higher authority may be necessary.
Solidary relations and arrangements that are legitimate with respect to all four
motives are likely to be strongest.  Also, van Oorschot contends that, if we regard
solidaristic welfare arrangements and institutions as serving the collective interest of a
society, then the foregoing analysis offers the possibility of measuring and analyzing
that legitimacy.  It is stronger to the degree that more people are motivated to
contribute to the arrangements and people have more different motives to contribute.
3.2.3      Social position  and support for the welfare state
Economically-oriented explanations of support for the welfare state emphasise self-
interest as the prime motivating factor. The self-interest thesis says that there is a
direct relationship between one's position in the social structure and one's attitudes
(d'Anjou, Steijn, & Aarsen, 1995, p. 357). In the stratification structure, the wealthier
will be less concerned about redistribution and more prone to argue for the necessity
of inequality. However, frameworks of interpretation and ideological commitments
tend to blur the impact of raw self-interest (Svallfors, 1993). This ideology thesis
(d'Anjou et al., 1995, p. 359) refines this self-interest thesis. It holds that there is no
direct relationship between people's position in the stratification structure and their
attitudes: This effect is mediated by people's ideological position.
Most research has focused on the direct impact ofvarious indicators of self-interest
and ideology on popular support (see, for example, Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989;
Papadakis, 1992; Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Svallfors, 1997, 1993). Below, the main
determinants identified in these studies are briefly discussed.
First of all, the importance of class is emphasised. According to Svallfors (1997,
p. 290), resources - i.e. money or qualifications and credentials - as well as the risks
of unemployment, sickness or poverty - are systematically connected to positions in
the labour market. They, therefore, constitute links between positions in the class
structure and welfare policies. Managerial and professional workers are better able
to armour themselves against the vagaries of the market, due to the nature of their
work or contractual relationships with private or government organizations (Kluegel &
Miyano, 1995, p. 83). Furthermore, self-employment encourages greater opposition
to government intervention (de Swaan, 1988; Wilensky, 1975), whereas unskilled
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workers - exposed to higher risk-levels of life because of their precarious position in
the labour market - will be more supportive of government intervention.
Another prime indicator for self-interest is income. It clearly defines who pays
for or who benefits from social security provisions. Education also functions in this
way. The higher educated may - because of their higher average income - expect to
benefit less from welfare policies than low-schooled persons. However, Hasenfeld and
Rafferty (1989, p. 1031) contend that socialization to democratic values - as measured
by years of formal education - evokes greater commitment to social equality and social
rights. That, in turn, leads to more support for the welfare state, independent of
income. Because the analyses in this chapter will also incorporate years of formal
education as an explanatory variable, the latter explanation should hold true here.
It is also often argued that certain groups seeking government assistance have
a potential collective interest in ensuring that the level of social transfers is not
eroded. Therefore, their opinions will significantly differ from those who are working.
These groups - generally labelled as 'transfer classes' (Alber, 1984) - include old-age
pensioners, the unemployed, the disabled and those with low incomes.
Previous research also points to the relationship between union membership and
support for the welfare state. Union membership may promote endorsement of
government intervention to reduce inequalities.  It does this by channelling diffuse
dissatisfactions into demands for welfare state policies to protect workers and other
individuals who are dependent on the market for their livelihood, and a more
egalitarian orientation (Fenwick & Olson,  1986).
Men and women may also differ in their degree of dependence on welfare state
programmes. Kluegel and Miyano (1995, pp. 83-84) and Svallfors (1997, p. 290)
argue that women show lower rates of continuous participation in the market due to
gender norms that make them principally responsible for unwaged care giving. This
and other disadvantages in the labour market make them more likely to be dependent
on welfare policies.
Furthermore, age may affect the likelihood of being dependent on welfare state
programmes. Kluegel and Miyano (1995, p. 83) argue that younger workers run
greater risk of unemployment due to lack of seniority.  They also lack accumulated
savings or other resources that may soften the impact of market fluctuations. Retirees
are out of the market and many of them are dependent on welfare services. Other
older workers may anticipate being outside the labour market soon.
In accordance with the ideology thesis, socio-political beliefs are also stressed in
many studies. Generally, a more right-wing or conservative political orientation -
either in terms of market justice or economic individualism - or a right-wing party
identification is expected to lead to weaker endorsement of welfare state efforts.
Typically, the new-right views the welfare state as an uneconomic, unproductive,
inefficient, ineffective and despotic institutional arrangement that denies freedom
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(Pierson, 1997, p. 48). Left-wing political views imply a trust in the welfare state
to reduce social inequality and foster social integration.  In this respect, the post-
materialist value-orientation could  also be relevant for the explanation of welfare state
adherence. Inglehart (1977) argued that a post-materialist value-orientation includes
social justice, equality and solidarity with the weak in society. This leads to the
expectation that post-materialists will be more supportive of the welfare state than
materialists.
3.2.4     Welfare state regimes and support for the welfare state
In The three worids of zuelfare capitalism, Esping-Andersen attempts to explain the
relationship between the different typeS of welfare state regimes and their legitimacy.
In his discussion, he particularly emphasises the important role that the new middle
classes have played in the development of welfare states and their presumed opposition
to government intervention. Specifically, he argues that the Scandinavian model was
able to incorporate the new middle classes into a social-democratic welfare state
by providing benefits that they approved of while retaining universalism of social
rights. However, in Anglo-Saxon nations the welfare state failed to attract the new
middle classes, which led to a residual type that mainly focused on the working
class and the poor.  Here, the market still caters to the needs of the middle classes.
Because this latter group constitutes an important part of the electorate, extension
of the welfare state is usually resisted in these countries. Finally, the maintenance
of occupationally-segregated social insurance programmes, by conservative political
forces, institutionalised the loyalty of the new middle classes within continental
European welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 31-32).
These arguments have led to the hypothesis that universal, social-democratic
regimes tend to engender high levels of support, whereas liberal regimes induce much
lower levels ofsupport for institutionalised welfare state solidarity. Corporatist regimes
should be somewhere in between. Empirical studies have found no clear evidence for
this hypothesis (see, for example, Gundelach, 1994; Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Peillon,
1996; Svallfors, 1997). As Papadakis and Bean (1993, p. 257) point out, Esping-
Andersen seems to assume a direct relationship between individual preferences (those
of the new middle classes) and institutional structures. However, such a relationship
is not necessarily true, because individual preferences are not equal to institutional
structures. Institutional structures are only partially the crystallization of individual
preferences. Furthermore, these structures may impose constraints on individual
preferences. Consequently, only a certain degree of congruence will exist between the
institutional arrangements of welfare states and preferences  or - as  in our case - levels
of popular support.
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3.2.5      Other Contextual-level  characteristics  and support for the welfare  state
Apart from the idea that qualitatively different welfare state regimes lead to different
levels of support for institutionalised welfare state solidarity, several other possible
explanations have been suggested. Wilensky (1976) and, more recently, Kangas
(1995) have proposed that the level of support will be highest in countries where
the tax system has low visibility. This may be the case in countries where least
reliance is placed on direct income or property taxes and more reliance on sales
or value added taxes (VAT) to finance the welfare state. Also, welfare effort may
matter. Forma (1997a) hypothesised that less inequality is experienced in those
countries which contribute heavily to social protection. In addition, he proposed
that redistributive policies should be claimed less in those countries which show high
levels of expenditures on social protection. Finally, it has also been argued that the
living-standard may explain cross-national differences. Roller (1995) suggested that
the lowest levels of support will be found in countries with the highest levels of income
equality. Moreover, Forma (1997a) proposed that a more equal income distribution
willlead to fewer claims of redistribution. These hypotheses are based on the theory of
diminishing marginal utility of increasing redistribution. When a high level of income
equality is already achieved, people will be less Willing to contribute more to achieve
an even higher level.
3.3 Hypotheses
We have argued above that supportiveness for the welfare state relates to various
objects of social policy.  In this chapter, the focus is on the goal-dimension of
government intervention: extensiveness (or range) and intensity (or degree).  We  will
thus investigate if- and to what degree - these dimensions are associated, as well as how
people's preferences here are related to their structural location, socio-demographic
characteristics and socio-political beliefs. Furthermore, we shall examine whether
these preferences are systematically structured across welfare state regimes. In order
to give preliminary answers to these questions, we must return to the theoretical
considerations and empirical findings discussed earlier.
The first hypothesis pertains to the association between the two goal-dimensions.
Although on the conceptual level a preference for an extensive welfare state is not
logically related to a preference for an intensive welfare state, on the empirical level
these two dimensions will probably be associated. Specifically, we formulate the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis    1:     For   eveg   European welfare state the following   hoMs   tme:
Individuals in favour of an extensive welfare state will also prefer an intensive
zoe(fare state.
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Another important question is whether preferences for extensiveness and intensity
of welfare state policies are affected in the same manner and to the same degree by
an individual's structural location, his or her socio-demographic characteristics and
his or her socio-political beliefs. Because extensiveness relates to a general level,
we anticipate finding high levels of commitment. Social divisions will not easily
emerge in this case. Here, moral commitment to the common good will be the
primary explanation, as articulated by socio-political beliefs, union membership and
educational attainment. Self-interest will only be of minor importance. Only those
who are most dependent on the welfare state will show particular high levels of
support for extensiveness. However, preferences concerning the intensity of welfare
state policies are more specific. This may lead to a disintegration of these high levels
of strong commitment. Therefore, we expect that social divisions will appear more
clearly in this dimension and that questions of self-interest will enter more profoundly
into the process ofattitude formation, apart from a moral commitment to the common
good. These considerations lead to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis  2  For evely European zoefare state the fouowing holds true:
A.   The stronger a person's moral commitment to the common good - exemplified
by a leftist position on the political spectrum, a post-materialist value-
orientation, trade union membership and hikher educational attainment
- the more he or she will prefer an extensive and intensive welfare state,
ceteris paribus.
B. If people belong to a transfer class, they will be more supportive of an
extensive and intensive welfare state than those who do not, ceteris paribus.
C. The higher a person's position in the system of stratification - expressed
by income, class or status - the less he or she will be motivated to support
an extensive and intensive wegare state, ceteris paribus. The association
will be stronger with respect to the preference for intensity and weaker with
respect to the preference for extensiveness of welfare state policies.
Above, it was argued that different welfare state regimes decisively influence
popular support for the welfare state. Whereas previous studies tested hypotheses
on the presumed public support found within the liberal, social-democratic and
corporatistic regime, no hypothesis has been advanced with respect to the levels of
support to be found in the Mediterranean countries. Several authors have argued that
the Mediterranean welfare states constitute a separate type ofwelfare state regime (see,
for example, Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 1996; Leibfried, 1992), whereas Esping-Andersen
identifies them as a subcategory of tile corporatist regime type, although he partially
agrees with some of these arguments (1999, p.  90; 1997, p.  171; 1996, p.  66).
One practical constraint may help us ascertain the relative position of these welfare
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states with regard to their levels of support: The length of time a country has been
in the welfare business (Wilensky, 1975, p. 9). The Southern welfare states are often
labelled 'welfare laggards' within Europe. Their social security systems are fairly young
and not fully developed compared with the other European welfare states. It can be
expected that the people of the Southern countries will strongly favour government
interventions to develop a welfare state that is comparable to other European welfare
states. The citizens of these countries have much more to gain from increased welfare
state efforts than the citizens of the other European welfare states.
This  line of reasoning suggests that high levels of support for government interven-
tion characterise both social-democratic and Southern welfare states. Consequently,
it is not possible to distinguish between levels of support in both typeS of regimes.
However, we argue that people living in social-democratic welfare states have become
accustomed to high levels of government intervention. This results in a less critical
evaluation of these interventions compared with citizens ofthe Southern welfare states.
On the basis of the above arguments, we advance the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Levels of support for an extensive and intensive welfare state
will be highest in Southern welfare states, followed by social-democratic and
corporatist welfare states.  Liberal welfare states will show the lowest levels of
support.
Underlying this hypothesis is a very general theory which states that people's
past experiences with the welfare state and future expectations of its performance
play an important role in determining supportiveness. Furthermore, the force of
circumstances (the actual or current condition of the welfare state) will also partially
determine people's aspirations regarding the extensiveness and intensity of social
policy programmes. How these factors affect levels of popular support, may be
exemplified in various manners. For instance, if the institutional arrangements of a
welfare state contain predominantly universal programmes (as in social-democratic
welfare states), then the participants will have widespread positive experiences. This
will lead to stronger affirmative expectations among its members than in a welfare
state with more particularistic social policy programmes (as is the case in conservative,
Mediterranean and especially the liberal welfare states). For example, in Sweden,
Norway or Denmark - all social- democratic welfare states - we should find higher
levels of support than in Great Britain or Ireland, which are liberal-leaning welfare
states.
It can also be argued that, if people live in a immature welfare state and their
expectations of the welfare state's development have risen (as in the Mediterranean
countries), then their supportiveness for an extensive and intensive welfare state will
be higher than in social-democratic, conservative or liberal welfare states, whose
members have already become accustomed to a mature welfare state.
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It is also possible that if welfare states have weathered the teSt of time - liberal,
conservative and social-democratic welfare states - positive experiences will generate
loyalty and affirmative expectations rather than breed contempt. However, negative
experiences will lead to diminished expectations and, consequently, to decreased
support. As retrenchment has been especially strong in liberal welfare states - i.e.
Great Britain and the United States - these citizens were probably confronted with
the most negative experiences. Therefore, we expect a division in public opinion to
exist between the liberal welfare states, on the one hand, and the social-democratic
and conservative welfare states, on the other.
Finally, we will test the extent to which other contextual-level characteristics
besides the regime typology matter for the level of support. In agreement with
previous research (see Section 3.2.5), we expect the following to hold true:
Hypothesis 4: Levels of support for an extensive and intensive welfare state
will be higher in countries where the tax system is less visible, where less is spent
on social protection.  and where there is little income equality.
3.4 Data, Operationalization and Method
3.4.1 Data
In order to test the hypotheses, we used survey data from Euro-barometer   37.1
(Reif  &   Melich, 1992), collected in April-May   1992,   were  used. This data-set
includes measurements of attitudes towards social security, unemployment, pensions
and the elderly. It also includes limited information on several socio-demographic
characteristics of respondents.
The data was collected in the following fourteen countries: France, Belgium, The
Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain,
Northern Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal and East Germany. Northern Ireland was
not included in the analysis because all data on the dependent variables used in the
analyses were missing. Luxembourg was omitted because of insufficient sample size
and East Germany was omitted because Esping-Andersen's classification does not
cover it.
Each sample was weighted in the analyses by adjusting all samples to the standard
size ofN=1000. These nation weights also incorporate post-stratification adjustments
based on cross-tabulations of national populations by sex, age, region and size of
locality.
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3.4.2        Operationalization
Following Roller (1992), the two dependent variables - support for an intensive
and extensive welfare state - were operationalised by using the following items from
Eurobarometer 37.1 as indicators  of two correlated latent variables  in a confirmatory
factor analysis (original coding2 :1= agree strongly, 2= agree slightly, 3= disagree
slightly,  4 = disagree strongly):
Support for extensiveness of social policy
Social security - major achievement: Social security is a major achievement of
modern society. The government should make sure that nobody is deprived
when unemployed, poor, ill or disabled.
Social security - broad range: The government must continue to provide everyone
with a broad range of social security benefits, even if this means increasing taxes
or contributions.
Social security - guaranteed assistance: Some people cannot earn enough  in-
come to live on, because of disability, old age etc.  To what extent do you agree
or disagree that the RIGHT to claim assistance from the authorities should be
guaranteed?
Support for intensity of social policy
Social security - too costly: Social security is too costly for society. Benefits should
be reduced and contributions should be lowered.
Social security - limited benefits: The government should provide everyone with
only a limited number of essential benefits (such as health care and minimum
income) and encourage people to provide for themselves in other respects.
Health care- provide everyone: The government should provide everyone  only
with essential services such as care for serious diseases, and encourage people to
provide for themselves in other respects.
A quick glance at the content of these items immediately reveals the rather general
wording of questions to measure levels of support.  In this case, one would expect
to find strong support, as suggested by Kangas. The first and the third items are, in
particular, very general questions to measure commitment to solidarity. The second
2The items 'social security - major achievement', 'social security - broad range' and 'social security -
guaranteed assistance' have been recoded for convenience as follows: 1 = disagree strongly, 2 = disagree
slightly, 3 = agree slightly, 4 = agree strongly. Thus, a higher score on the variable indicates a stronger
propensity for support.
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item presents respondents with a cost-benefit dilemma with respect to the provision of
social security. As such, we would expect to find a weaker support base for collective
solidarity on this item. The same holds for items 4 to 6, since these items appeal to
the personal responsibility of individuals.
LISREL was used to test a measurement model for every country included. The
results of these confirmatory factor analyses are presented in Table 3.13.
These factor-analytic measurement models are based on the fundamental assump-
tion that some underlying factors - smaller in number than the number of observed
variables - are responsible for the covariation among the observed variables (Kim &
Mueller, 1978, p.  12). Here, we propose and teSt a model for each country separately,
with two dimensions or factors ('extensiveness' and 'intensity') explaining the covari-
ation among the items. The model further assumes that these two dimensions are
correlated. For example, factor 1 'support for an intensive welfare state' is assumed to
explain the covariation among the items 'social security - too costly', 'social-security
- limited benefits' and 'health care, provide everyone'. The figures in Table  3.1  are
loadings4, which express the extent to which this underlying factor is responsible for
the covariation among these three observed variables: Differently formulated, how
strongly is this factor related to the item concerned? For the first factor, in France
the intensity dimension is most strongly related to the item 'social security - limited
benefits' (loading = 0.83) whereas, in Belgium, this dimension is most strongly related
to 'social security - too costly' (loading = 0.75).
3Because the observed variables are ordinal, estimates of polychoric correlations among the indicators
were computed and analysed by the Weighted Least Squares method, as suggested by J6reskog and S6rbom
(1993).
4Loadings are weights for each factor dimension measuring the variance contribution the factor makes
to a data vector (Rummel,  1970, p.  108).  Here they indicate the relative importance of the extensiveness
and intensity dimension for the determination  of the accompanying responses to the indicators (items).
0\e
Table 3.1: Factor loadings, correlations and fit-indices of measurement models for extensiveness and intensity.
F            B NL WG I DM GB IRI. G S P Multigroup
Factor 1: Support for Major achievement .74 .78 .67 .67 .94 .74 .65 .61 .57 .98 .40 .66
an extensive welfare state Broad range .51 .39 .71 .36 .26 82 .71 .54 .67 .37 -.20 .60
Guaranteed assistance .44 .34 .45 .46 .25 .42 .55 .49 -.Olt .37 .54 .39
Factor 2: SUpport for Too costly .60 .75 .62 .72 .57 .77 .79 .65 .49 .18 .73 .66
an intensive welfare state Limited benefits .83 .68 .67 .80 .79 .60 .60 .78 .82 .57 .92 .75
Provide everyone .57 .48 .55 .67 .55 .63 .51 .62 .60 .90 .67 .57
2
Correlation
between                                                                                                                                                                                    ' Factor 1 and Factor 2 .35 .24 .74 .90 .15 .72 .88 .65 .46 .38 .81 W
('hi2 (,lf ) 32.3(8) 10.2(8) 42.6(8) 38.3(8) 23.5(8) 20.4(8) 30.6(8) 54.0(8) 18.7(8) 39.8(8) 48.3(8) 837.2(148)
1, .000 .250 .000 .000 .003 .009 .000 .000 .017 .000 .000 .000
RMSEA .060 .018 .072 .068 .050 .041 .057 .090 .042 074 .078 .076
RMR .047 .032 .052 .049 .052 .034 .053 .059 .045 .072 .067 .065
GFI .99 1.00 .99 .99 1.00 1.00 .99 .99 1.00 .99 .99 .99
Note: F=France; B=Belgium; NL=The Netherlands; WG=West Germany, I=Italy; DM=Denmark; GB=Great Britain, IRL=Ireland; G=Greece; S=Spain; P=Portugal
tnot  significant  at  I}   <   .05 (Mo-tailed  tesr)
Source:  Eurobarometer 37.1
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Upon closer inspection of these factor-loadings for the country-specific models,
we see that they appear to vary significantly across countries. This suggests that
the underlying dimensions may not have the same meaning in all countries studied.
Notice, especially, the weak loadings of certain items on the extensiveness-dimension
for Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. This finding could reflect the low level of
government intervention in certain areas of social policy that characterises these
countries (for example, a lack of a legally guaranteed minimum income support).
These observations point to the general problem of cross-national validity of
indicators and factors within comparative attitude research. Specifically, the meaning
and connotation of concepts may vary across nations; they are, by nature, context-
dependent. Differences in answers may also be caused by the inaccurate translation
of questionnaires, as well as by culturally different appraisal of scale points or by
varying response styles. These problems can make the correct interpretation of
results problematic (Svallfors, 1997, p. 287; Halman & Moor, 1993, pp. 25-27).
Structural equation models, such as the ones presented here, are well-suited to check
the comparability of underlying dimensions. In particular, they allow for the testing
of two important hypotheses (Halman & Moor,  1993, p. 30). First, they test whether
the structure is equivalent across countries (i.e., only the same indicators are related
to the factors).   If the same structure  does not apply, the factors  are too different  to
compare, and thus need a nation-specific interpretation. The second hypothesis teStS
the equality of the relationship between the indicators and factors across countries,
as expressed by the loadings. Ideally, these should be equal cross-nationally.  If the
structure appears to be the same, but the loadings appear to differ across countries,
the factor needs a country-specific interpretation.
The fit-indices5 of the models we present here point to a reasonably close fit be-
tween the hypothesised structure and the data. To assure cross-national comparability
of the meaning of the latent variables, the factor loadings on the two latent variables
were restricted to be equal across countries in a multi-group analysis. One drawback
of this approach is that constraints are imposed on the data which often leads to less
well-fitting models; better fitting country-specific models could always be estimated.
Since we are interested in comparing positions of countries on both dimensions and
not so much in country-specific structures, this approach appears - although imperfect
- to be most useful for this purpose. The results of this analysis are also presented in
5 To assess the overall fit of the measurement model, we use the Goodness of Fit Index  (GFI), the values
of which range from 0 to 1, where values close to  1  indicate a satisfactory fit. Also, the Root Mean Square
Residual  (RMR)  and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)  are used. The smaller the
RMR, the better the fit of the model.  A RMR of zero indicates a perfect fit. To evaluate the fit of the models
by the RMSEA, we follow the following'rule of thumb' by Browne and Cudeck (Browne & Cudeck, 1993,
p.  144). They suggest that "a value of RMSEA of about  .05  or less would indicate a close fit of the model in
relation  to the degrees of freedom. A value of about  .08 or less for the RMSEA would indicate a reasonable
error of approximation, whereas a model with an RMSEA greater  than  .1  should not be employed".
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Table 3.1. Based on this model, factor regression coefficients were saved which were
used to calculate scores on both latent variables.
The explanatoo, vanables at the individual level were operationalised as follows.
A first measure of social location is duration of educational attainment. Unfortunately,
Eurobarometer-surveys generally do not include information about educational at-
tainment in terms of educational levels. Following Schmidberger (Schmidberger,
1997, p. 119), this variable was recoded into 9 ordered categories, ranging from 0 =
' 1  through 14 years of education'  to  1  =  '22  or more years of education'. Respondents
who were still in education and younger than 22 years old were given their current age
as the year in which they finished their education. Social location was also measured
in terms of class on the basis of a respondent's occupation. We applied Goldthorpe's
nominal class scheme and classified the occupations by constructing the following 4
dummies: skilled workers, petit bourgeoisie, routine non-manual workers, and the
service class. Non-skilled workers were appointed as the reference category. The un-
employed, pensioners/ disabled and people who are currently not active in the labour
market were given the class score that referred to their last occupation. Social location
was also measured in terms of subjective class position, which was operationalised by 4
dummies: people who see themselves as belonging to the lower middle class, to the
middle class, to the upper middle class, and to the upper class. People who identify
with the working class were used as the reference category.
Three dummies were constructed to indicate transfer classes: people who are not in
the labour force, the unemployed, and old age pensioners/ disabled. People with paid
jobs were used as the reference category. People with low incomes were also counted
among the transfer classes. To evaluate whether people with a low income have a
different view at the welfare state than people with higher incomes, a dummy variable
was included, based on quartiles of household incomes. People who belong to the
lowest quartile were appointed as the reference category.
People's social political orientation was operationalised, first of all, by their
position on the political left-nkht continuum. This variable was measured by asking
respondents to place themselves on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 = 'left' to 10
= 'right'. Furthermore, a four-point scale to measure a respondent's position on the
matenalism-post,naterialism continuum was included, where a higher score indicated a
stronger post-materialist value orientation. Union membership is a dummy variable,
where score 1 identifies respondents as members ofa trade union. Lastly, two variables
assessed the effect of demographic characteristics: Age (measured in years) and sex (0
=  male,   1 = female).
The explanatory variables at the country level were operationalised as follows.
Countries were classified largely according to welfare state regime based on Esping-
Andersen's (1990, p. 52) de-commodification criterion (i.e., liberal: Ireland and
Great Britain; corporatist: France and Germany; social-democratic: Belgium, The
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Netherlands and Denmark). Furthermore, we added a fourth - Southern type - of
welfare state regime consisting of Italy6, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Based on this
classification, three dummy variables were constructed for the corporatist, social-
democratic and Southern typeS, leaving the liberal type as the reference category.
To measure the impact of the visibility and the method of financing the welfare
state, we calculated the share of income taxation in the total financing of public
sector expenditure by different types of financing as a percentage of GNP,  1992. The
primary data come from Greve (1996). In addition, welfare effort is measured as the
total social protection expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1992 (OECD, 1996).
Finally, income inequality is measured by the GINI-index, which varies from 0%
(no  inequality)  to 100% (total inequality) and which provides an overall indicator of
income distribution. These data come from Eurostat (1998).
3.4.3     Method
Apart from the confirmatory factor analyses to estimate cross-nationally comparable
scores on the two dependent variables, multilevel modelling was used to evaluate the
effects of individuallevel and country level variables. Parameters of two 2-level random
intercept models were estimated with the HLM programme (Bryk, Raudenbusch, &
Congdon Jr.,  1990). The general form of the level-1 equation, which represents the
outcome Y (supportiveness for an extensive and intensive welfare state) for case i
(respondents) within unit j (countries), is as follows  (Bryk et al.,  1990):
Q
11., = 4 + E '391 X qij + Tij (3.1)
q=1
where Bqj(q = 0.1....,Q) are level-1 coefficients, Xqij is level-1 predictor q for
case i  in unit j, and r    is the level-1 random effect.  In the level-2 model,  each of the2j
level- 1 coefficients, B.j, defined in the level-1 model becomes an outcome variable in
the level-2 model:
Sq
Bqj - 790 +   7qa Waj  + uqj (3.2)
5-1
where   iq,(q   = 0.1, . . . , Sq) are level-2 coefficients, 11/8, is a level-2 predictor and
uqj is a level-2 random effect.
In the first model, a positive coefficient indicates that, as the values of the
explanatory variable increase, supportiveness for an extensive or intensive welfare
6Note that, according to Esping-Andersen, Italy belongs to the corporatist type of welfare state regime.
However, several authors have argued thaI Italy belongs  to a Southern  type (see Chapter  2).   To  test  this
argument, Italy is analysed here together with the other Mediterranean countries.
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Table 3.2: Scale distributions ofpopular support for extensiveness and intensity ofsocial policy.
IRL GBFWGBNLDMISPG
Extensiveness
Mean 3.92 4.10 3.70 3.88 3.44 3.74 3.69 3.50 3.59 3.89 4.00
Standard
deviation .58 .64 .57 .65 .59 .68 .73 .51 .48 .45 .44
Intensity
Mean 3.38 3.88 3.19 3.73 2.85 3.35 3.41 2.82 2.72 3.06 3.29
Standard
deviation .86 .72 .83 .76 .83 .80 .84 .83 .79 1.04 .83
40„.ilry.pecifir ·65** .88** .35** .90** .24** .74** .72** .15* .38** .81** .46**
rmu/t,group .62** .89** .41** .86** .19** .74** .76** .17** .03 -.29** -.41**
Note: F=France; B=Belgium; NL=The Netherlands; WG=West Gennaity; I=Italy; DM=Denmark; GB=Great
Britain; IRL=Ireland; G=Greece; S=Spain; P=Portugal
One-Way ANOVA for  Extensiteness:  F (10;9073)=105.58,  p<.000
One- 1Fay ANOVA for Intensity: F(10;8965)=159.52, p<.000
* *p  5  .01 (one-tailed test)
*P  S  .05(one-tailed test)
Source:  Eurobarometer  37.1
state also increases. However, a negative coefficient indicates that, as the values
of the explanatory variables increases, supportiveness for an extensive or intensive
welfare state decreases. The level-2 model explains the variability in the intercepts
of the different regression equations for each country.  That is, it explains why some
countries have a higher overall level of support for an extensive or intensive welfare
state than other countries. The models do not explain the variation across countries
of the effects of the level-1 covariates.  It is assumed that these slopes are a function of
the average regression slopes for these variables and level-2 random effects  U.
3.5       Results
In Table  3.2, we report the scores  on  the tWO support scales for the  11  countries,
calculated in a multi-group LISREL analysis for each country as a whole.  Also
presented are the correlations between the two scales based on the country-specific
measurement models  (see also Table 3.1)  and on the multi-group analysis7.
7To estimate an identified model for Spain, the error variances in the model for this country were
additionally fixed to zero. This explains the lower correlation between extensiveness and intensity in the
multigroup analysis.
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Britain appears to have the highest scale values in both dimensions. Greece also
shows a fairly high score on the extensiveness dimension, whereas Ireland, Portugal
and Germany are all at about the same support levels here. With respect to the ranking
of countries on the intensity scale, what is significant is that the predicted high levels of
support for the Southern countries are not found. Compared with the other countries,
their average scores on this dimension are relatively low. In conclusion, since no
clear pattern is visible upon ranking countries on both dimensions, hypothesis 3 is
unfounded.
The correlations between the two scales give support to hypothesis   1. For every
country there is a positive association between the preference for an extensive welfare
state and an intensive welfare state. However, the strength of the correlation between
the two dimensions varies significantly among countries, from a very high correlation
of.90 for Germany,  to a fairly weak correlation of.15 for Italy8.  We do not have an
explanation for these differences, as they do not seem to follow any pattern.
Finally, we discuss the multivariate analyses to assess hypotheses 2 and 3. The
results of modelling the relationships between micro-level and macro-level factors, on
the one hand and supportiveness for the welfare state, on the other, are shown in Table
3.3. As has been stated above, a positive coefficient indicates that as the values of
the explanatory variable increase, supportiveness for an extensive or intensive welfare
state also increases. However, a negative coefficient indicates that, as the values of
the explanatory variables increase, supportiveness for an extensive or intensive welfare
state decreases.
Because people's social and political views are often found to be strongly related to
educational attainment and income, the individual-level section of the models includes
four interactions as controls: between educational attainment and subjective left-right
placement; between educational attainment and post-materialism; between having a
low income and subjective left-right placement; between post-materialism and having
a low income.
Hypothesis ZA predicted that a stronger moral commitment to the common good
- as exemplified by a leftist position on the political spectrum, a post- materialist
value-orientation, trade union membership, and more educational attainment - will
go hand in hand with a higher level of supportiveness for the welfare state, in terms of
extensiveness as well as intensity. Because subjective left-right placement is scaled from
1 = left to 10 = right, we expect to find a statistically significant, negative coefficient for
this variable. For the other variables, however, we expect to find positive coefficients.
The scaling of these variables is from a low score on educational attainment, post-
materialism and trade union membership to a high score on educational attainment,
8This finding suggests that for the countries with very high correlations between the two dimensions,
a model with one latent variable and six indicators might show a better fit to the data. For reasons of
comparison, however, we will use the model with two latent variables for all the countries included.
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Table 3.3: Two-level model of factors affecting the level of support for an extensive and
intensive welfare state.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 3.77* * * 3.25*** 3.77* * * 3.26* * *
Individual te·od variables
Social location
Duration of education attainment .28* .43** .28* .44**
Occupation
Reference: Non-skilled workers
Skilled workers -.00 -.02 -.00 -.02
Petty bourgeoisie .01 -.01 .01 -.01
Routine non-manual workers .01 .03 .01 .03
Service class -.08* -.13* -.08* -.13*
Subjective social class
Reference: Working class
Lower middle class -.01 -.02 -.01 -.02
Middle class -.03 -.07* -.03 -.07*
Upper middle class -.08 -.14* -.08 -.14*
Upper class -.10* -.08 -.09* ...08
Transfer classes
Reference: Working
Not in the labour force .07 ** -.03 .07** -.03
Unemployed .10* .10** .10* .10**
Old-age pensioners/disabled .10** .10* .10** .10*
Low income .07 .02 .07 .01
Social-political orientation
Subjective left-right placement -.02** -.01 -.02** -.01
Post-materialism .03* .04 .03* .04
Union membership .09* * * .12* * * .09* * * .12***
Demographic characteristics
Sex .06* .08* .06* .08*
Age .00 .00 .00 .00
Interaction-tenns
Educational attainment x Left-right selfplacement -.05** -.09** -.05** -.09**
Educational attainment x Post-materialism .03 .06 .03 .06**
Low income x Post-materialism -.05** -.02 -.05** -.02
Low income x Left-right selfplacement .01 .00 .01 .00




Southern -.21* * * -.71* * *
Social-democratic -.31* * * -.49* * *
Corporatist -. 15*  * * -.08
Income inequality -.02* -.06**
Total social protection expenditure -.05* * * -.04**
Importance of income tax -.43* * * -1.28* * *
Level 2 modeled variance 32% 64% 8% n.a.
Intraclass correlation coefficient 12% 18% 12% 18%
Nlist wise 6929 6929 6929 6929
Note:
Model  1:  Effects  of individual-level  characteristics  and  welfare state  type  on  preference for an extensiue welfare  state
Model  2:  Effects of mdiuidual-let,€1  charactenstics  and welfare  state  type  on preference for an  intensive welfare state
Model  3:  Effects of individual-level  and  structural characrmstics mi  preference for an extensive  welfare state
Model  4:  Effects of individual-le'uel and structural characteristics on preference for an mtensive welfare stare
***p<.001 (one-tailed  1210
*  I  p  f  .01(one-tailed kst)
* p  S   .05(one-railed rest)
Source: Eurobarometer 37.1
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post-materialism and trade union membership. As both models show, the effects
of several indicators of this commitment to the common good are in line with the
expectations. People with longer educational training are more prone to hold the
government responsible for socio-economic security. They are also more in favour of
a broader range of social security than people with fewer years of education.  Note
that these results support the Hasenfeld and Rafferty hypothesis (1989) that there
is a positive association between educational attainment and support for the welfare
state. Moreover, members of trade unions also appear to be more in favour of an
extensive and intensive welfare state than non-members. Furthermore, people with
a left-wing political orientation and a post-materialist value-orientation also tend to
support it. There is also a significant interaction-effect between educational attainment
and subjective left-right placement on support for an extensive welfare state. As the
educational attainment increases, the effect of subjective left-right placement on this
support lessens. No evidence has been found for the expected direct effects of political
position and post-materialism with respect to support for an intensive welfare state.
The interaction-effects show that the strength of these effects is dependent on years
of education. The effect of subjective left-right placement is weaker as the number of
years of education increases, whereas the effect of a post-materialist value-orientation
becomes stronger.
As expected, most members of transfer classes appear to be more in favour of an
extensive welfare state than people who are working. This applies particularly to those
who are not in the labour force: the unemployed, old age pensioners and disabled
people. If individuals who belong to the lowest income group are also seen as a
transfer class, they do not show significantly higher levels of support for extensiveness
of social policy than people with higher incomes. An interesting finding is that this
effect interacts with an individual's post-materialist value-orientation. The effect of
post-materialism on support for an extensive welfare state appears to be less strong for
those who belong to the lowest income group than for others. The model for support
for an intensive welfare state indicates that the unemployed, old-age pensioners and
disabled people are more in favour of an intensive welfare state than people in paid
employment.
With respect to the effects of objective and subjective social class location on
supportiveness for an extensive welfare state, there is little indication for class divisions.
Members of the service class appear to be less supportive than non-skilled workers.
Also, people who consider themselves to be members of the upper class are less in
favour of extensiveness than those who count themselves among the working class.
However, these effects are only significant at the 10% significance level. Therefore,
as expected, the association between class position - objective or subjective - and
supportiveness for an extensive welfare state turns out to be very weak. However,
when examining support for an intensive welfare state, we see that class differences
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surface more clearly. People in the service class are less Willing to speak out
positively on an intensive welfare state than non-skilled workers. Furthermore, we
find that people who see themselves middle class and upper middle class are clearly
less supportive of an intensive welfare state than people who feel they are working
class. Accordingly, although the evidence is not overwhelming, there appears to be a
stronger relationship between class and support for an intensive welfare state. Lastly,
a demographic characteristic contributes significantly to both models. In accordance
with previous findings, women show a stronger propensity than men to support an
extensive and intensive welfare state.
Hypothesis 3 addressed differences in levels of support at the level of the welfare
state. Specifically, this hypothesis predicted that levels of support for an extensive
and intensive welfare state will be highest in Southern welfare states, followed by
social-democratic and corporatist welfare states. Liberal welfare states, however,
should show the lowest levels of support. The effect of the dummy variables for the
various welfare states regimes leads to the conclusion that this hypothesis is again
unfounded. In comparison to the liberal regime, all other welfare state regimes
exhibit lower levels of support, both extensively and intensively. Thus, although a
classification according to the type of regime appears to explain a considerable amount
of variance in both dependent variables  (32%  and 64%, compared with the intraclass
correlation coefficients'  of  12%  and  18%), the expected pattern  is not reproduced
by the data. Obviously, Esping-Andersen's classification is only of limited use in
predicting cross-national differences in levels of popular support for the welfare state.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicted that the method of financing the welfare state, the
level of expenditure on social protection and the level of income inequality also play
a part in people's willingness to support an extensive and intensive welfare state.
Specifically, it was expected that these levels of support will be higher in countries
where the tax system has less visibility, where less is spent on social protection, and
where there are low levels of income equality. In models 3 and 410 we have tested these
hypotheses. We will not discuss the individual-level results as these are practically
identical to the results in models 1 and 2. The findings suggest that our expectations
are partially confirmed. As expected, it appears that, as income taxes - more visible to
citizens than financing by, for example value added taxes - play a more important role,
people are less in favour of an extensive and intensive welfare state. Furthermore, we
see that the level of development of a welfare state, in terms of expenditure on social
gThis coefficient measures the proportion of variance in the dependent variables that is among the
level-2 units.  In this  case,  12%  of the variance in popular support for an extensive welfare state and  18%  in
popular support for an intensive welfare state is among countries.
10No explained variances could be calculated for model 4, because no stable model could be estimated.
Although the effects found are interpretable, caution should be used concerning the results of models  3 and
4.
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protection, also matters for the public's support. As expected, in countries where less
is spent on social protection, people tend to give more support to an extensive and
intensive welfare state. Finally, income inequality matters for the level of support,
but not as we predicted. Here, we find that, as the income distribution of a country
is more characterised by inequality, people are less supportive of an extensive and
intensive welfare state, controlling for the level of expenditure on social protection and
the method of financing. It therefore appears that people who live under an income
regime which is characterised by high inequality are less willing to support welfare
state solidarity, especially if we take the level of development into account. There
is no immediate explanation for this unexpected effect. Presumably, the high level
of income inequality in a country reflects a lack of social cohesion which, in turn, is
reflected by lower levels of support to achieve welfare state solidarity.
3.6   Summary and discussion
This chapter has attempted to provide an answer to the question of how, and
to what extent, popular support for the welfare state is related to such individual
characteristics as position in the stratification structure, demographic characteristics
and social-political beliefs, as well as to features of the particular welfare state regimes
that are distinguishable within Europe. Several important conclusions arise from the
analyses.
First, indicators of moral commitment to the welfare state - longer education,
trade union membership, a left-wing political stance on the political spectrum and a
post-materialist value-orientation - perform relatively well when it comes to explaining
people's preferences for an extensive and intensive welfare state. This hypothesis was
largely supported by the data. An interesting finding is that educational attainment
not only independently affects people's supportiveness for the welfare state, but also
that this effect is dependent on socio-political orientations. Previous research had
not systematically tested the existence of such a relationship. In general, this result
points to the necessity for taking into account interactions between both structural
and ideological determinants of welfare state attitudes (Taylor-Gooby,  1985).
Secondly, self-interest enters the picture mainly through the dependence oftransfer
classes on the provisions of the welfare state. In general, the data supported the
hypothesis that individuals who belong to a transfer class will be more supportive of
an extensive and intensive welfare state. However, the attitudes of low-income people
towards government intervention in social security did show much difference from the
attitudes of other people. If income affected the preference for an extensive welfare
state at all, it appeared to be dependent on people's post-materialist value orientation.
Thirdly, some indications are found for the presence of class differences, which
were mainly reflected in the levels of support for an intensive welfare state. However,
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these differences were not particularly strong. Given the high level on which welfare
state popularity is measured, this result is not surprising. As Kangas (1997) argued,
moral commitment to the common good seems to outweigh self-interest on a general
level, as the findings seem to indicate. We agree with Kangas that future research
should make more use of specific questions concerning concrete actions with respect
to social policy.  In this way, it will be possible to shed more light on the social
foundations of the popular support for institutionalised welfare state solidarity.
These findings also show that a structural position in the stratification system
amounts to a self-interested motivation to support the welfare state. Moreover, a
particular ideological position implies one or more motives to give more support.
Unfortunately, these relationships are only implicit in most studies due to a lack of
empirical indicators for the various motives for supporting a solidary relationship. It
would be a challenge for future research to construct and include empirical measures
of these motives and to relate them to structural variables (see, for an example of this
approach, van Oorschot, 1999; 2000).
Fourth and finally, no evidence was found for the thesis that there is a relationship
between the type ofwelfare state, as defined by Esping-Andersen, and levels ofpopular
support for it. These results corroborate previous findings by Papadakis and Bean,
who consequently argue that "classifications by writers like Esping-Andersen would
thus  appear to offer limited guidance to welfare state popularity"   (1993,  p.    246).
The results show that countries belonging to the liberal regime type are characterised
by the highest levels of support, whereas the social-democratic welfare states do not
show the expected high levels of support. These results point to the need to search
for other explanations. For example, it has been suggested that the varying levels
of popular support for the welfare state may lie in concrete differences in its social,
political and economic organization, rather than in the specific model to which a real
welfare state belongs.  In this respect, Wilensky has identified the orientation of the
tax system as a salient feature. Specifically, he argues (1975, p. 59) that less reliance
on direct income and property taxes on households and more on sales or value added
taxes to finance the welfare state would lead to higher levels of popular support for
welfare state spending. The latter tax system may be less visible to citizens. We have
tested these and other ideas empirically here and we have found clear indications that
the level of development, the method of financing, and the level of income inequality
matter for the level of support for an extensive and intensive welfare state.
Theories oflegitimacy point to yet another explanation for varying levels of support:
confidence in democratic institutions (Misztal, 1996). These theories assume that trust
in institutions is based on legitimacy and that political trust is associated with political
participation and consent. People who trust that political power is appropriately
exercised will give more support to policy efforts. Citizens who do not believe that
their government can be trusted are less likely to express support. Trust, however,
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must not be seen as identical to legitimacy, but rather "as one of the dynamics of
public opinion, helping to explain citizens' attitudes and actions vis-a-vis the regime ,.
(Misztal, 1996, p.  248).  This line of reasoning suggests that trust may also influence
people's opinion about the performance of welfare state institutions. We may suppose
that, if the general confidence in welfare state institutions of a country is low, people
will be less inclined to be supportive of these institutions. Obviously, complicated
interactions among various factors at the country level are at work here. They need to
be addressed in future research, both theoretically and empirically.
The most important conclusion of this chapter is that the welfare state was still
strongly legitimated among its citizens at the beginning of the 9Os, even after a period
of intensive restructuring. In every country, the majority of the population was then
strongly - or very strongly - in favour of an extensive and intensive welfare state. One
must, however, keep in mind that the support base may have been overrated due to
the general level of some of the indicators used in the analyses. Another restriction
concerns the fact that our data are rather old (from 1992). Levels of public support
may have changed during the 90s. Consequently, the results may not reflect the
more recent general mood towards supportiveness.  Only the results of more recent
public opinion surveys will make it possible to evaluate the degree to which citizens
appreciated their welfare state by the end of the 90s. In summary, despite the erosion
of social provisions and efforts to introduce the market into social security, the citizens
of European welfare states appeared to feel that the national governments should play
a significant role in the provision of social security. This suggests that future efforts
for retrenchment of government intervention might meet with substantial opposition,
which is reflected in a more positive public opinion towards government intervention
in social policy.
4 Welfare States, Solidarity and Justice Principles:
Does the Type really matter?
Abstract. In this chapter, we investigate whether - and if so, to what extent - people's
notions of solidarity and their choice of justice principles are related to the type of welfare
state regime they live under, as well as to individual socio-demographic and ideological
factors.  We  analyse  data  from the  International Social Survey  Program  1996  and  the  European
Values Stucy 1999 which, together, cover preferences of citizens from 20 welfare states.
Hypotheses pertaining to people's notions of solidarity and preferences of distributive justice
in the different welfare state regimes are derived from the work of Esping-Andersen and his
critics, as well as from sociological and social-psychological theories of distributive justice.
We find important, although not decisive evidence for the thesis that the actual state of affairs
with respect to the welfare state regime determines a citizen's views about which level of
solidarity should be achieved and which justice principles should be emphasised. However,
differences are often slight, and we argue that this is because values of solidarity and justice
are matters of priority to all welfare states. Taking into account the existing differences
among welfare state regimes, we also find important variations among individuals and social
groups in their preferred level of solidarity and their choices of justice principles.
4.1      Introduction
When Esping-Andersen published his Three worlds of IFWfare Capimlism in 1990, it
instantly became a sociology-classic.  One of the crucial premises in this book was
that the creation of equality has always been the core issue of welfare states. Later,
Esping-Andersen (1994, p. 3; 1996, p. 2; 1999, p. 3) observed that, in a manner of
speaking, the welfare state itself is equality, at least, in the sense that welfare states
- morally speaking - have always promised a more universal, classless justice and
'solidarity of the people'.  They are, in other words, committed to upholding existing
standards of equality and social justice.
If Esping-Andersen's premise is correct - and the aim and character of welfare
states can be formulated in such a simple straightforward manner - then why do welfare
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states so often differ substantially with respect to the allocation and distribution of
welfare? The obvious answer for Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 3; 1994, p. 717; 1996, p.
2; 1999, p. 32) himself is that definitions of equality espoused in distinct welfare states
have not only remained rather vague, but have also often varied considerably. Welfare
states vary in terms of which particular egalitarian justice principles they accentuate
and which specific notions of social solidarity they pursue. Some welfare states, for
example, have embraced a notion of equality that reflects a redistributive justice of
collective solidarity. Others, however, have cherished a conflicting notion of solidarity
- i.e.  equity - which reflects the rationality of a quid pro quo actuarial principle of
distributive justice.
Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 3, p. 26 & p. 32) suggests that, when we focus on the
justice principles and notions of solidarity embedded in welfare states, we discover
that variations are not linearly distributed around a common denominator. They
are clustered into three highly diverse regime-types, each organised around its own
discrete logic of organization, stratification and societal integration. Therefore we
can identify three models - or ideal typeS - of welfare states: conservative, liberal and
a social-democratic. He tested this theoretical conjecture empirically by finding an
answer to the question of whether distinct welfare states that resemble his ideal types
can be observed. There appears to be a clear coincidence of high de-commodification
and strong universalism in the Scandinavian, social-democratically influenced welfare
states. There is an equally clear coincidence of low de-commodification and strong
individualistic self-reliance in the Anglo-Saxon nations. Finally, the continental
European countries group closely together as corporatist and statist. They are also
modestly de-commodifying (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 77).
4.2 Research questions
In the first part ofhis classic, Esping-Andersen's was concerned with specifying crucial
welfare-state differences and testing leading hypotheses concerning their crystallization
into three different regime-types.  In the second part, he studied those types as
independent, causal variables. He tried to answer the question: How do different
types of welfare state regimes systematically influence social and economic behaviour
in advanced capitalist states? In this chapter we will follow in his footsteps. We will
look critically at his typology and will also examine modified versions of it to see if
they have explanatory or heuristic power with regard to some crucial aspects of life
within welfare states. The specific question we will address in this chapter concerns
whether  or not it matters to people under which type of welfare state regime they live,
with respect to their acceptance of certain notions of solidarity and their choice of
particular justice principles.
The answer to this question cannot be found by simply looking into the myriad
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of empirical studies elaborating on Esping-Andersen's work. Svallfors (1997) has
observed that most studies of welfare state regimes generally neglect the impact of
regime characteristics on the attitude structures and value commitments found among
populations of various welfare states. Their sophisticated treatment of institutions and
actual distributions of various goods, he remarked, has seldom been extended to any
substantial analysis of the way in which different regimes promote certain attitudes
at the expense of others. Looking at the literature, Gundelach (1994) and Kluegel
and Miyano (1995) seem to be among the very few exceptions that prove Svallfors's
rule. Svallfors himself, however, is not someone to simply accept this. Prior to his
above-mentioned criticism of comparative welfare state studies, he (Svallfors, 1993)
had already searched for an empirical answer to the question of whether Sweden
and Great Britain - both welfarist capitalist nations and differing significantly in their
policies and politics - vary in the way their citizens perceive equality and redistribution.
In the 1997 article, he continued by analyzing how attitudes toWards redistribution
are structured in various types of welfare state regimes. He found that different typeS
actually tend to promote different ways of valuing income differences resulting from
both market forces and the redistributive policies of governments. If justice principles
and notions ofsolidarity are used by people as guidelines for valuing income differences
then, according to Svallfors' findings, the type of welfare state really matters.
According to Svallfors, however, research  into the question of whether - and how
- welfare state regimes influence the attitudes concerning equality and redistribution,
is not the only thing that is lacking. He refers to several authors who argue that
Esping-Andersen's typology is not exhaustive and that further regime-types need to be
distinguished. He has, to some extent, been heeding the critics' Call to add a fourth,
radical world of welfare capitalism, which includes Australia and New Zealand. These
countries, labelled by Esping-Andersen as liberal welfare states, show a low degree
of welfare redistribution through the state. However, their industrial relations system
emphasises the equal distribution of primary welfare by regulating wages and other
work conditions.
Our aim, in this chapter, iS to follow both Esping-Andersen's and Svallfors' lead
by extending their analyses. By doing so we will attempt to gain more in-depth
knowledge about the degree to which different regime typeS influence people's choices
of principles of distributive justice and notions of solidarity. In order to do this, we
will elaborate on Esping-Andersen's and Svallfors' studies in three ways. We will,
first of all, address the question of whether there are three - as Esping-Andersen
assumes - or more ideal-types of welfare-state regimes. Furthermore, we Will try to
measure people's choices of justice principles and notions of solidarity more directly,
not relying on judgements of income (re)distribution as in Svallfors (1997). Finally,
we will use deductive reasoning - instead of Svallfors' inductive style of argumentation
- by first applying explanatory theories of justice and solidarity and, secondly, by using
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confirmatory instead of exploratory forms of data-analysis.
4.3 Conceptual framework
Before we can accomplish our mission, we must first explain the conceptual framework
applied in this chapter. As we have mentioned before, Esping-Andersen's point of
departure is the assumption that welfare states are supposed to produce equality and,
in a manner of speaking, even are equality. Because equality is such a broad and
vague concept, welfare states often vary in terms of which egalitarian principles they
accentuate. Not all welfare states have wholeheartedly and equally embraced the
notion of equality that reflects a redistributive justice of collective solidarity.  This
raises the question of what the exact relationship is between this multifarious concept
of equality, on the one hand, and notions of solidarity and principles of distributive
justice on the other. Esping-Andersen suggests that the latter, at least in this case, can
be treated as intertwined concepts. Both concepts refer to particular aspects of the
notions of equality espoused by welfare states and are, at least in this regard, two sides
of the same coin. Therefore, his answer - if we interpret his line of reasoning correctly
- should be as follows.  If all welfare states try to create some sort of equality, then they
must try to find an institutional solution for the problem of solidarity: In other words,
who should be made equal to whom or, more precisely, who should have equivalent
rights to what kind of collective protection. Because solidarity and distributive justice
are intertwined, the following consecutive question must be answered: What kind of
equality should be applied to those who should have equivalent rights to what level of
collective protection?
Although solidarity is one of sociology's key problems, the theoretical connotations
of this concept have, since the important early contributions of Durkheim and Weber,
seldomly been analysed in a satisfactory manner (Bayertz, 1998; Doreian & Fararo,
1997; van Oorschot & Komter, 1998). In their review of the state of the art of
sociological theory construction concerning solidarity, van Oorschot and Komter
(1998) come to this conclusion. The sociologists they discuss (Durkheim, Weber,
Parsons, Mayhew and Hechter) seem to perceive solidarity primarily as a state of
relationships among individuals and groups enabling collective interests to be served
and only, in the second place, as a value or moral sentiment. The essence of such
relationships is that people have or experience a common fate, either because they
share identity as members of the same collectivity - therefore feel a mutual sense of
belonging and responsibility - or because they share utility: They need each other to
make the most of their life chances and, especially, to avert risks. In order to make
the concept of solidarity easier to handle in empirical research, van Oorschot (1997b)
has searched for indications of these communal interests and feelings. According
to his findings, societal solidarity takes shape either vertically: The 'strong' help the
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'weak' by redistributing benefits and burdens, or horizontally: The 'strong' and the
'weak' contribute to the common weal by risk-sharing. Societal solidarity increases
the more the 'strong' support the 'weak' and the more both the 'strong' and the 'weak'
contribute to the general interest.
In the literature, social or distributive justice, like solidarity, is conceived not only
as a particular societal state of affairs, but also as a value or moral sentiment.  Once
again, the problem of justice features prominently in the work of the two most famous
classical sociologists: Durkheim and Weber  (Arts  &  van der Veen,   1992,  p.    144).
Contrary, however, to the sociological treatment of notions of solidarity that people
cherish, there is extensive and informative literature pertaining to what principles
of distributive justice people embrace. Their answer to the question of who should
get what and why (for an overview, see, Jasso, 1989; Arts, 1995; Jasso & Wegener,
1997).  Deutsch  (1975, p. 139) provides the substantive values that, according to this
literature, are the underlying principles of distributive justice. Justice is the treatment
of all people,   such  that all receive outcomes 1) proportional to their inputs;   2)   as
equals; 3) according to their needs; 4) according to their ability; 5) according to their
efforts; 6) according to their accomplishments; 7) so that they have equal opportunity
to compete without external favoritism or discrimination; 8) according to the supply
and demand of the market place; 9) according to the requirements of the common
good; 10) according to the principle of reciprocity;   11)  so  that  no one falls below  a
specified minimum. This rather long list of different values that may conflict with one
another, seems to contradict what we said above about the informative character of
the literature. Its length - and the possible internal conflict among certain values -
does not conflict with the finding that every society has a set of norms determining
the fairness of certain societal distributions of benefits and burdens. Neither does it
conflict with the claim for a basic justice motive, that can be reduced to a shared
moral feeling of entitlement. This feeling gives, in its most primitive form, rise to
the perceived right to expect outcomes that are equivalent or proportional to relevant
inputs. Although such a proportionality rule is generally accepted as the most general
conception of distributive justice, there is often difference of opinion regarding the
just extent of a distribution of social benefits and burdens in particular circumstances.
That could be because people do not always agree on what constitutes relevant inputs,
nor on how much emphasis must be put on each of those factors. Deutsch (1975)
advances the thesis that, in spite of the many specific values underlying principles of
distributive justice, three overreaching principles can be distinguished: 1) equity; 2)
equality; 3) need.  Most of the substantive values can be gathered under the umbrella
of these principles.
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4.4    Differences in solidarity and justice among welfare states regimes
Esping-Andersen is not the only one to conclude that distributive justice and solidarity
are the crucial institutional virtues of welfare states. The welfare state,   as a societal
type sui generis, can, according to the literature even be seen as an organised system
of solidarity, historically progressing from group solidarity among workers - later
between workers and employers - towards solidarity among larger social groups: the
healthy and the sick, the young and the elderly, the employed and the unemployed
(Schuyt, 1998). The welfare state can, therefore, also be conceived as an agent which
now plays an important - if not dominant - role in the implementation of income
maintenance and redistribution, according to modern norms of distributive justice
(Arts,   1985). The institutions  of the welfare state function  as a major foundation  of
societal solidarity and distributive justice by embodying the collection of social rights
which give individuals a formal legal and social identity - i.e. social citizenship - as
members  of a socio-political community (Turner,  1997). This raises the question  of
whether the formal inclusion in such a socio-political community leads to growing
realization that one also belongs to a moral community.  If so, does living under a
specific welfare regime cause people to adhere to a particular conception of this moral
community? What should be the primary units to produce and receive collective
protection? What should be the scope and strength of solidarity? How should equality
be established, and what principles of justice should be emphasised?
If ideal typical welfare state regimes exhibit qualitatively different notions of
solidarity and pursue different conceptions of distributive justice, what are then the
specific notions and conceptions embedded in each of them? How many ideal types
of welfare states can be distinguished in the real world of welfare capitalism?  As we
have seen before, Esping-Andersen (1990) answered the latter question by limiting
the number of ideal types to only three: liberal, conservative and social-democratic.
The liberal type emphasises equality in the sense of equal opportunity and in-
dividualistic equity. Equal opportunity means that social positions are open to all.
Individualistic equity means that people themselves are first and foremost responsible
for their own welfare and that they, at least ideally, are awarded by the market
according to their achievements and efforts. In its social policy, therefore, the state
is rather reluctant to provide welfare to those in need. Income transfers are deemed
legitimate only as far as they are intended for the deserving poor. Welfare programmes
serve to encourage the operation of the market; either actively, by means of subsidising
private welfare schemes, or passively, by keeping (often means-tested) social benefits
on a modest level for only the truly and demonstrably needy. Horizontal and vertical
solidarity are low, as is the degree of de-commodification: the degree of protection
against the vicissitudes of market fortune. Exclusion of the 'undeserving' from welfare
state provisions is an inevitable consequence of this kind of welfare state regime. Here,
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welfare is characterised by a relatively low degree of welfare expenditure and only a
small extent of vertical income redistribution.
The conservative type stresses equity over redistribution. This is not an individ-
ualistic equity, but rather a corporative status equity. Society in conservative welfare
states is segmented. There is a hierarchy according to class and status differentials.
Not only the welfare state, but also the 'StUnde' are the relevant moral communities.
Solidarity is, therefore, not only founded on the ideal of social citizenship but also on
'Stb:ndesbewusstsein'. The welfare state institutions and programmes emphasise  the
functional importance for society of hierarchy according to class and status and are
designed to preserve status differentials. All citizens are socially included, provided
they have participated in the labour market and contributed to social insurance. Social
security is preserved through intermediate quasi- or semi-governmental institutions.
The welfare state generally provides means-tested social security to families according
to the previous class and status of the breadwinner.  This is done in order to preserve
the existing hierarchy and maintain the social status of families. Therefore, the redistri-
bution of welfare, and therefore solidarity, is more horizontal than vertical. The degree
of de-commodification depends strongly upon one's position in the labour market and
within the family.  If one does not participate fully on the labour market, then one
either becomes dependent on the breadwinner or lacks full social security.  If one does
participate fully and one is a breadwinner, then the degree of de-commodification is
relatively high.
The social-democratic type of welfare state regime, in its turn, underlines univer-
salistic solidarity and egalitarianism, which means equality of outcome. The state is
the predominant moral community and takes full responsibility for the social welfare
of the people by guaranteeing everybody a minimum standard of living, by pro-
viding full citizenship and by preventing social exclusion. There is a high level of
de-commodification, high standards for meeting needs, the benefits are generous and
are not dependent on individual contributions. The effects of this type of welfare
state regimes are: Class and status differentials are blurred, social inequalities are
levelled, a standard of living that appropriately and decently caters for people's needs
is guaranteed.
Several authors have developed alternative typologies of welfare state regimes, or
added one or more types to Esping-Andersen's classification, in order to achieve
more explanatory power or empirical refinement.  From the vast array of welfare state
typologies found in the literature (for an overview: Arts & Gelissen, 1999a), we have
selected three additional regime types. We think that they draw attention to interesting
characteristics of those welfare states not directly included in Esping-Andersen's
classification. These alternative classifications arise from three of the important areas
of criticism of Esping-Andersen's typology:  1) He generally neglects Southern or
Mediterranean welfare states.  Even if they are mentioned, and briefly dealt with, they
86                                                Chapter 4
are incorrectly classified as conservative types (Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli,
1997).   2) The so-called antipodean or radical welfare states of Australia  and  New-
Zealand are incorrectly classified as liberal welfare states (Castles & Mitchell, 1993;
Castles, 1996; Hill, 1996). 3) He neglects the East-Asian communitarian welfare
states and, in particular, the position of Japan (Becker, 1996; Goodman & Peng,
1996). Southern Mediterranean welfare states resemble the conservative  type,  but
they are characterised by a high degree of familialism and an immature system of social
security, which means a low degree of de-commodification. European countries of the
Southern type are familialistic in that they assign a maximum of welfare obligations
to the nuclear or even the extended family. Also, in general, there is relatively little
state intervention in the welfare sphere. The social security system in this kind of
welfare states is not only immature - in the sense that the state and the insurance
markets, as providers of social security, find themselves still in statu nascendi - but also
highly fragmented.  On the one hand, there is no articulated net of minimum social
protection but, on the other, some benefits are very generous and some provisions
are universal. Anglo-Saxon countries under a radical regime - the Antipodeans -
resemble those under a liberal regime as far as the low degree of welfare expenditure is
concerned. Income maintenance schemes are, although rather modest and targeted,
more needs-sensitive than in liberal welfare states and not simply concentrated on
the very poor. Assistance is also more inclusive. While the liberal type is highly
inegalitarian, the radical type is highly egalitarian. As in the continental European
countries of the conservative type, solidarity is restricted to labour market participants
and their dependents. Income and welfare levelling takes place by regulating wages
and working conditions through industrial and political action. The labour market
itself is a welfare producer.  That is why radical welfare states are sometimes called
wage-earners' welfare states.
Although communitarian East-Asian welfare states have some characteristics in
common with both the conservative and the liberal welfare states, they have other
specific characteristics that make them different from the Western typeS. Peng and
Goodman (1996), for example, argue that Japan is characterised by: (a) A system
of family welfare that appears to negate much of the need for state welfare; (b) a
status-segregated and somewhat residual social insurance based system; (c) corporate
occupational plans for 'core' workers. A case can be made, they state, that much of
this pattern also holds for South-Korea and Taiwan. In communitarian, East-Asian
welfare states, solidarity is mainly restricted to - and expected from - the (nuclear and
extended) family and the local and one's business community. Big conglomerates
(firms) and local community organizations on the one hand, and the family on the
other, are important for providing welfare and social security. The state is a welfare
provider of last resort, only seeing to elementary needs. The social assistance system,
for example, is strictly means-tested and highly targeted, as well as stigmatising.
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According to Esping-Andersen (1999, p. 8) there is a dichotomy between the
welfare state regimes ofthe Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries, on the one hand,
and Continental European countries and Japan, on the other, as far as the primary
unit to receive collective protection is concerned. For the first group, the primary
unit is the individual; for the second, it is the status group ('corporation') and/or the
family  (via the male breadwinner). There  are also differences among countries  as  far
the units to produce collective protection are concerned. Esping-Andersen (1999,
p.  85) calls this the dominant locus of solidarity. Social risks can be internalised in
the family, allocated to the market or absorbed by the welfare state.  Each of them
can function as the dominant locus of solidarity in welfare states. In Anglo-Saxon
countries of the liberal type, the produCtion of collective protection is predominantly
via insurance markets, while the state is only a protector of last resort.  On one
side, there is a self-reliant majority of citizens who can obtain adequate insurance
through private means. On the other side, there is a minotarian and dependent welfare
clientele. In Anglo-Saxon countries of the radical type, however, the production of
collective protection is primarily via governmental income policies to level pre-tax
and pre-transfer income inequality and via collective bargaining and wage arbitration
within the industrial relations system with a view to secure income maintenance. The
radical welfare states follow another route to a greater income redistribution from the
rich to the poor. The regulated labour market is, therefore, the dominant welfare
producer and locus of solidarity. In Scandinavian countries of the social-democratic
regime-type universal solidarity predominates. All individual risks, bad or good, are
collected under one umbrella. This implies a solidarity of the 'people'. The collective
protector and dominant locus of solidarity is the state. In continental European
countries of the conservative type, risks are pooled by status membership.  They
stress corporatist (status or occupational groups) solidarity. Protection takes place
both via quasi- and semi-governmental institutions and via a corporatist system of
industrial relations (subsidiarity). In South-Asian communitarian welfare states  such
as Japan, the family and the big industrial and commercial conglomerates are the
primary vehicles of protection and, therefore, the dominant locus of solidarity.  The
state is only a protector of last resort.
In a reply to his critics, Esping-Andersen (1997) first partly agreed with them.
He agreed that both the Antipodean and Mediterranean welfare states have strong
distinctive characteristics. He was, however, less convinced about the Japanese case.
Based on a comparative analysis, he concludes that Japan is not a distinct regime
type, but a more or less hybrid case. Recently, however, the critics have found a
less sympathetic ear from Esping-Andersen (1999). In addressing the question of the
advantage of a fourth, fifth or sixth regime cluster, he argues that we would probably
benefit from greater refinement, more nuance and more precision. Still, if we also
value analytical parsimony, neither of the proposed alternatives warrant additional
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regime types.  Why not? First, if we assume the validity of all three claims, we will
find  ourselves  with a total  of six models  for a total  of 18-20 nations. The desired
explanatory parsimony would be sacrificed, and we might as well return to individual
comparisons. Secondly, the peculiarities of the alternatives are only variations within a
distinct overalllogic, not the foundations of a wholly different logic per se. Recognising
the fact that the first argument is a weighty - although not necessarily conclusive one
- we will inquire whether each of the additional regime types produces qualitatively
different notions of solidarity and principles of justice than each of the original three
worlds of welfare capitalism.
4.5   Models and hypotheses
4.5.1        Distributive  justice  and  solidarity:   a  causal  model
The assumption underlying Svallfors' work on people's attitudes towards the welfare
state is that people's choices or their preference order of principles of justice and
notions of solidarity are based on contextual factors, particularly on the type of
welfare state regime. This is in accordance with much of the literature on distributive
justice. Several authors (Rescher, 1966; Eckhoff, 1974; Deutsch, 1975, Miller, 1976;
Leventhal, 1976; Schwinger, 1980) have argued that the choices people make with
respect to principles of justice depend to a large degree on their personal situations.
Some will choose an equity principle, others a need principle and a third group
will turn to an equality principle. The common goal underlying the interaction in
a certain situation seems to be the determining factor. When the primary goal is to
facilitate and enhance productivity, the equity rule is preferred. When the paramount
concern is preserving harmony in a social aggregate, equality will be the dominant
principle.  The need principle will dominate when the well-being of individuals is
most  salient  (Arts  &  van der Veen,  1992).   This  is  to a large extent in agreement
with  Peillon  (1996). He states  that the distribution of benefits  by the welfare state
has been legitimised, viz. by applying the need, the equity (desert or merit) and
the equality (universal right) principle. Social services, he argues, were originally
aimed at people who did not obtain sufficient resources on the basis of their efforts.
The provision of social housing, unemployment benefits, health protection, etc. was
justified by the fact that people need it. The provision of welfare may also be based on
equity (merit), if welfare benefits are related to contributions.  One may also consider
that, as members of a nation, people are equally entitled to a range of services and
benefits, independent of what they achieve or need. Peillon (1996, p. 180) believes
that the need/equity/equality basis ofwelfare is implied in Esping-Andersen's typology
of welfare regimes. The liberal welfare regime relies on needs. The conservative
regime includes the principle of insurance (equity/merit)  for the distribution of welfare
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benefits. Finally, the social-democratic regime is firmly associated with equal rights,
which generate universal services.
Contextual factors, however, only indirectly exercise their influence on the attitudes
of individuals. First, people must become accustomed to the contextual factors and
their social situations.  Only if welfare state regimes have been around for some
time have their citizens had the chance to gather individual and collective knowledge
necessary for the smooth functioning of the institutional solidary arrangements: Only
then can they learn to act in the socially approved manner. Secondly, people's choices
of solidarity notions and justice principles are strongly affected by the way they frame
the situation. Those frames are shaped by the socio-economic and institutional context
of the past. They affect people's definition of the situation at hand and prestructure
their choices of justice principles and notions of solidarity (e.g. Arts, Hermkens, &
van Wijk, 1995, pp. 136-137).
We can derive from status value theory (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Wagner, 1985;
Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, & Cohen, 1972) that issues of distributive justice only
arise in the presence of stable frames of reference. Those frames describe distribution
rules that are thought to be social fact and can serve as generalised standards whereby
individuals eventually develop expectations for rewards in specific situations. As a
consequence of beliefs about what is typically the case, expectations are formed about
what one can legitimately claim ought to be the case. A similar hypothesis can be found
in framing theory: "Any stable state of affairs tends to become accepted eventually, at
least in the sense that alternatives to it no longer readily come to mind" (Kahneman &
Tversky,  1981, pp. 730-731).  This idea is consistent with Homans's observation that
"the rule of distributive justice is a statement of what ought to be, and what people
say ought to be is determined, in the long run, and with some lag, by what they find
in fact to be the case".
Lindenberg (1997,1993) feels that how solidarity functions in a society depends
on how weak or strong it is. While there are gradations within these categories they
are, in his opinion, qualitatively quite different. Because of this qualitative difference,
societal situations give rise to two distinctive normative frames of reference in terms
of justice and solidarity.  At one extreme, there is a frame of strong solidarity in which
the dominant goal is to follow solidarity norms. This frame emphasises equality and
need as the principal justice principles. The entwining of need and equality is in line
with Miller's (1992, p. 570) observation that equality and need, in practice, are often
difficult to distinguish. In social aggregates where people have good relations with
each other and nurse feelings of solidarity, they probably also feel a duty to boost each
other's welfare. At the other extreme, there is a frame of weak solidarity in which the
dominant goal is to gain maximization and a subordinate goal is to follow solidarity
norms. This frame emphasises equity (merit/desert).
Therefore, liberal welfare states tend to create a normative frame that comes close to
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Figure 4.1: Theoretical Model of the Impact of Institutional Arrangements.
the weak solidarity ideal type. Social-democratic ones create a frame that approximates
the strong solidarity one. The other types will give rise to mixed normative frames -
between the extremes of weak and strong solidarity - with conservative and Southern
welfare states more to the strong extreme and radical and communitarian states more
to the weak side. All in all, these differences between welfare state regimes will be
reflected in people's consensually held notions of solidarity and the highly similar
choices of justice principles they make.
Following this line of reasoning, we can now construct the causal model depicted
in Figure 4.1. In this model, the connections assumed in the preceding section are
reproduced in brief.
4.5.2      Distributive justice  and  solidarity:  additional  hypotheses
It would be naive to suppose that people's choices of principles of distributive justice
and notions of solidarity are entirely determined by the force of circumstances of
the welfare regimes and the frames of reference created by them. Research findings
make it immediately apparent that these choices will not be completely determined
by contextual factors and more or less uniform frames of reference.  If that were the
case, we would find a nearly general consensus on issues of social justice and solidarity
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within welfare states. Even though consensus dominates dissension, this conclusion
would be obviously unrealistic (cf.  Arts & van der Veen,  1992, p. 152; Tdrnblom,
1992, p. 203). Welfare states will not only be characterised by a considerable degree
of agreement concerning the choice of notions of solidarity and justice principles, but
they will also show differences among individuals and groups in their preferences.
Empirical studies clearly illustrate that people's beliefs about distributive justice and
solidarity are not only conditioned by situational factors, but also by individual,
relational, and cultural ones (Hegrved, 1992, p. 325).
The most important individual factor seems to be self-interest (Miller, 1992, p.
585; Arts & Hermkens, 1994, p. 138; d'Anjou et al., 1995, p. 358; van Oorschot,
1997b, p. 23). According to the so-called self-interest thesis, beliefs about justice
and solidarity are a rationalization of self-interest. People tend to endorse the view of
solidarity and justice which, if implemented, would work to their relative advantage.
Swift et al. (1995, pp. 35-37) found, for example, that there were significant social
class differences in normative judgements about justice. Members of the working
classes were most in favour of equality, whereas the salariat and the (traditionally
conservative) petite bourgeoisie were less sympathetic to it. d'Anjou et al. (1995)
found a clearly marked difference in adherence between the members of the highest
and the lowest social positions, i.e. between higher management (who are more in
favour of the desert or merit [equity] and less in favour of the need principle) and
the social security recipients (who are, conversely, less in favour of the merit and
more in favour of the need principle), although the preferences of the members of the
other classes showed a rather confusing pattern. These findings can, however, also
be differently interpreted (Miller, 1992, p. 585). It could be argued that lower-class
respondents and social security recipients tend to have greater exposure to solidaristic
relationships (through trade unions etc.) and less exposure to competitive relationships
than higher-class respondents do. One's day-to-day experiences of solidarity tend to
determine whether or not he or she is inclined to conceive society in solidaristic terms
and, therefore, use the appropriate criteria (merit vs. need) in making judgements of
social justice. Miller guesses that each of these interpretations contains a partial truth.
He also remarks that there is a considerable degree of cross-class consensus. Where
differences exist in the class-specific choice or preference order of justice principles,
the relationship is generally weak. Van Oorschot (1997b, p. 23) found that self-interest
is the main motivation for paying contributions to social insurances, but also that class
has no direct effect.
Swift et al. (1995), d'Anjou et al. (1995), and van Oorschot (1997b) found
that demographic and ideological factors were also associated with differences in
the choice of solidarity notions and justice principles. There are generally weak
correlations between demographic factors - such as gender and age - and the choice of
justice principles (Tdrnblom,  1992,  p. 203). Women sometimes seem to emphasise
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equality and need principles, men the merit principle. Increasing age sometimes leads
to a stronger emphasis on the merit principle. Ideological factors have a stronger
influence than demographic factors on the choice of justice principles and solidarity
notions. Research findings indicate that people who align themselves with parties of
the left/right tend to prefer relatively low/high inequality. Adherence to a free market
ideology is shown to be positively related to the merit principle and negatively related
to the need principle.
We can now formulate a number of additional hypotheses. First, we must mention,
however, that in the causal model we expected that contextual factors - especially the
type of welfare state regime - would primarily determine which principle ofdistributive
justice people would choose or what notions of solidarity they would embrace.  This
determination takes place, we have argued, through frames of reference that are a
result of the historical legacy of welfare state regime institutionalization.  Now we can
add that we also expect that individual attributes, demographic characteristics and
ideological factors also will affect the choice of justice principles and the notions of
solidarity that are cherished.
Based on the results of previous research, we have formulated the following
expectations concerning how some of the factors mentioned above affect people's
considerations of justice and solidarity across welfare states. We examine the main
effects of an individual's social-demographic and ideological position and assume - for
the time being and the sake of simplicity - that these effects hold equally across the
different types of welfare states.
·   Hypothesis 1: Women will be more  solidary and more in favour of equality  and need
principles  and Zess in favour of an  equity principle than men, ceteris paribus.
•  Hypothesis 2: Those who are self-employed will less strongly endorse the principles of
equality and need, and zoill more strongly adhere to an equity principle than those zoho
are not self-employed. ceteris paribus.
• Hypothesis 3: Younger people will be less solidag, more in favour of an equity
principle and less in favour of equality and need principles than older people, ceteris
paribus.
• Hypothesis 4: The more left-wing one's political inclination, the more one will be
solidaTy and in favour of the equality  and need principles, and the less  in favour of the
equity principle, ceteris paribus.
•    Hypothesis  5: The higher one's level of education, the more one will be solidag and
in favour of need and equality principles and the less in favour of an equity principle,
ceteris paribus.
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Figure 4.2: Determinants of People's Notions of Solidarity and Choice ofJustice Principles.
·  Hypothesis 6: People on heh incomes will be less solidao,  more in favour of an
equity principle and less supportive of the principles of equality and need than people
on low incomes, ceteris paribus.
•  Hypothesis 7: People who are gainfully employed will be less solidag, more supportive
of an equity principle and less supportive of equality and need principles than people
who are not employed, ceteris paribus.
These expectations, together with the primary hypothesis mentioned above, are
represented in a graph in Figure 4.2.
The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to testing these hypotheses. First,
however, we will give a brief overview ofthe data, the measures ofjustice and solidarity
principles and the statistical techniques used.
4.6 Data, Operationalization and Method
4.6.1 I)ata
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, we use data from two cross-national survey
projects.  In the first place, data from the 'Role of Government' module (carried
out  in  1996)  of the International Social Survey Program  (ISSP)  are  used.   The  ISSP
is a on-going annual programme of cross-national collaboration concerning surveys
on social attitudes and values. Every year, a module about a specific topic (e.g.
social inequality, religion, family and changing gender roles) is fielded, using the same
wording and sequencing of questions in each participating country. The research
population (N=32795) consists of representative samples of the following countries
(with sample sizes varying from N=500 for the Arab population of Israel to N=2494
for Spain; see ISSP 1996 for details): Australia, West Germany, East Germany, Great
Britain, United States, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic,
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Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, New Zealand, Canada, Philippines, Israel, Japan,
Spain, Latvia, France and Cyprus. The second data-source is the European Values
Study (EVS).  The EVS  is a large-scale,  cross-national and longitudinal survey research
programme on basic human values initiated by the European Value Systems Study
Group (EVSSG)  in  the late 1970s. Its major  aim  is to design and conduct a major
empirical study ofthe moral and social values underlying European social and political
institutions and governing conduct. Two waves of data-collection were carried out in
26  countries  in  1981  and  1990.   Here,  we  will  use  data  from  the most recent third
wave  conducted  in   1999  or 2000 throughout Europe. Each national survey  was  a
large representative sample of citizens  aged   18  or  over. The observational method
used was face-to-face interviews based on largely standardised questionnaires. The
current research population consist of the following 34 countries which participate
in  the  EVS 1999: Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, The Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom and the USA. For our purposes, it is necessary to confine
our analysis to countries which can be classified according to the 6 types of welfare
state regimes we distinguish and for which sufficient data in either data-set is available.
Specifically, we include the countries listed below.  Some of these are close empirical
representations of the ideal type and others are hybrid cases, exhibiting traits of two
or more regime-types. However, one has to keep in mind that, ultimately, even
archetypes are not completely pure cases:
Liberal:
1.   Pure type: Canada  (ISSP  1996)  and the United States  (ISSP  1996).
2.  Hybrid type: Great Britain (ISSP 1996, EVS 1999) and Ireland (ISSP 1996, EVS
1999).
Conservative:
1.  Pure type: France (ISSP  1996) and West Germany (ISSP 1996, EVS  1999).
Social-democratic:
1.   Pure type: Denmark  (EVS 1999), Norway  (ISSP  1996) and Sweden  (ISSP  1996,
EVS 1999).
2.   Hybrid type: Austria  (EVS 1999), Belgium  (EVS  1999), The Netherlands  (EVS
1999).
Mediterranean:
1.   Pure type: Greece  (EVS 1999), Portugal  (EVS  1999) and Spain  (ISSP  1996, EVS
2000).
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2. Hybrid type: Italy (ISSP 1996, EVS 2000)
Radical:
1.   Pure type: Australia (ISSP  1996) and New Zealand (ISSP  1996).
East-Asian Communitarian:
1.   Pure type: Japan  (ISSP  1996)
2.   Hybrid type: The Philippinesl  (ISSP  1996).
In both data-sets, national weights are adjusted to generate samples with a standard
size of 1000 respondents.
4.6.2      Operationalization
The dependent vanables of this study - people's notions of solidarity and choice of
justice principles - were measured as follows. In the first place, we selected seven
indicators from the ISSP  1996 to assess people's preferred level of solidarity. These items
relate primarily to the issue of who should have a right to a certain kind of collective
protection. Specifically, respondents were asked how much they thought that, on the
whole, it should or should not be the government's responsibility to do the following:
·   Provide a job for everybody who wants one  (IND 1) .
· Provide health  care  for the  sick  (IND2).
•   Provide a decent standard of living for the old  (IND3).
•   Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed  (IND4).
• Reduce income differences between the rich and the poor (IND5).
•   Give financial help to college students from low-income families  (IND6).
• Provide decent housing for those who can't afford  it  (IND7).
We  hypothesised that this selection of items  from  the  ISSP 1996 would yield  a
scale which measures people's preferred level of solidarity. Prior to any analysis, the
original response scales of these items (1 'Definitely should be, 2 'Probably should
be', 3 'Probably should not be' and 4 'Definitely should not be') were reversed for
convenience of interpretation. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to test
a one-factor measurement model for each country with these observed variables as
1 Note  that the Philippines  are not included by Esping-Andersen  in his discussion of welfare states.
However, in order to have some variation within the South-East Asian welfare state regime we use the
Philippines as another real 'immature' welfare state which can be assigned to  this  type of regime.
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Table 4.1: Factor loadings and fit-indices for Confirmatory Factor Models of solidarity items.
Item: Ind 1 Ind2 Ind3 Ind4 Ind5 Ind6 Ind7 Min Max RMSEA RMR GFI
USA .70 .81 .82 .78 .74 .69 .82 1.21 4.84 .086 .075 .99
Canada .63 .72 .80 .79 .71 .68 .81 1.21 4.84 .110 .093 .98
Great Britain .65 .70 .79 .81 .75 .71 .88 1.85 4.84 .071 .(}62 .99
Ireland .53 .85 .85 75 .66 .65 .74 1.59 4.84 .110 .110 .98
West Germany .68 .75 .79 .70 .65 .57 .72 1.45 4.84 .087 .089 .98
France .67 72 .81 .83 .76 .74 .88 1.21 4.84 .080 .075 .99
Sweden .81 .76 .79 .81 .79 .59 .82 1.21 4.84 .091 .087 .99
Norway 69 .77 .82 .77 .69 .59 .79 1.21 4.84 .096 .120 .98
Spain .67 .81 .87 .82 .74 .84 .89 2.37 4.84 .045 .046 99
Italy .61 .70 .76 .67 .61 .70 .74 1.87 4.84 .099 .110 .98
New Zealand .68 .79 .77 .74 .68 .62 .81 1.21 4.84 .110 097 .98
Australia .65 .78 .78 .74 .68 .73 .81 1.21 4.84 .081 .076 99
Japan .65 .78 .80 .82 .73 .68 .71 1.21 4.84 .090 .082 .98
Philippines .78 .80 .78 77 .59 .78 .80 1.21 4.84 .075 .081 .99
Multigroup .68 .76 .79 .78 .71 .68 .80 .080
Note:
Ind 1:  Provide a job for everybody who wants one.
Ind2: Provide health care for the sick.
Ind3: Provide a decent standard of living for the old.
Ind4: Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed.
Ind5: Reduce income differences between the rich and the poor.
Ind6: Give financial help ro college students from low-income families.
Ind7: Provide decent housing for those who can't afford it.
Source: ISSP 1996
indicators.2. Specifically,  we used a Weighted Least Squares procedure to analyse the
covariance matrix and asymptotic covariance matrix of these items. For comparative
purposes, a multi-group analysis was also performed in which we restricted the
loadings of the latent variable on the indicators to be equal across countries. Based on
this model, factor regression weights were calculated which were used to estimate the
scores of the latent variable. The results of these models are presented in Table 4.1.
In order to assess people's choice of justice principles, we selected three items from
the EVS 1999. These items correspond with the equality,  need and equity principles
2To assess the overall fit of the measurement model,  we use the Goodness of Fit Index  (GFI), the values
of which lie on a scale ranging from  0  to 1, where values Close to  1  indicate a satisfactory fit.  Also,  the  Root
Mean Square Residual (RMR) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) are used.
The smaller the RMR, the better the fit of the model.  A RMR of zero indicates a perfect fit. A value of
RMSEA of about .05 or less indicates a close fit of the model in relation to the degrees offreedom, whereas
a value of about .08 or less for the RMSEA indicates a reasonable error of approximation. Models with a
value of RMSEA  of.1  or more indicate unsatisfactory fit of the model.
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of justice. Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of each of the following
statements about what a society should provide in order to be considered 'just':
• Eliminating large inequalities in income among citizens ('equality').
•  Guaranteeing that basic needs are met for all, in terms of food, housing, clothing,
education, health ('need').
• Recognising people on their merits ('equity').
The original response format of these items (1 'very important' 2 'important' 3
'neither important not unimportant' 4 'unimportant' 5 'not at all important') was also
reversed.
The explanatog variables at the individual level were measured as follows. To
assess the effect of educational attainment, we used a four-category collapse of
the CASMIN project educational attainment classification (see Marshall, Swift, &
Roberts, 1997). These four categories are 'low educational attainment', 'ordinary
educational attainment', 'advanced educational attainment' and 'degree'. Three
dummy-variables were constructed using a 'low educational attainment' as the ref-
erence category. Furthermore, the effect of belonging to a transfer class was also
assessed with three dummy-variables: 'not in the labour force', 'unemployed' and
'old-age pensioners/disabled'. Those who are employed were taken as the reference
category. Household income is included using a ten category variable, based on
deciles. We also included the respondent's age - measured in years - and gender, using
men as the reference category. Note that these variables are present both in the ISSP
1996 and in the EVS 1999.
However, some important variables were only present in one of the data-sets.
Specifically, information about whether someone is self-employed was only included
in the ISSP 1996. We added this variable to the model of factors explaining people's
preferred level of solidarity by including a dummy-variable, taking those who are not
self-employed as the reference category. The EVS 1999 data also made it possible to
include union membership (non-members are the reference category) and subjective
left-right placement (measured on a ten point scale 1 'left' to 10 'right') as explanatory
variables in the models of factors affecting people's adherence to justice principles.
At the country-level, we included five dummy-variables for the various welfare
state regimes in the model of factors affecting people's preferred level of solidarity. In
this model, countries are indicated as belonging to the conservative, social-democratic,
Mediterranean, Antipodean or South-East Asian type according to the classification
presented in Section 4.6.1. Countries which belong to the liberal type are taken
as the reference category.  In the models of factors affecting people's adherence to
justice principles, we include three dummy-variables to indicate conservative, social-
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democratic and Mediterranean welfare states. In these models, liberal welfare states
are also taken as the reference category.
4.6.3   Method
Multilevel modelling was used to assess the effects of individual and country-level
variables on people's notions of solidarity and their choices of justice principles.
Multilevel modelling is a special kind of regression analysis, which takes into account
the nested structure of data. The basic idea is that the dependent variable Y has an
individual as well as a group aspect. The dependent variable must be a variable at level
one: The hierarchical linear model is used to explain an occurrence at the lowest, most
detailed level (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). We estimated several hierarchical models in
which the effects of social characteristics of individuals (level one or individual level)
and their belonging to a certain world of welfare capitalism (level two or country
level) were modelled simultaneously (see also Section 3.4.3). The general hierarchical
model assumes that both intercept and slope parameters may vary randomly across
countries. In some cases it was necessary to estimate a more simple random intercept
model, which assumes that only the intercept parameter at level one is allowed to
vary randomly across level two, whereas the effects of social characteristics are fixed
(assumed to be non-random) across level two. Eventually, both models allow uS to
investigate why some countries are more than others characterised by a higher average
level of preferred solidarity and stronger preferences for a certain justice principle.
4.7 Results
To investigate the relationship between welfare states and public preferences with
respect to solidarity and justice, we examine the pattern of the mean scores (and
standard deviations) on these instruments across countries (Table 4.2).
The first column represents the average position of the various welfare states on
our instrument of the preferred level of solidarity. The following emerging patterns
deserve attention. The first group ofwelfare states consists of Spain, Ireland and Italy,
which have, on average, a relatively high score on the preferred level of solidarity. This
group of countries is also characterised by more invariant attitudes concerning the
preferred level of institutionalised solidarity, as is apparent from the smaller standard
deviation of this variable. Obviously, these countries are 'immature' welfare states, in
which the role of the government is not as developed as citizens would like.
A second group of countries includes two 'pure' social-democratic welfare states:
Norway and Sweden. It also includes conservative France, as well as hybrid Great
Britain. These four countries occupy an intermediate position, which still signifies a
markedly positive attitude towards solidarity through government intervention. France
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Table 4.2: Means (and standard deviations) of measures of preferred level of solidarity and
justice, across countries.
Measure: Solidarity Equality Need Equity
USA 3.37(.78)
Canada 3.57(.69)
Great Britain 3.98(.61) 3.61(1.18) 4.62(.67) 4.31(.84)
Ireland 4.15(.51) 3.97(1.10) 4.67(.69) 4.33(.86)
West Germany 3.76(.57) 3.62(1.04) 4.48(.70) 4.10(.95)
France 4.02(.69) 4.06(1.10) 4.66(.71) 4.26(.98)
Sweden 3.96(.65) 3.29(1.17) 4.54(.86) 4.09(1.00)
Norway 4.06(.54)
Austria 3.63(1.07) 4.48(.79) 4.20(.88)
The Netherlands 3.17(1.13) 4.54(.85) 4.13(.97)
Belgium 3.82(1.15) 4.64(.71) 4.25(.94)
Denmark 2.71(1.28) 4.05(1.16) 3.87(1.22)
Spain 4.42(.48) 4.31( .89) 4.61(.69) 4.17(.98)
Italy 4.09(.56) 3.76(1.19) 4.56(.81) 4.03(1.06)
Portugal 4.52(.86) 4.71(.66) 4.47(.83)





One-Way ANOVA for Solidarity: F(13;11643)=181.15, p<.000
One-Way ANOVA for Equality: F(12;12681)=210.04, p<.000
One-Way ANOVAfor Need: F(12,12805)=52.88, p<.000
One-Way ANOVA for Equity: F(12,12611)=23.77, p<.000
Source: ISSP 1996; EVS 1999
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is a country in which a strong statist legacy exists, whereas Great Britain is an example
of what Esping-Andersen calls "stalled social-democratization" (1999, p.  87): A
welfare state in which a more comprehensive and collectivist orientation in social
security has gradually blended with a more pronounced liberal ideology. All in all, the
positive stance towards institutionalised solidarity in these countries is not surprising,
given the important part the state plays - or has played - in the provision of social
welfare.
The third group consists of countries which belong to the liberal, radical, conser-
vative or South-East Asian Communitarian regime type. With respect to the previous
two clusters of countries, citizens of these countries  show a relatively low endorsement
of institutionalised solidarity. Not surprisingly, the United States is always at the bot-
tom, preceded by Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand. As predicted, citizens
of these welfare states appear to prefer a rather weak solidarity frame. Moreover, the
citizens of the Philippines - an East-Asian Communitarian welfare state - and West
Germany - a corporatist welfare state - show a tendency to prefer a weaker frame
of solidarity.  This is expressed by less endorsement of the state's rights to provide
collective protection. As we predicted, the latter two countries occupy a position here
which lies between the pure liberal and pure social-democratic countries.
In  columns  two  to four of Table 4.2, we summarise the average values of choices
for justice principles for the various countries. With respect to the preference for
the equality principle, we observe that the citizens of Spain, Portugal and Greece
show the strongest adherence in comparison to the other countries. Furthermore, the
variance of the preference for this principle is significantly lower in the Mediterranean
countries. A middle group consists of welfare states with predominantly conservative
characteristics - West Germany and France - and also some mixed types - Italy,
Austria and Belgium. Not surprisingly, the people of Ireland also show a relatively
strong positive stance towards equality, because it is an immature welfare state.
At the bottom of the range of countries are the mature social-democratic welfare
states of Sweden and Denmark and the hybrid cases of Great Britain and The
Netherlands3. The latter two countries  are also mature welfare states  with a strong
social-democratic legacy.  Thus, we find a pattern in which citizens of immature
welfare states want more equality, whereas those in more mature welfare states are in
favour of levelling but are, at the same time, more willing to accept income inequality.
The third column of Table 4.2 reports that there is generally little variation among
countries when the preference for the need-principle is at issue. This is a consequence
of the level of generality of the item measuring people's preference for this principle;
general level questions elicit a strong commitment to solidarity (Kangas,   1997).   If
contrasts between welfare states do exist in this dimension, they are mainly between
3Notice that with the exception of Denmark, all response patterns on the item measuring the preference
for the equality principle are more strongly skewed to the right.
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the immature welfare states Greece and Portugal on the one hand, and the mature
social-democratic Denmark on the other. There, people take a slightly less positive
stance towards guaranteeing the meeting of basic needs. Notice, also, the higher
variation of this item in Denmark, in comparison to the other countries.
Finally, with respect to the public preference for the equity-principle, the pattern
is more pronounced. As expected, welfare states with a liberal imprint rank higher
than welfare states with conservative and/or social-democratic characteristics which
show a weaker endorsement of this principle of justice.
When we review the results with respect to the preference for the three justice
principles, one other interesting finding deserves attention: Portugal often ranks
among the top, whereas Denmark - in all cases - occupies a position at the bottom.
A possible explanation for this may lie in the expressiveness of the justice evaluation.
Jasso and Wegener (1997, p. 408) point out that individuals have a certain style
of expression that allows them to express with greater or lesser emphasis and with
hyperbole or understatement. Therefore, it might be that Danes tend to understate
their justice evaluation, whereas the Portuguese tend to overstate it.
To investigate whether this is actually a result of expressive style, we adapted a
technique proposed by Greenleaf (1992) to construct a measuring instrument for
extreme response style in surveys.  The goal of this method is to identify a subset
of items in the item-pool which are uncorrelated and have similar extreme response
proportions. Specifically, we selected several items from the EVS 1999 survey which
had 5 interval scales with the same endpoint labels as the items used to measure the
preference for justice principles. To identify uncorrelated items, we subjected this
selection to principal component analysis with varimax rotation. Next, we examined
the positive extreme response proportions, which we choose to be at least 40% of the
respondents answering 'agree strongly' or 'agree' of the items loading highest on each
rotated principal component". Four items were retained to construct each respondent's
extreme response score as the proportion of items in which the respondent chose the
'agree strongly' or'agree' category. Although this measurement is obviously limited by
the small number of selected items, the results gave some indication that the extreme
response style of the Portuguese might affect their evaluation of the justice principles5.
In Table 4.3 we present the results of a hierarchical linear regression analysis for
people's preferred level of solidarity.
dOnly two uncorrelated items had negative extreme response proportions, which we choose to be at least
40%  of the respondents answering 'disagree strongly' or 'disagree'. Because the number of usable items
causes too little variation in the negative extreme response measure, we could not investigate whether the
Danes also have a extreme response style.
5For  Portugal, this measure of positive response style explained  10%  of the variance  in the preference
for the equality- principle,   11%  of the variance  in the preference  for  the need- principle  and   10%  of the
variance in the preference for the equity-principle. For the other countries, explained variances by this
measure were 4% or less.
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Level-2 Modelled Variance .24
Individual-level variables:





Transfer classes (Reference: working)






Level-1 Modelled variance .09
* * * =p< 0.01 (one-tailed)
* * =p< 0.025 (one-tailed)
* =p< 0.05 (one-tailed)
Source: ISSP 1996
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Consistent with our predictions, the type of welfare state regime does matter
for people's notions of solidarity. Specifically, the contrasts among the different
regime-types suggest, first of all, that citizens of social-democratic welfare states
are significantly more in favour of social rights by government than citizens of liberal
welfare states. Furthermore, citizens of Southern welfare states give a higher preference
to a strong form of solidarity.  We also expected that citizens of radical and South-East
Asian Communitarian welfare states would give more preference to weak forms of
solidarity.  As the coefficients of the contrasts of these two regime-types are not
significantly different from the liberal regime, we do not have to reject this hypothesis.
Finally, we predicted that conservative welfare states would lean more towards a
solidarity frame in the strong extreme and, as such, we expected that their citizens
would show a stronger preference for a high level of solidarity. However, here we
find that there is no significant difference between the citizens of conservative and
liberal welfare states. All in all, however, our hypothesis that the welfare state matters
for people's notions of solidarity holds rather well, especially if we keep in mind that
the classification we used explains 24% of the variance in people's preferred level of
solidarity at the country-level.
As to our secondary hypotheses, we find, first of all, that the educational attainment
of a respondent significantly affects his or her preferred level of solidarity. However,
contrary to hypothesis 5, it appears that the more education an individual has had, the
less he or she is in favour of a strong frame of solidarity.  Consistent with hypothesis
2, we see that the self-employed are less inclined to support a high level of solidarity.
As far as transfer classes are concerned, only the unemployed prefer a higher level of
solidarity than those who are working; a result which only partially confirms hypothesis
7. According to hypothesis 6, individuals with higher incomes should show a weaker
preference for solidarity than people with lower incomes. The effect of the household
income of a respondent confirms this. Finally, the coefficient of gender reveals that
there is a difference between men and women when the preference for a certain level
of solidarity is at issue: As expected (see hypothesis 1), women prefer a higher level
of solidarity than men, ceteris paribus. Altogether, the explanatory variables at the
individual level account for only 9% of the variance in the preferred level of solidarity.
In the models presented in Table 4.4, we first investigated whether - and if so, to
what degree - welfare state regimes account for differences among populations in their
preferences for justice principles6.
With respect to the public preference for the equality principle, people living
in a social-democratic welfare state appear to be less in favour of equality than
citizens of liberal welfare states. In contrast, citizens of Southern countries are clearly
6Models for the dependent variables Equality and Equity are random-intercept and slopes-models, the
model for the dependent variables Need is a random intercept model (Random intercept and slopes model
for this dependent variable proved not to be Stable).
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Table 4.4: Two-level model of factors affecting preference for justice principles.
Dependent variable: Equality Need Equity
Intercept 3.74 * ** 4.56 * ** 4.17 * **
Country-level variables:
Welfare state regime (Reference: liberal)
Conservative .06 -.09 -.20 * **
Social-democratic -.22 * ** -.19 * * -.17***
Mediterranean .35 * ** -.02 -.16 * **
Level-2 Modelled Variance .49 .07 .08
Individual-level variables:
Educational attainment (Reference: low)
Ordinary .054* -.033 -.102**
Advanced -.102* .043 -.062
Degree -.136  * * .091 * * -.054
Union member .060* .012 -.091***
Transfer classes (Reference: working)
Not in the labour force .(}55 .038 .044
Unemployed .047 .055* -.018
Old-age pensioners/disabled .024 .019 -.01.1
Household income -.031*** -.005 * * .003
Sex .012 .045*** -.046
Age .004*** -.001* .005***
Subjective left-right placement -.113*** -.040*** .014 * *
Level-1 Modelled Variance .()9 .02 .03
*** - p < 0.01 (one-tailed)
* * =p< 0.025 (one-tailed)
* =p< 0.05 (one-tailed)
Source: EVS 1999
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more supportive of equality. These results are in agreement with previous findings
in Chapter 3 that the citizens of mature social-democratic welfare states are less
supportive of an extensive and intensive welfare state than citizens of Southern welfare
states. Furthermore, citizens of social-democratic welfare states are significantly less
in favour of applying the principle of need than citizens of liberal welfare states.  One
possible explanation for these effects is that, in social-democratic welfare states, the
tax regime needed to achieve equality might be more burdensome than in liberal
welfare states. This leads these citizens to take a less positive position towards
equality. Finally, the results in the last column show that citizens of conservative,
social-democratic and of Southern welfare states are all less supportive of the equity
principle of justice. This is in accordance with our expectations. We hypothesised that
primarily the liberal welfare states would tend to create a normative frame of weak
solidarity, which emphasises equity most strongly.
With respect to the effects of the individual level variables, we find that, as
educational attainment increases, individuals are less likely to choose the principle of
equality. However, those with a degree are - in contrast to those who are low-schooled -
significantly more supportive of the need principle of justice. Only those with ordinary
(secondary school) education are less in favour of the equity principle than those
with the least educational attainment. Thus, these results do not, in general, support
hypothesis   5. The coefficients of union membership suggest that this socio-political
characteristic promotes a stronger preference for the principle of equality and a weaker
preference for the equity principle. Surprisingly, in these models there are hardly any
visible differences between the transfer classes and those who are working. Only the
unemployed appear to be more in favour of the need principle than the employed. A
higher household income negatively affects the preference for the principles of equality
and need, which is in line with hypothesis 6. Furthermore, women appear to be more
supportive of the need principle than men.  As age increases, people are more in favour
of equality, less in favour of the principle of need (although this effect is significant
only at p < .05, one-tailed), and more in favour of the equity principle. As expected,
we find that, as people move more to the right of the political spectrum, they are less
in favour of equality and need, and more supportive of merit.
4.8   Conclusion and discussion
We have argued here that people's notions of solidarity and their choices of justice
principles need to be understood in the context of the frames of reference and the
forces of circumstances created by their welfare state regimes. A second objective of
the analyses presented here has been to test the idea that welfare states will show a
considerable degree of agreement with respect to the public's commitment to solidarity
and its choice of justice principles. Moreover, within these welfare states, dividing
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lines will run among individuals and groups in their preferences for certain justice
principles and notions of solidarity. The results and wider implications of our analyses
can be summarised as follows.
With respect to the analyses at the welfare state level, we found significant -
although not decisive evidence - that there is a connection between cognition and
evaluation (Marshall, Swift, Routh, & Burgoyne,    1999, pp. 350-351).      More
specifically, the actual state of affairs concerning welfare state regimes is associated
with people's views about which level of solidarity should be achieved and which
justice principles ought to be emphasised. Citizens of the immature Mediterranean
welfare states show a strong commitment to institutionalised solidarity. Likewise, the
people of social-democratic welfare states or welfare states with a strong statist of
social-democratic imprint clearly take a positive view of government intervention to
achieve a high level of solidarity. In contrast, in a third group of countries - a mixture
of liberal, radical, conservative and South-east Asian communitarian welfare states -
citizens appear to be relatively less dedicated to achieving a high level of solidarity
through government intervention. In general, the results show a close match between
the expected ranking of countries according to the public's preferred level of solidarity
and the frames of solidarity which are emphasised by the various regime types.
Concerning citizens' choices of justice principles, we also find a ranking of countries
which comes relatively close to Esping-Andersen's classification of welfare states, but
which is not as clear-cut as the public's preferred level of solidarity. With respect
to people's choice of the principle of equality, the findings suggest that, although
citizens  of all types of mature welfare states are in favour of income levelling, they are
simultaneously willing to accept income inequality. Conversely, the populations of
immature welfare states appeared to be more in favour of equality.
As for the preference for the need principle, the most significant result is that
citizens - regardless of their type of welfare state - rate this principle as paramount.
However, the results also  show that the populations of modern welfare states  also  give
strong preference to the principle of equity and equality. However, this latter finding
does not hold true for the immature welfare states of Spain, Portugal and Greece, where
the principle of equality is preferred over the equity principle. These results are largely
consistent with the observation  of Arts  and van der Veen  (1992,  p.   149). In modern
societies, they state, not only the differentiated distribution of primary resources is
increasingly based on achievement and decreasingly on ascription (hence the high
evaluation  of the equity principle of justice). However, also egalitarian ideas  have
become more important. At the value-level, modern societies are basically egalitarian
in the sense that inequalities are positively justified in terms of their importance for
society. The systematic ordering of preferences for the three principles, which exists
across all types of welfare states, provides a clear illustration of this argument.
With respect to citizens' preference for the equity principle, we find - as expected -
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that the citizens of welfare states which emphasise a weak frame of solidarity (in casu
the welfare states with a liberal imprint) tend to show a stronger preference for desert
criteria than the citizens of welfare states which create a strong solidarity frame: the
conservative and social-democratic regime types.
Taking into account the differences which exist among welfare state regimes, we
also found important differences among individuals and social groups in their preferred
level of solidarity and their choices of justice principles. Our results are largely in
line with previous findings by, for example, Kluegel and Miyano (1995) and our own
findings in Chapter 3. In general, we find that, as people's educational levels increase,
they are less committed to institutionalised solidarity and equality. This result supports
Kluegel and Miyano's thesis (1995) that, due to its strong correlation with income,
educational attainment differentiates between those who expect to benefit from and
those who expect to pay the price for solidarity and equality. As expected, a higher
income negatively affects people's preferred level of solidarity and their choices of
justice principles. Furthermore, women prefer a higher level of solidarity than men.
Finally, as far as the effects of transfer classes are concerned, only the unemployed
appear to be significantly more in favour of a high level of solidarity than those who
are employed.
Therefore, there is a strong correspondence among the normative frames of
solidarity - embodied by the various welfare state regimes - their populations' preferred
level of solidarity and their choices of justice principles. However, these findings
deserve a critical comment.
A first critical remark concerns the data.  The high level of commitment to
solidarity, which we find is possibly based both on a general consensus about solidarity
and justice in life beyond welfare regimes and the consequence  of the questions which
we currently have at our disposal to measure people's preferred level of solidarity
and their choices of justice principles. A statement such as 'guaranteeing that basic
needs are met for all' will only elicit approval by the majority of the public in most
welfare states, because they have no alternative readily available. Including this kind
of question obviously limits the scope of research on public commitment to solidarity
and justice and their connection to welfare states 7. As Arts and van der Veen (1992,
p.  152) point out, this kind of critique has been promoted, in particular, by Marxist
theorists, who suspect that the apparent consensus results from the fact that questions
are formulated in abstract terms. This causes the observed agreement to be an artefact
of the measurement instrument used. Eventually, this raises important issues of
validity, and the discussion whether dissent predominates consent - or vice versa -
needs to be settled by future research.
7Large-scale surveys such as the Iizternational  Social  Justice  Project 1991 include more refined measures of
people's perceptions and preferences with respect to the distributive order, but are limited in the number
of welfare states  (see  also, Arts & Gelissen, 1999b).
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A second critical note pertains to the fact that the differences found among
countries and regime types are often slight. For example, a quick glance at Table 4.2
reveals that the average scores of the various welfare states are relatively close together.
This shows that differences among welfare state regimes are largely simply differences
of emphasis. Whether regimes differ from one another is dependent on how much
weight they attach to specific justice principles and notions of solidarity. As Goodin
et al. (1999, p. 36) correctly argue, "discussions of differences among welfare state
regimes must be set firmly against the backdrop of commonality.  In many respects,
what all these  wel fare regimes share   is at least as important as their differences".
Because the countries we included in our analyses are all welfare states- albeit some
are 'immature' and others are mature - that some are one particular kind and some
are another - we do not come across truly large differences in people's preferred level
of solidarity and their choices of justice principles. Our findings only underscore the
following: Irrespective of the particular ideology on which specific welfare states are
built, a loose social unanimity exists over the various types of welfare states. Values of
solidarity and justice are matters of priority to all.
5 Public Health Care in the Balance
Exploring Popular Support for Health Care
Systems in the European Union
Abstract. Which factors explain intra- and inter-country variations in levels of public support
for national health care systems within the European Union, and why? In this chapter, we
propose that public opinion towards public health care is dependent on  1)  the type of welfare
state regime to which the various European welfare states belong, 2) typical features of the
national health care system and 3) individual social and demographic characteristics, which
are related to self-interest or morality-oriented motives. To assess the explanatory power of
these factors, data from the Euro-barometer survey series are analysed. Support for public
health care appears to be positively related to social-democratic attributes of welfare states
and negatively related to increasing degrees of liberalism and conservatism. Furthermore,
support for public health care proves to be associated with wider coverage and public
funding of national care services.  We also find higher levels of support in countries with
fewer social services for children and the elderly, and larger proportions of female(part-time)
employment. Lastly, with respect to individual characteristics, we find remarkably little
evidence for self-interest-oriented motives affecting the preference for solidary health care
arrangements.
5.1   Introduction and research questions
Health care systems are important elements of Western European welfare states.
Earlier research indicates that public health care has always been warmly welcomed
and supported, even in periods of welfare state retrenchment policies. Using data
from 1973, Ardig6 (1995) compared public opinion concerning health services  in
seven European countries and the United States. He found that citizens considered
good medical care 'very important' and its provision an 'essential' responsibility of
the government. Even though the welfare state is said to have been suffering from a
legitimacy crisis since the mid-7Os; this is not evident from the results of the survey
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or from the results of Coughlin's profound trend-study on welfare attitudes (1980).
Despite the public's ambivalence towards some programmes, his findings clearly
showed that some of the most expensive and extensive elements of the welfare state
- old-age pensions and health care - were invariably popular. Because his findings
revealed no evidence of a health care backlash, Coughlin (1980, pp. 74-75) concludes
that, even though the provision of health care varies among nations in organization,
coverage, funding and circumstances, under which care is provided, public attitudes
show a surprisingly constant pattern of popularity across nations.
Currently, all European Union member states provide or guarantee health care to
their people. In all countries, coverage is nearly 100 percent of the population, except
in Germany, The Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal where part of the population
must rely on private insurance or cover the costs themselves. However, as pointed
out by Taylor-Gooby (1996), these health care systems - in spite of many differences
in their set-up - face common problems: Demographic shifts, technological advances
and rising public expectations are increasing the costs of provision.
The ageing of the population and, closely related, the growth of chronic
diseases and the increasing need for care; technological developments in
health care, many of which increase costs directly or indirectly and the
lack of incentives for cost reduction are, although to differing degrees,
mayor issues in all EU health care systems (Abel-Smith & Mossalios,
1994; quoted by Taylor-Gooby,  1996).
Apart from the rising costs and the growing demand for services, health care
systems struggle with a decline in the caring capabilities of families, i.e. falling birth
rates and rising female labour participation. These changes transform social care
services into increasingly important ingredients of welfare state production (Alber,
1995).      In the fifties, the welfare state   and its arrangements were based   on   the
dominant family relationships: The male partner was the main breadwinner and the
female partner was primarily engaged in domestic labour and caring duties. This
model must now be adjusted to meet new demands and preferences.
These rather recent economic, demographic, and technological developments are
attached to an encompassing secular trend of on-going modernization in Western
societies.  One of the most important elements of the overall process of modernization
is the long-term and continuous process of individualization. The latter process
has three main aspects (Wilterdink, 1995). First, the relational aspect, which refers
to increasing instability and changeability of social relations. Second, the situational
aspect, which suggests that the range ofbehavioral options for individuals has increased
in nearly all situations. Third, the normative aspect, which refers to increasing stress
on the moral significance of individual autonomy. Although individualization has
been going on for a long time in all Western societies, this process has been more
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advanced in some countries than in others. This raises the question of whether all
the citizens of Western European countries are - to the same degree - willing to
support public health care services and prepared to share the burden of rising health
care costs. The provisional theoretical answer to this question has to be negative. If
the above-mentioned processes have a different influence on various countries - as
well as social categories, groups and individuals - then their readiness to support and
contribute will also differ. That is, however, not the only reason why the provisional
answer is negative. Comparative research shows that individualists do not always -
and in every situation - opt for individualistic choices. Individualism appears to be
domain specific and, above all, there appear to be marked cross-national variations
(Ester, Halman, & de Moor, 1994; Halman, 1996). This raises a new question. To
what extent do organised solidarity and shared responsibility - according to people
themselves - necessarily conflict with the increasing emphasis on individual autonomy
and self-realization?
The organization of the chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2 there is first a
brief introduction on the concept of solidarity; subsequently, we delve into one's
motivational bases for supporting solidary arrangements. In Section 5.3, we focus on
the questions: How do different institutional settings affect popular support for public
health care, and how are attitudes constituted by individual characteristics? Based
on these insights, we present hypotheses in Section 5.4 which will be empirically
tested in subsequent sections of this chapter. In Section 5.5 we present the data,
measurements and analytical strategy, followed by a description of the results of our
analyses in Section 5.6. Finally, in Section 5.7, we discuss the conclusions and the
wider implications of our results.
5.2   Solidarity and its motivational bases
The Western European welfare state might be regarded an organised system of
solidarity. Historically, it is based on solidarity among workers, later between workers
and employers which, subsequently, evolves into solidarity among large social groups.
In the latter sense, we talk about solidarity between the healthy and the sick, between
the young and the elderly and between the employed and the unemployed (Schuyt,
1998). Van Oorschot (1998b, p. 1) defines solidarity as an actual state of interrelations
among individuals, groups and the larger society, which enables the collective interests
to take priority over the interest of individuals or subcollectivities.  Such a state, he
explains, is based upon either a shared identity or a shared utility: Individuals perceive
themselves as members of the same collectivity and, therefore, feel a mutual sense
of belonging and responsibility or they feel they need each other to realise their life
opportunities. Subsequently, he argues that the strength and the range of the system's
solidarity are a function of the nearness and dependency of its social actors.  With
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respect to the motives people have for supporting solidarity arrangements, theorists
mostly refer to self-interest and moral commitment (Taylor-Gooby, 1985; Peillon,
1996; Kangas, 1997), which is in line with van Oorschot's distinction .  Such
explanations are roughly based on two lines of thought concerning the motivational
foundation of people's actions: the economical and the sociological (Kangas,  1997).
Neo-classical economic theory portrays individuals acting like Homo Economicus: An
all-informed, consumption-orientated maximizer acting in a rational manner in pursuit
of individual gain and economic advantage. In contrast, sociological explanations of
human action emphasise its social and normative bases: Homo Sociologicus is a value-
oriented conformer directed by social norms and driven by a moral commitment to
the common good. According to Lindenberg (1989; 1990), a man is not either homo
economicus or homo sociologicus, but rather Homo Socio-economicus, directed by both
his/her own interest and the collective norms. He assumes, following Adam Smith, that
all individuals have at least three ultimate goals: social approval, physical well-being,
and the minimalization of loss. These goals are universal. People, therefore, differ
less in their subjective desires than in their objective means of producing a particular
amount of a high level good (1990, p. 745). These means vary with social position.
Every person defines his own instrumental goals for achieving the ultimate goals,
given the constraints of the situation. Socialization enters the picture in that collective
norms provide a framework for the interpretation of the situation, thereby playing
an important role in conveying and coordinating preferences for certain instrumental
goals. Someone's attitude towards solidary arrangements, according to this theory of
human action, therefore stems from both self-interest and moral considerations. It is
dependent upon the constraints social structures impose on personal preferences.
Previously, we discussed van Oorschot's classification of these motivational bases
for supporting solidary arrangements, of which health care and care of the elderly are
obviously important examples. This framework also enables us to specify why it is that
people may support health care and care for the elderly. People may feel affectionately
and emotionally close to the ill and the elderly, either because they themselves are in
need of care or because they are care-givers: spouses, daughters and daughters-in-law,
sons, parents, relatives or close friends - who often have a very personal relationship
with the person in need (Pijl,  1994, pp.  3-4).  In both cases, feelings of affection and
loyalty at the micro level may translate into a more general supportiveness for health
and social care services, which is directed at the care for these vulnerable groups.
Furthermore, feelings ofmoral obligation and culturally based convictions may dictate
a greater supportiveness for health care and social care services. People may feel a
strong commitment to the collective interest as far as medical and social care for the
ill and the elderly are concerned. For instance, in Mediterranean countries, where
family and community ties are still strong and important in daily life, solidarity -
as exemplified by social care for the elderly - might have a different moral meaning
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than in Northern European countries, where the role of the family in informal care
for the elderly is more limited (Pacolet, Bouten, Lanoye, & Versieck, 1999, p. 27).
Another motive for solidarity, more directly oriented towards health care and care for
the elderly, may be based on perceived, long-term self-interest. Among the many risks
of life, virtually everybody will, sooner or later, be confronted with the risk of sickness
or with the risk of frailty in old age. People may, therefore, support health care and
social protection for the elderly because they expect to benefit from these health and
social care services in the short or the long run. Finally, when these three motives do
not provide enough support to bear the weight of a system of health care and social
care for the elderly, a higher authority (i. e. the state), which is sufficiently legitimised
among its citizens, may step in to enforce and to support such a collective health and
social care system.
5.3    Reasons for welfare state support
Few studies have attempted to determine which factors are important in the formation
ofpublic attitudes towards solidaristic welfare arrangements. The ones that have, were
mostly focused upon either the impact of institutional characteristics of the welfare
state or the impact of social position and ideological beliefs among the population.
From the above, however, it is clear that attitudes towards solidarity arrangements are
likely to depend upon both of these factors: the social structures and one's position
therein. Lately, this approach has been followed by many other researchers (e.g.
Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Svallfors, 1997). Here we will mainly follow the arguments
put forward in Chapter 3 on intra- and inter-country variations in levels of public
support for the welfare state. In order to explain differences in support for the welfare
state provision of health care, we will go  into the influences of macro-level indicators
as well as micro-level factors.
5.3.1        Welfare  state  regimes
First of all, the level of support for the welfare state is considered to be affected by
the institutional characteristics of welfare states (Korpi, 1980; Gallie, 1983; Esping-
Andersen, 1990). Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 23,55), in his socio-political account,
points out that the welfare state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in the structure
of inequality, but a system of social stratification in itself. Based on variations in social
rights and welfare state stratification, welfare states cluster in regime-types with
qualitatively different arrangements among state, market and the family (1990, p. 26).
He classifies Western welfare states into three regimes: the liberal, the conservative
(corporatist) and the social-democratic regime. The brief description of the three
regimes that follows, is derived - with thanks - from Diane Sainsbury (1996, p. 12):
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The liberal welfare state regime is characterised by heavy reliance on means
tested programmes, modest social insurance benefits, market solutions in
the form of occupational welfare (employer sponsored benefits), and
private insurance. In the conservative corporatist welfare state regime,
social insurance schemes are central but they are differentiated according
to class and status. Benefits are designed to maintain the status quo with
respect to income distribution, class structure, and societal institutions
- the state, the church and the family. The social-democratic regime is
typified by universal benefits and services covering the entire population,
a weakening of the influence of the market on distribution, and a strong
commitment to full employment.
The organizational features of the welfare state actively determine social relations.
Public benefits tend to segment or integrate the population and, because of that,
provide support for social solidarity, class and status differentiation. Based on the
work of Esping-Andersen - and Korpi's model of'welfare backlash' - Papadakis and
Bean (1993) argued that universal schemes will lead to stronger support for the welfare
regime as they provide wider coverage. Selective schemes will more easily result in
a 'welfare backlash' and, hence, less support, since benefits are targeted towards
specific groups through means testing. This divides the population into payers and
receivers. Another argument is that services devoted solely to minorities might fail
to attract the support of the majority. Hence, the institutional set-up of the welfare
state shapes the citizens' attitudes toward solidarity and imposes constraints on them.
These constraints might affect the individual preferences for particular welfare state
arrangements. Moreover, we may also consider the institutional characteristics of a
country to be the crystallization - at least to some extent - of the preferences of its
population about welfare state responsibilities. Hence, the ways in which welfare state
arrangements are shaped is both the product of people's preferences and the context
through which these preferences are constrained.
Empirical studies have addressed the question of the relationship between the level
of support for a welfare state and its institutional structure. Papadakis and Bean (1993)
found little support for the hypothesis that the level of popularity of welfare services
is likely to vary with the institutional context of a welfare regime. They conclude that
classifications of regimes - like that of Esping-Andersen (1990) - offer little help in
explaining the popularity of welfare state services. Research by Peillon (1996) and
Svallfors (1997), on the other hand, indicates that these characteristics really matter
for the support a welfare state gets and for the overall support for state intervention.
Moreover, Peillon also emphasises that other factors - i.e. the scope of a service and
whether it renders benefits in kind or cash transfers - carry more weight in producing
support for a particular welfare programme. We should realise that the classification
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into liberal, conservative and social-democratic welfare regimes is based on ideal
types, which in practice, may not exist - at least in ideal-typical sense. In practice,
the various national systems combine elements of all three (Taylor-Gooby, 1991).
The point of using typologieS, as Esping-Andersen (1999) points out, is economy of
explanation. First of all, they allow for greater analytical parsimony so that we can
see the forest rather than the myriad of unique trees. Secondly, if various species
can be clustered according to similar crucial attributes, the analyst can more easily
identify some underlying connecting logic of movement and, maybe, even causality.
Thirdly, typologies are useful tools for generating and testing hypotheses. However,
as parsimony is bought at the expense of nuance, the resulting forest might bear little
resemblance to reality, thus impairing its value for the explanation of concrete social
phenomena. It might, therefore, be important to study the real differences in the
characteristics of welfare state programmes so that they could serve as indicators for
the support of welfare state services (Goodin et al.,  1999).
5.3.2      Institutional characteristics  of the national care  system
Only recently, a body of literature has been developed which systematically addresses
the structure and development of care services from a cross-national point of view.
An important and difficult issue relates to the boundary between 'care' and 'cure',
between social care and health care.  Both of these concepts can be placed under
the general heading of 'care services'. According to Hill (1996, p.  142), the main
problem is that the sick may need physical care - someone to provide food, do
household tasks and perhaps to wash and feed them - as well as medical treatment.
Usually, separate systems of care deal with these issues. This leads to problems
of accountability and issues of financial responsibility. Apart from the question of
whether these matters relate to the system of health care or social care, problems of
subsidiarity enter the picture. Are they the concern of the individual with the capacity
to purchase a service, of the family and/or community, or of the state? Eventually,
because the demarcation lines of social care arrangements vary quite strongly within
Europe, differing definitions and boundaries of social care are the result, which make
it difficult to gather comparable data. Therefore, studies of care services, by necessity,
often applied more general welfare state models - i.e. the ones previously discussed
in Chapter 2 - to social care comparisons, as data on health and social protection
is generally more readily available (Munday, 1996, p. 11). In this chapter, we are
also confronted with these conceptual and empirical difficulties. Here, we choose to
focus mainly on the levels of popular support for health care systems. However, since
the health care and social care sectors for the elderly are 'communicating vessels' and
sometimes show considerable overlap (e.g. in Sweden large parts of the earlier health
care sector have been transferred to the social services sector or to social care for
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the elderly), we will also discuss - and take into account - the characteristics of the
national social care systems for the elderly.
Although the present study is devoted to popular support for welfare state pro-
visions of health care, the institutional characteristics - which we presume to have
considerable explanatory power - pertain to the national care systems in general,
including health and social care. We expect that our empirical findings are meaningful
for both health and social care, because health care systems and social care systems
are narrowly integrated and presumably share the broader institutional features of the
various 'welfare regimes'. Peillon (1996, p. 179) points out that the size of welfare
state programmes are a relevant factor for welfare state support. He argues that the
people in countries with an extensive social policy sector are more supportive of the
welfare state. For the same reason, 'heavy' social programmes will enjoy stronger sup-
port. Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 32-33) acknowledges that this seems paradoxical
as  "it is generally believed that welfare state backlash movements  .... are initiated
when social expenditure burdens become too heavy". Contradictorily, he finds that
anti-welfare-state sentiments have generally been weakest where welfare spending has
been heaviest. Moreover, Peillon warns us to separate the size of a welfare programme
from its scope. An extensive programme (as measured by proportion of the GDP it
absorbs) is not necessarily widespread. It has already been argued that services granted
to a minority are not very likely to attract the support of the majority. Peillon stresses
this, when he states that a widespread social programme solidifies support, while the
narrow scope of a programme hampers high support (1996, p. 190). Taylor-Gooby
(1985) for example, attributes the popularity of pension, education and health service
programmes in Britain to the fact that these services are directed - potentially at
least - to the whole of the population: They "command mass support because they
meet mass demands". Therefore, higher levels of support are enjoyed when a service
benefits the whole population.
Furthermore, Ardig6 (1995) shows that the way health care services are financed
affects the degree of responsibility attributed to the government for providing good
medical care. His findings reveal that the level of consensus that the government is
responsible for good medical care is higher in countries with a strong public health
system than in countries with a largely private health system. Elola (1996) studied the
differences in the structures and processes of the NHS and social security systems of
Western European countries and the influences on their outcomes. NHS (national
health) systems perform better than social security systems in controlling costs,
guaranteeing equity, and, most likely, efficiently improving a populations' health.
However, public satisfaction with the health care system is lower in countries with
NHS systems than in countries with social security based health systems. Moreover,
within the NHS group of countries, Mediterranean countries have less public support
for their health care systems than countries with older, more consolidated NHS
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systems, such as Denmark and Great-Britain. According to Elola, insufficient political
commitment to the transformation offormer social security systems into NHS systems
- i.e. Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal - might account for the significantly lower levels
of popular support than in other Western European countries with NHS systems.
In response to the classification of welfare regimes by such authors as Esping-
Andersen, several researchers (Orloff, 1993; O'Connor, 1993; Alber, 1995; Anttonen
& Sipila,  1996) have argued that the institutional characteristics of social care services
should also be included in these comparative social policy studies. Anttonen and
Sipila (1996) state that the de-commodification concept is primarily directed at male
liberation from the market through the abolition of dependency between market
affiliation and income (Rostgaard & Fridberg, 1998, p. 13). Esping-Andersen,
however, does not provide the toolS necessary for the analysis of other typeS of
dependency relations. As far as women are concerned, they argue, basic social rights
include those that make them less dependent on family and marriage: rights to separate
from the family.  In a recent re-examination of the family, Esping-Andersen (1999)
acknowledges the importance of 'de-familialization' in the different welfare regimes.
Whereas a familialistic welfare regime assigns a maximum of welfare obligations  to  the
household, de-familialising policies lessen individuals' reliance on the family. They
maximise individuals' command of economic resources independently of familial
or conjugal reciprocities (1999, p.  45). The demand for social care services is
fuelled by the time pressures placed on families when both parents are active in
the labour force.  In such a situation, the needs of children may not be sufficiently
met. The problem also lies in the growing proportion of elderly people who need
care, on one hand, and the decline of caring capacities of families - due to of falling
birth rates and rising female employment - on the other (Alber, 1995). Hence,
socio-demographic and socio-economic changes make social care services increasingly
important ingredients of welfare state production. It could also be presumed that the
demands for social care services may also affect support for health care provisions.
The distinction between the tWO is often not very clear-cut. Moreover, health care
and social care act as communicating vessels. As health care is increasingly dedicated
to specialised medical care, social care institutions have come to provide for many
services traditionally provided by health care institutions. In Mediterranean welfare
states, such responsibilities are still - or once again - entrusted to the family. Informal
care, therefore, meets many of the needs of children, as well as, the elderly, people
with ill health, the disabled and the mentally handicapped (Munday, 1996; Pacolet
et al., 1999). Therefore, in countries with few social services, extended health care
services would be more inclined to relieve families from their caring duties, than in
highly de-familialised countries. Hence, it is important to study how the institutional
characteristics of the social care system, such as the extent of government-sponsored
social care services and the number of people dependant on care - relative to the
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capacity of families to supply informal care - are related to public support for health
care.
The issue of the growing number of elderly dependent people and the consequences
for long term-social care services has gained considerable attention. For example, the
European Commission conducted an extensive comparative study of social protection
for dependency in old age (Pacolet et al., 1999, pp. 21-25). Specifically, this study
addressed the variety, availability and affordability of care services for the elderly within
European welfare states. The results indicate that, as far as the diversity of services is
concerned, an increase in the variety of care services has occurred during the last two
decades, as the care sector diversified simultaneously with the quantitative expansion
of welfare states.  In the second half of the 198Os, the care sector entered a period in
which cost-containment, rationalization, innovation and quantitative differentiation
led to a renewal of its institutional arrangements in many countries. However, after
this period - which ended at the end of the 1990s - a new period of expansion started
that is currently dictated by demographic pressures due to the consequences of aging:
i.e. the gap between supply and demand of long-term care.
Looking at the supply of social care services, we see that there is considerable
variation in the absolute level and the relative importance of the mix of services
across countries, both in terms of residential care services and community (personal
social  or home care) services. Figure  5.1 portrays these differences in residential  and
community services among European welfare states.
The system of residential care services - in the form of traditional old age homes,
nursing homes or other types of sheltered housing - prevails in most of the countries.
These services are especially important in Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, France, Belgium and Luxembourg. Note further the cluster of the
Mediterranean countries that is characterised by a strikingly low share of residential
care. Figure 5.1 also shows that community care services are even less well developed
than residential care services, albeit that the former are generally more diversified. In
such countries as Austria, Belgium and The Netherlands, which are characterised by a
relatively high degree of residential care, we find that community care is less available.
Pacolet et al. interpret this general picture as "one of topping-Up of residential and
community care instead of a clear substitution. Those with good residential services
already also have good community services" (1999, p. 22). A consequence ofthis great
variety in the availability of services is the looming risk of underinsurance, particularly
for the social care services. Consequently, many countries - especially France and
Germany - are confronted with the undersupply of long-term care. A debate on the
need for new policy measures, particularly for long-term social care for the elderly, is
high on the political agenda.
From this political point of view, affordability of services is also an important
aspect. According to Pacolet et al.  (1999, pp. 23-24), public financing prevails
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mainly in the more cure-intensive services, which are closely situated to - or even
intertwined with - the health care system. The more care-intensive systems or those
services concentrating on housing and home care tend to have a lower degree of
public financing. However, as we noted above, care and cure are often difficult to
distinguish; consequently, there is a reasonable overall degree of public financing
in both categories. Here, another aspect of affordability refers to the issue of co-
payments for the use of care services for the elderly. Although these services are fairly
well safeguarded in most countries, co-payments are becoming increasingly important,
which puts a heavy burden on the consumer and endangers the supply of care services.
Pacolet et al. (1999, pp. 26-27) conclude that the political debate on the risks
of underinsurance and the need for a long-term care insurance has evolved or is
evolving differently in the various countries, depending on whether its welfare state
is Bismarck-oriented (with a lower degree of universalism) or Beveridge-oriented
(with a higher degree of universalism). Countries  with a Beveridge-oriented system
of social protection seem to have long-term care integrated into existing health and
personal care services - at a high or more moderate level. Countries with a more
Bismarck-oriented welfare state lack such a programme, but are experiencing - or have
concluded - an often lengthy debate on the creation of an explicit social insurance
scheme for long-term care. This is not true for the Mediterranean countries, where
there has been less discussion about the need for long-term care insurance. This is
either because the family-based informal care model predominates in these countries
or because they are dedicated to a stricter budgetary discipline. In contrast, in the
Scandinavian welfare states, the issue is not on the political agenda. These welfare
states are mature, with long-term care extensively included in their present systems of
social protection.
5.3.3      Individual,  social  and ideological position
A third line of research is aimed at explaining adherence to welfare state efforts by
studying demographic variables, social and ideological position. As was discussed in
Chapter 3, economically oriented explanations of support for welfare arrangements
generally emphasise the self-interest thesis (d'Anjou et al., 1995, p. 357). This states
that there is a direct relationship between one's position in the social structure and
one's attitude. Svallfors (1993, p. 268), for example, argues that different groups
tend to perceive, interpret and value inequality in different ways: Those who are
better off in the stratification structure hold more favourable views on inequality. The
wealthier will be less concerned about redistribution, and more concerned about for
the necessity of inequality to induce incentives of various kinds. However, Svallfors,
in agreement with Lindenberg, argues that perceptions and attitudes are not formed
as calculated responses to economic realities and self-interest. The process of attitude
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formation is a much more complex one, where frameworks of interpretation and
ideological commitments, tend to blur the impact of raw self-interest. An ideology
thesis (d'Anjou et al., 1995, p. 359) has been proposed which refines the self-interest
thesis. This thesis states that there is no direct relationship between people's position
in the stratification structure and their attitudes. This effect is mediated by people's
ideological position or their socio-political beliefs. These ideological features guide
people in their decisions and shape their attitudes and preferences, which are related
to more mundane and concrete phenomena. As such, they affect the probability
that someone holds certain attitudes or preferences, but do not determine them. A
certain ideological position does not imply full agreement with specific goals, means
or outcomes. This also means that one's ideological position is, in turn, affected
by his or her position in the stratification system. In this way, support for welfare
state arrangements is indirectly related to one's location in the stratification structure
as well, through his or her ideological position. It can, therefore, be argued that a
structural position in the stratification system goes hand in hand with a motivation
to support the welfare state based on self-interest. moreover, a particular ideological
position may induce a motivational pattern causing people to support the welfare
state.
5.4 Hypotheses
Earlier, we claimed that the institutional set-up of the welfare state (through the
political process) is a product of public opinion preferences. However, at the
same time it forms the context in which citizen's attitudes toward solidarity are
shaped, therefore affecting individual preferences for particular welfare state services.
Moreover, we argued that the support for particular welfare state services is also
associated with the individual's demographic characteristics, health, social position
and ideological beliefs. Furthermore, in Section 5.2 we discussed the different motives
people may have to support solidaristic welfare state arrangements. We also lightly
touched upon the notion that the strength of a certain motive is dependent upon
framing (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981, 1984; Lindenberg, 1989). Framing is the
process through which the situation is defined in a person's mind: How information
is coded and evaluated. When examining the situation this way, one particular motive
may become more salient and might exert a stronger influence on a person's preference
or choice, whereas other motives become less relevant. Lindenberg argues that this
is the way culture and collective norms exert their influence on personal preferences.
We suspect that this may also be the way the explanatory factors specified in the above
model exert their influence on public support for solidaristic health care arrangements.
Unfortunately, we lack the empirical evidence to relate the various motives to the
revealed preferences. We will, however, use them - in conjunction with the theoretical
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considerations and the empirical findings discussed earlier - to formulate hypotheses
on the relationships between support for welfare state provisions of health care and
three other variables: 1) different welfare state regimes; 2) the specific institutional
characteristics of the national health care system and 3) the social and ideological
position of the individual.
We take Esping-Andersen's work (1990) as a point of departure for making
empirically testable inferences on the association between public support and the
type of welfare state regime. Preliminary studies for this chapter suggest that it is
more fruitful to use a combined index of conservative, liberal and social-democratic
characteristics of a national system (Esping-Andersen,  1990, p. 74, Table 3.3), than
a classification based on the most dominant attribute, as in the previous chapters.
There, it was shown that the classification of countries on the basis of the extended
typology could only partially account for differences among countries in the levels
of public support for the welfare state and certain justice principles. According to
Esping-Andersen (1990), a classification on the basis of combining conservative,
liberal and social-democratic characteristics of a national system may be quite similar
to a classification on the basis of the de-commodification criterion. However, subtle
differences may exist when the welfare state is seen as a system of stratification.
Because the provision of health care is presumably strongly related to characteristics
of stratification of welfare states, countries were classified here on the basis of a
hierarchical cluster analysis. On these three types of attributes, it yielded four clusters.
Sweden is identified as the most purely social-democratic welfare state. Denmark,
The Netherlands and Great-Britain have many social-democratic attributes but also
some liberalistic or even conservative ones, such as The Netherlands. West Germany,
France, Italy and Austria are welfare states with predominantly conservative attributes.
Ireland and Finland appear not to have a clear profile and are identified as hybrid
welfare states. We assume that the more the institutional arrangements of a welfare
state regime emphasise universality and collective responsibility, the more salient
moral considerations become as a motive for solidarity. Consequently, the higher the
levels of support for solidaristic welfare arrangements will be among the citizens. More
selective social programmes will accentuate social divisions, so that the self-interest
motive becomes more significant in attitude formation, resulting in dissent among
citizens.
Since the present study focuses on European welfare states, we need to take a
closer look at the position of the Mediterranean states (Italy, Portugal, Spain and
Greece). In Esping-Andersen's classification,  as well  as in our cluster analysis, Italy -
the sole Mediterranean welfare state in Esping-Andersen's typology - is identified as a
subcategory of the corporatist welfare state regime. However, it is often argued that
the Mediterranean welfare states, including Italy, constitute a separate type altogether
(see, for example, the discussion of the classification by Leibfried (1992), Ferrera
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(1996), and Bonoli (1997) in Chapter 2). They are identified by the non-existence
of a guaranteed minimum benefit, little government intervention in the field of social
care, a strong reliance on the family and particularism and clientelism among the
discriminating features. Esping-Andersen supported these arguments (1996, p. 66).
Hence, it seems reasonable to presume that Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece do
indeed constitute a separate type of welfare state regime. Levels of support for welfare
state programmes will, therefore, systematically differ from the levels of support in
the other regime typeS. More specifically, we expect that the populations of these
countries will strongly favour government interventions to develop a welfare state that
is comparable to the other European ones. The Mediterranean welfare states are often
labelled 'welfare laggards' within Europe. Their social security systems are fairly young
and not fully developed, compared to the other European welfare states. The citizens
of these countries will, therefore, have much more to gain from increased welfare
state efforts than the citizens of the other European welfare states. We expect the
level of support for state interventions to be higher in the Mediterranean type than in
the social-democratic one, whose citizens are accustomed to widespread government
interventions and who, therefore, see them as less important than do citizens in the
juvenile Mediterranean welfare states.
Thus, we assume that:
A. the more moral commitment is reflected in the institutional attributes through the
dominant existence of universal programmes, the higher the levels of support
for solidaristic welfare arrangements will be among the citizens;
B. when the institutional arrangements contain dominantly selective social pro-
grammes, social divisions and self-interest will be emphasised, leading to dimin-
ished support for solidaristic welfare state arrangements;
C.  if people live in immature welfare states and their expectations about the progress
of the welfare state have risen - due to positive past experiences - their support
will be stronger than in mature welfare states whose members are accustomed
to such services.
Based on these assumptions, we can formulate hypotheses about the support for
the European welfare states. We have no hypotheses for those identified as hybrid.
Hypothesis    1:      With   the   position   of  the   hybnd   zoe(fare   states   remaining
uncertain, the level of support for welfare state provisions of health care will be
highest in Mediterranean welfare states, with social-democratic welfare states in
second place. Corporatist welfare states will show the lowest levels of support.
With respect to the more concrete characteristics of social policy, we argued
in Section 5.3.2 that popular support for health care services is related to the
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institutional characteristics of the national health and social care system.  We have
seen from earlier studies that generous, universal and publicly financed welfare state
programmes enjoy more support and lead to stronger consensus concerning a public
responsibility for such provisions. Besides a stronger commitment to the public
good, the widespread positive past experience with such programmes are likely to
result in stronger affirmative expectations with respect to future performance. We
may, therefore, expect higher levels of support in countries where health care is
currently provided by means of a NHS system, than in countries with a social security
based health care system. Moreover, as we mentioned earlier, past experiences in
less consolidated NHS systems due to insufficient political commitment - as in the
Mediterranean countries - may even lead to stronger support for public health care
programmes. Citizens in these countries have more to gain. Countries with a less
well-developed health care system often also lack very well-developed formal social
care. Therefore, those citizens depend heavily on family support. Widespread public
care services will receive particularly high levels of support in countries where socio-
demographic changes have led to an increasing number of elderly people needing
social services. The rise in female employment has caused a decreasing capacity of
the family to supply care. Because social care services relieve women from their
caring duties, strong support for public care may be expected in countries with a high
dependency ratio and high female labour force participation. Thus, at the concrete
social policy level we notice that positive attitudes towards solidarity arrangements are
based on moral commitment as well as self-interest. This leads us to formulate the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: KThen a count,y's health care programme is basically funded
through generous public expenditures to provide for universal health care services,
and when a positive and widespread past experience and a strong moral
commitment to the public good iii irs institutional arrangements prevail, it will
result in higher levels of public support for health care services.
Hypothesis 3: Support for public health care will be higher in countries with
an NHS syste,n than iii countries with a social security type of health care
system, especially in countries with less consolidated NHS systems, such as the
Mediterranean   countries.
Hypothesis 4: Self-interest motives for the support of public interuentions will
lead to higher levels of support for public health care services in countries with
fewer social care services for children and the elderly, a high dependency ratio
and a high female  (part-time)  employment.
In Section 5.3.3 it was argued that attitudes towards welfare state arrangements
are related to people's ideological position or socio-political beliefs. Indirectly, it
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is also related to their position in the stratification structure: their demographic
characteristics and social position. First, we argued that dependency on welfare state
provisions will likely result in self-interest related motives to support the welfare state.
From this we deduce that people who are dependent on welfare state provisions will
also give more support to health care. Furthermore, we also showed that a higher
level of education and a left-wing political orientation are probably associated with
a stronger moral commitment to the provision of public care services.  We may,
therefore, hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 5: Self-interest and a moral commitment to helping others will lead
to stronger levels  of support for the provision of public health care services among
women than among men.
Hypothesis 6: Dependency on welfare state services - due to old age, health
problems, low income, or membership in a transfer class - will emphasise the
importance of self-interest motives and will likely result in a more positive attitude
towards public health care.
Hypothesis 7: The stronger one's commitment to the public good - as reflected
in a left-wing political orientation and a hikher educational atminment - the
stronger one's support for public health care.
One final factor that might affect the individual support for health care is a person's
satisfaction with the current health care system. This relates to the characteristics of
the national health care system and one's individual position. Dissatisfaction with
a nation's current care system is likely to be the result of negative experiences with
the supply of care to people currently dependent on it. These two factors, as we
already noticed before, feed self-interest related motives to support public health
care programmes. Moreover, the person who perceives his health care system as
inadequate, may also welcome - from a moral point of view - a widespread and
generous supply of public care services. Our final hypothesis, therefore, reads as
follows:
Hypothesis 8:  If a person perceives   his  or her count,y's   current  health   care
system as inadequate, motives of self-interest and moral sentiment will result in
higher levels of support for the provision of public health care.
5.5 Data, operationalization and method
5.5.1 Data
Data for this study are taken from the Euro-barometer survey 44.3, conducted in
15 of the European Union Member States between 27 February and 3 April 1996.
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This survey also interviewed respondents about their views on the health care system
in their country, the need for reforming the system, the level of health expenditures
and the government's responsibility in providing health care.  On the basis of the
availability of comparable  data  on  the main dependent variables, the following  13
countries were selected for the present study: Denmark, Greece, West Germany, Italy,
Spain, France, Ireland, The Netherlands, Portugal, Great Britain, Finland, Sweden
and Austria. Each sample is weighted according to a national weighting procedure for
sex, age and region. Furthermore, an international weighting procedure is applied to
adjust samples to a standard size of 1000 respondents. In conclusion, the data covered
those citizens of the  13 EU Member States who are older than 14 years of age.
5.5.2       Operationatization
The dependent variable in this study - the level of support for the welfare state with
respect to the provision of (health) care services - was measured using the following
three items from the Euro-barometer 44.3:
Q121 c: The government should provide everyone  with  only the essential services  such
as care for serious diseases and encourage people to provide for themselves in
other respects  (1 = agree strongly -5= disagree strongly).
Q 1 2 l d:   It is impossible for any government or public or private health insurance scheme
to pay for all new medical treatments and technologies (1 = agree strongly -5=
disagree strongly).
Q122:   Here are three opinions. Please tell me with one comes closest to your own?
1.  The  government  has to ensure that health  care is provided  to all people
residing legally here, irrespective of their income.
2.   The  government must ensure that health  care is provided  only to those
people residing legally here, with low income.
3. The government does not have to ensure that health care is provided to
people residing legally here, not even those with low income.
The original encoding of the last item was recoded so that on all three items a high
score indicates a positive attitude towards the welfare state. Principal Component
Analysis on the three variables yielded a single factor in all countries that can be
interpreted as the level   of   support  for   public  health   care. The factor scores, calculated
with the Bartlett method, will be the dependent variable in this study.
The factor loadings of the three items for each country are presented in Table
5.1.       To   test the cross-national equivalence   of this scale,    we also tested   a   this
measurement model using the multigroup model specification in LISREL. Specifically,
Support for health care systems 127
Table 5.1: Factor loadings for items q121 c, q121 d and q122 for measurements of the level of
support for public health care.
DM WG G I S  F IRL NL P GB FIN SW A Multigroup
ql2lc
The government should provide even·one .79   .82   .86  .84  .84  .83  .81   .76  .83  .81  .77   .74  .87  .78
with only essential services such as care for
serious diseases and encourage people to
provide for themselves in other respects
ql2ld
Itisimpossibleforanygovernmentorpub- .70 .80 .86 .82 .81 .82 .75 .72 .80 .76 .69 .64 .84 .39
tic or private insurance scheme to pay for
all new medical treatments and technolo-
gies
q 122
The government has to insure that health  .46   .58   .17  .29  .37  .33  .51   .38  .37  .44  .58   .53  .34  .31
care is provided to all people residing
legally here, irrespective of their income
Note: DM=Den,nark; WG=West Gennany; G=Greece; I=Italy; S=Spain; F=France; IRL=Ireland; NL=The
Netherlands; P=Portugal; GB=Great Britain; FIN=Finland; SW=Sweden, A=Austria
Source:  Eurobarometer  44.3
Table 5.2: Correlations between factor scores estimated with the Bartlett method and with
multigroup analysis in LISREL.
D M W G G I S F IRL NL P GB FIN SW A
Pearson Correlation   .91**  .77**  .79**  .84**  .83**  .84**  .86**  .89**  .85**  .84**  .90**  .91**  .82**
* *P 5  .01(one-tailed  test)
Note: DM=Denmark; WG=West Germany; G=Greece; I=Italy; S=Spain; F=France; IRL=Ireland; NL=The
Netherlands; P=Portugal; GB=Great Britain; FIN=Finland; SW=Sweden, A-Austria
Source:   Eurobarometer  44.3
we investigated whether the model in which the loadings were restricted to be equal
across countries had to be rejected. This appeared not to be the case (Minimum
Fit Function Chi-Square=19.01, df=48; RMSEA=.0; NFI and RFI both equal to
.99).  On the basis of this model, factor regression weights were calculated and,
subsequently, correlated with the country-specific factor scores, calculated with the
Bartlett method.
As shown in Table 5.2, the former correlates strongly to very strongly with the
latter in all countries. This indicates that the scores used in the analyses are sufficiently
comparable across countries.
The welfare regime typology, macro-level indicators and micro-level factors that
will be used in our study are described in more detail below. The welfare state regimes
were operationalised as follows. Sweden represents a typical social-democratic welfare
state regime. Denmark, The Netherlands and Great-Britain have many social-
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democratic attributes but also some liberalistic and even conservative ones. The
conservative, corporatist welfare regime seems to exist in West Germany, France and
Austria. Ireland and Finland represent a cluster of hybrid welfare states. Finally,
a fifth, Mediterranean type was added which is seen in Italy, Greece, Spain and
Portugal. Dummies were constructed to bring this typology into the analyses, using
Sweden as the reference category.
The institutional characteristics of the health care and social care systems of the
countries are presented in Table  5.3.
The data on health care expenditure, coverage and the dependency ratio are
taken  from the Human Development Report  of 1994 (United Nations,   1994).   The
dependency ratio represents the ratio of the population defined as dependent - under
15  and  over 64 years  of age  -  to the working-age population -  aged  15  to  64.   The
distributions of the coverage rate and the dependency ratio have been improved by
means of a log-linear transformation on the former and a square root transformation
on the latter. To measure the effect of the health care organization, a distinction
was made between countries with a national health service system and those with a
social security system  (0 = social security type of health care system;  1   =  NHS).  The
classifications on this variable are derived from Elola (1996, p. 241, Table 2).
Table 5.3: Structural characteristics of the health and social care systems of the European countries.
Country GDP Total health Private health  Type of % of Dependency Elderly people Recipients of Children Children Women in Women in
per capita expenditure expenditure health care population ratio, 65 and over, home-help 3 under aged 3-5 in active labour part-time jobs
(PPPS), (as % of (as % of system2 eligible for 1991' in institutional services aged in daycare preparatory force (as (as prop. of all
1991' GDP), total health public health care as prop. 65 and over    as prop. of school as prop. of all women in active
1991' expenditure), insurance, of age group, as prop. of age group, prop. of working-aged labour force),
1989-19911 19871 1985-19913 age group 1985-19923 age group women), 19913
1985-19863 1985-19863  19913
DM 17880 7.0 18.5 nhs 100                    49                        6.0                      20                      44.0                 87                     79                       38
WG 19770 9.1 28.2 socsec       92           46             6.0             3 3.0 60         58           34
G 7680 4.8 23.0 nhs                                            49                          .5                                                   2.5                 60                    40                         7
I 17040 8.3 22.5 Ilhs 100 46 2.0 1 5.0 88 46 10  0
S        12670 6.5 17.8 Ilhs 97 49 2.0 1 1.0 66 41 11  V
F 18430 9.1 26.1 socsec              98                    52                        3.0                        7                      22.5                 95                     57                       23
IRL 11430 8.0 24.2 nhs 37 62 5.0 3 .5 52 40 18
NL 16820 8.7 26.9 socsec 72 45 10.0 8 1.5 50 54 62  0
P 9450 6.2 38.3 nhs 100                    51                        2.0                        1                         4.0                 25                     63                        10
GB
16340 6.6  16.7  nhs 100  53  5.0  9  2.0 44  53  27     FIN 16130 8.9 19.1 nhs 100                    49                        7.0                      10                      22.0                 62                     72                        10
SW 17490 8.8 22.0 nhs 100                    56                        5.0                      12                      29.0                 79                     80                       41 S
A                17690 8.5 32.9 nhs 99 48          N




' United Nations (I 994)
2Elola (1996) -N
3Anttonen and Sipill (1996) 0
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In Section 5.3.2, we emphasised the need to include measurements of coverage
for care services for children and, in particular, for the elderly who are closely related
to the health care system. The indicators are derived  from the work of Anttonen and
Sipila (1996) on European social care systems. They took an inventory of care services
for the frail elderly, as well as children's day-care services in the Western European
countries. The supply of care for the frail elderly is measured by the proportion of
elderly people over 65 years of age in residential care services and the number of elder
recipients of the same age in home help services,  as a proportion of the corresponding
age group. Unfortunately, the category of residential services is comprised of both
social welfare and health care. The category of care services is comprised of both
private, commercial services and public services. The latter, however, is inevitable
so, because - in many countries - social services are publicly funded but privately
provided.  In our analysis, we use the sum of the standardised scores of the two
variables to represent the supply of services for the elderly in a particular country.
The supply of children's day-care services is measured by the proportion of children
under three years old in day care and the proportion of children aged 3 to 5 years
in nursery school. These data include only information on public day-care centres,
where public authorities are responsible for both the funding and the service itself.
Again, the sum of the standardised scores of the two variables is used to represent the
supply of children's day care services.
Finally, the capacity of the family to supply for care - and the division of care and
domestic labour by gender - is operationalised using two variables on the woman's
position in paid employment: the proportion of women in the active labour force  (as
a proportion of all women of working-age) and the proportion of women working
part-time. The data are also derived from the work of Anttonen and Sipild  (1996).
The explanatory variables at the individual level are - aside from the usual
demographic variables such as gender (0 = male; 1 = female) and age - measures of
social location, political location and perceived adequacy of the health care system.
Social location is operationalised by means of the duration of a person's schooling.
Following Schmidberger  (1997,  p. 119), the dessation  age of full-time education  is
classified in 9 ordered categories:  from 0  '1  through 14 years' to  1 '22 years or older'.
Those younger than 22 years of age and still in education are categorised on the basis
of current age. A variant of social location is the notion of transfer classes. Those
belonging to transfer classes - who profit more directly from the welfare state - are
thought to have a common interest in ensuring that the welfare state will not be eroded.
To examine the influence of belonging to a transfer class, three dummies have been
constructed: people who are not in the labour force; the unemployed; and pensioners
or the disabled. Because low-income groups are also perceived as belonging to the
transfer classes, another set of dummies (3 in total) was constructed for the quartiles
of household income.  Here, the lowest quartile is taken as the reference group.
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Dependency on the care system could, according to the same reasoning, influence
people's attitude towards the welfare state, especially where health care provisions
are concerned. Two measures of personal health are used as indicators for possible
dependency on care provisions. A fairly objective measure of personal health is based
on whether one has any long-term illnesses, health problems or handicaps that limit
- either slightly or severely - ones capability to work or perform daily activities (0 =
no;  1  = yes). This includes all types of health problems as well as old age. Subjective
personal health is measured by asking respondents if they would rate their health status
in the last twelve months as very good, good, fair, poor or very poor. Two dummies
have been constructed: people who feel they are in 'very good health' and people who
rate themselves in 'good health'. Those who feel their health is fair/neutral, poor or
very poor are taken as the reference category. Political orientation is assessed by asking
respondents to place their personal political views on a left-right continuum, ranging
from  1   'left'  to 10 'right'. Finally,  for the operationalization of perceived adequacy
of the countries health care system, factor scores were calculated applying a Principal
Component Analysis technique, using the following three questions as indicators:
Q121c: Health services available to the average citizen are inefficient  (1 'agree strongly'
to  5 'disagree strongly').
Q123: In general, would  you  say  you  are   (1) very satisfied, (2) fairly satisfied,   (3)
neither satisfied/nor dissatisfied, (4) fairly dissatisfied or (5) very dissatisfied
with the way health care runs in our country?
Q124:   Which of these four statements  on  the way health care is run in our country
comes closest to your own point of view?
1.   On the whole, health care in our country is run quite well.
2. There are some good things ..., and minor changes might make it work
better.
3.  There are some good things ..., but only fundamental changes would make
it work better.
4. Health care in our country is run so badly that we need to rebuild it
completely.
The original encodings  of the items  q123  and  q124 were recoded  so  that,  on  all




Our model for the supportiveness of welfare state provisions of health care involves
micro-level factors - demographic variables, social position and ideological position
- as well as macro-level factors - welfare state regimes and health care indicators.
A common strategy to test hypotheses concerning micro-and macro-level factors
in cross-national research is to calculate estimates using Ordinary Least Squares
regression on a pooled data set, where these factors are included as explanatory
variables. However, this approach raises tWO methodological problems. First of all,
Snijders and Bosker (1999) argue that the traditional OLS regression approach leads
to incorrect estimates when a large number of context units are used (following a 'rule
of thumb': 10 context units or more). Secondly, it is difficult to assess separately the
modelled variance at both the individual level and the context level. These drawbacks
can be avoided by using multilevel modelling. Using multilevel techniques, values
of 82 can be calculated for both the individual level model and the context level
model, thus providing more information (Schmidberger,   1997,  p. 111). Therefore,
we performed two analyses within the framework of hierarchical linear models applied
in the previous chapters (see Section 3.4.3 for details). The first analysis involved
the data on the individual level (level-1), analysed together with the welfare state
typology (level-2). The second analysis involved  the same individual level variables,
now analysed together with the health care indicators (level-2).  The two macro-level
factors cannot be analysed together in one model because the health care arrangements
are, in many ways, specifications of the welfare regime types causing multicollinearity,
which leads to misspecifications of the model. Moreover, because some of the health
care arrangement indicators were not available for Greece and Austria, these countries
had to be omitted from the second analysis. As these countries were included in the
first analysis, we should note that this hinders comparability between the two models.
In the level-1 model, a positive coefficient indicates that, when the value of the
explanatory variable increases, supportiveness for welfare state provisions ofhealth care
also increases. A negative coefficient indicates that, as the value of the explanatory
variable increases, public support decreases. In the level-2 model, we explain the
variability in the intercepts of the different regression equations for each country. The
model does not explain the variation across countries of the regression slopes.  It is
assumed that they are a function of the average regression slopes for these variables
and the level-2 random effects U.
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5.6 Results
5.6.1      Attitudes  towards public  health  care
In the following, we will first take a look at the distributions of the three items which
were used to measure the public opinion on public health care. Table 5.4 presents the
percentage ofpeople in each country who agree completely with the s tatem ents q 1 2 1 c
and q121 d.  For item q122, the table shows the percentage of people  in each country
who share the opinion that the government is responsible for providing health care to
all legal residents in the country, irrespective of their income. Additionally, measures
of central tendency, dispersion and shape are displayed.
From the table it is clear that a positive attitude exists towards public health care
in the European Union. The high proportion of citizens demonstrating a pro-welfare
attitude and the measures of central tendency, dispersion and shape show nearly
unanimous support.  In all countries - with the exception of Portugal, Finland and
Austria - at least one quarter of the population disagrees completely with the statement
that the government should provide only essential services - care services for serious
diseases - and that it should encourage people to provide for themselves in other
respects. This indicates a strong preference for broad public health care provisions.
Support is especially high in Great Britain, Denmark and Italy. Similar high levels
are found in Sweden, Spain and The Netherlands. The lowest levels of support are
found in Portugal and Austria; countries with typically high levels of private health
expenditures.
The statement that it is impossible for any government - or public or private
insurance scheme - to pay for all new medical treatments and technologies, taps
respondents' opinions on the feasibility of such a wide-ranging health care system.
In comparison to the previous statement, disagreement here is less widespread. The
results show that people from the Mediterranean countries - as opposed to the
Scandinavian countries - are particularly optimistic in this regard. All other countries
score somewhere in between. Apparently, even though people in most countries
prefer an extensive health care system, the perceived feasibility of such a system is
related to the range of facilities already covered and the financial burden associated
with it. Because their health care system is highly developed and contributions
are correspondingly high, the Scandinavian citizens might not see a need for broader
provisions. In the Mediterranean countries - with less consolidated health care systems
- more room is left for extended provisions and contributions.
 
Table 5.4: Measures of distribution for items q121 c, q12ld and q122.
Country D M W G G I S F IRL NL P GB FIN SW A
q 121c
The government should provide everyone % disagree completely 41.9 25.6 29.2 41.9 35.2 26.6 25.0 39.0 21.3 44.9 23.3 36.8 18.6
with only essential services such as care for Mean 3.71 3.50 3.60 3.44 3.82 3.44 3.40 3.54 3.48 3.98 3.28 3.98 3.18
serious diseases and encourage people to Standard deviation 1.41 1.26 1.30 1.54 1.20 1.35 1.30 1.46 1.20 1.21 1.38 1.08 1.27
provide for themselves in other respects Skewness -.70 -.47 -.67 -.29 -.84 -.45 -.32 -.44 -.44 -1.03 -.22 -1.06 -.10
:.q12ld                                                                                                    
                                                                                                             
                            n
45
It is impossible for any government or % disagree completely 9.7 13.2 28.8 26.9 21.5 23.3 10.4 16.1 12.9 16.8 5.1 8.4 10.5 Ei
public or private insurance scheme to Mean 2.36 2.96 3.68 3.06 3.41 3.43 2.64 2.72 3.20 2.89 2.49 2.73 2.85 Ul
pay for all new medical treatments and Standard deviation 1.31 1.26 1.19 1.48 1.23 1.24 1.21 1.38 1.22 1.36 1.11 1.23 1.22
technologies Skewness 0.79 0.07 -.68 0.07 ..32 -.33 .53 .45 -.01 .25 -.33 .27 .16
The government has to ensure that health % choosing alternative 1  86.5   71.8   87.2   71.2 90.1 76.2 58.9 77.7 72.0 85.9 79.6 94.8 65.0
care is provided to all people residing legally Mean 2.86 2.67 2.83 2.68 2.88 2.70 2.55 2.75 2.66 2.84 2.79 2.94 2.59
here, irrespective of their income (%) Standard deviation 0.38 0.57 0.47 0.53 0.40 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.59 0.41 0.43 0.27 0.61
Skewness 2.52 1.52 2.85 1.44 3.39 1.79 .84 1.84 1.53 2.60 1.70 4.87 1.18
Note: DM=Denmark, WG= West Germany, G=Greece, I=Italy, S=Spain, F=France; IRL=Ireland, NL=The Netherla™is; P=Portugal, GB=Great Britain, FIN=Finland; SW=Sweden, A=Austria
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Table 5.5: Means, standard deviations and valid N on 'Support for public health care' by
country.
D M W G G  I S F IRL NL P GB FIN SW A
Mean -.15 -.11 .34 -.07 .35 .19 -.38 -.14 -.03 .20 -.31 .17 -.34
Standard deviation .95 1.05 .96 1.14 .91 1.02 1.01 1.00 .94 .95 .93 .77 1.03
Valid N 934 839 906 822 742 878 878 817 748 919 916 865 839
Note: D,M=Denniark; WG=West Gennany; G=Greece; I=Italy; S=Spain; F=France; IRL=Ireland; NL=The Netherlands;
P=Ponugal; GB=Great Britain; FIN=Finland, SVe=Sweden; A=Austria
Source:   Eurobarometer  44.3
Very high levels of agreement with the third statement provide evidence of a
widespread preference for universal health care policies in all countries. Responses
are unanimous in this regard, within as well as across countries. Support for an all-
encompassing health care system is especially high in countries with highly developed
National Health Services, such as Denmark, Great Britain and Sweden. Equally high
proportions are found in countries with less consolidated National Health Services, for
example Greece and Spain. Austria and Ireland show the lowest percentages opting
for broad health care provisions, although more than half of their population favours
universal over selective provisions.
5.6.2   Explaining differences in attitudes towards public health care
Combining the three variables in a factor score provides us with one measure for the
level of support for public health care. The mean factor scores are reported for each
country in Table 5.5, together with the standard deviations and the number of valid
responses.
Cross-national comparison, using ANOVA, indicates that there are significant
differences in the level of support across the European Union member states (F
(12;    11101) = 53.272;   p<.000). To specify these cross-national differences  and
to assess our hypotheses concerning the effect of welfare regime types, institutional
arrangements and individual characteristics on the support for public health care, we
will now turn to the multilevel analyses. Starting with the country level variables, we
will first discuss the effect of the welfare state regime, then we examine the results of
the institutional characteristics and, finally, we turn to the individual level variables
which are included in both models.
The results of modelling the relationship between welfare state regime types and
individual characteristics, on the one side, and support for public health care, on the
other, are reported in Table 5.6.
Our first hypothesis, which addresses differences in public support among five
welfare state regime types, is partly confirmed by the results. In comparison to
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Table 5.6: Two-level model of factors affecting support for health   care with welfare state
regimes as macro-level explanatory variables.
Intercept -.02
Welfare state regime typology
Reference: Sweden
Southern Cluster: Italy, Spain, Portugal Greece -.04
Social-democratic cluster: Denmark, The Netherlands, Great Britain -.29* **
Conservative cluster: West Germany, France, Austria -.33* * *
Hybrid cluster: Ireland, Finland -.37* * *
Irvel 2 modelled variance 11%
Individual level variables
Dentographics
Gender (Reference: Men) .09***
Age -.00
Social *:adon
Duration of education attainment -.02
Transfer classes
Reference: Working




Reference: Lowest income quartile
Second income quartile .02
Third income quartile .04
Highest income quartile .11** *
Personal health




Very good health -.11 ***
Political orientarion
Subjective left-right placement -.05* I *
Perceived adequacy of the running health care system .01
Level 1 modelled variance 5%
N'ist w Me 8889
* * *p 5 .001(one-railed rest)
*  *  p  I   .01(one-tailed test)
*p S .05(one-tailed test)
Source:   Eurobarometer 44.3
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Sweden, the cluster of social-democratic welfare states shows a lower level of support
for public health care.  This is followed, as predicted, by the corporatist welfare
states. Contrary to our expectations, no differences in support occur between Sweden
and the Mediterranean welfare states. The lowest levels of support are found in
the hybrid welfare states, a finding for which there is no obvious explanation. With
11% macro-level modelled variancel, the explanatory power  of this classification  of
welfare state regime types is low. Nonetheless, the typology successfully distinguishes
clusters of countries with different levels of support for public health care. Moreover,
the differences in public support between the Mediterranean welfare states and the
other types of welfare state regimes - apart from Sweden - strengthen the argument to
classify them as a separate, distinguishable welfare state regime type.
Hypotheses 2 through 4 address the influence of the institutional characteristics of
a country's health care system on the support levels for public health care. These
hypotheses were tested in a second hierarchical regression model for the association
between these institutional characteristics and the individual characteristics, on the
one side, and support for public health care on the other. The results are reported in
Table 5.7.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the levels of support would be higher if a country has a
universal public health care system. As predicted, higher levels of support are found
in countries with a larger number of people eligible for public health care, whereas
support drops when health care services are mainly privately funded. As opposed
to our expectations, support for public health care is lower in countries with higher
total health care spending. Moreover, contrary to the predictions of hypothesis    3,
the level of support for public health care appears higher in countries with a social
security type of health care system than in countries with a National Health Service.
However, looking at the mean scores, support proves to be particularly high in the
Mediterranean countries with a less consolidated NHS-system (M = 0.08), whereas
the countries with a social security type ofhealth care system and the remaining NHS-
countries both show fairly low mean scores (respectively M =  -0.05  and M  =  -0.09).
Hypothesis 4 is fully confirmed by the results.  As predicted, higher levels of support
are found in countries with few social services for children and the elderly and larger
proportions of female (part-time) employment. Presumably this must be attributed
to the fact that there is more support for less consolidated health care systems which
draw more heavily on formal and informal social care services. Dependency ratio
shows no effect on the dependent variable. In conclusion, almost all the macro-level
factors contribute significantly to the model for explaining differences in attitudes
towards public health care. Moreover,  with  1 4  %  of the variance in supportiveness
explained, the model proves to be more powerful than the welfare state typology.
i The  values  of  R2 are measured in accordance  with the guidelines provided by Snijders and Bosker
(1994, p. 351)
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Table 5.7: Two-level model of factors affecting support for health care with structural charac-
teristics of the care system as macro-level explanatory variables.
Intercept -.03
Strucmral characteristics of the care system
Total health care expenditures -.06* * *
Private health care expenditures -.03* * *
Type of health care system (Reference: Social security system) -.25* * *
Health care coverage .12* * *
Dependency ratio .002* * *
Volume of children' day care services -.03.*.
Volume of services for the elderly -. 18*  *  *
Women in active labour force .01* * *
Women in part-time jobs .01...
Level 2 modelled variance 14%
Individual level :,anables
Demographics
Gender (Reference: Men) .10**
Age -.00
Social location
Duration of education attainment Excluded
Transfer Classes
Reference: Working




Reference: Lowest income quartile
Second income quartile .04
Third income quartile .04
Highest income quartile .12 ./
Personal health




Very good health -.12 **
Political ountation
Subjective left-right placement -.06* * *
Perceived adequacy of the running health care system .01
Lzvel 1 modelled variance 5%
..iplist.·Me 7642
*  * *p S  ·001(one-tailed kst)
*  7 P  S  .01 (one-tailed teso
* P   S   ·05 (one-rded  test)
Source:   Eurobarometer  44.3
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Nevertheless, considering the extensive and detailed description of the health care
system provided by the institutional characteristics, the explanatory power of the
model remains unsatisfactory in comparison to the simple and more parsimonious
typology model.
Finally, we turn to the relationship between the individual characteristics - the
micro-level factors in the models - and support for public health care. For some of
the factors, there is a slight divergence in results between the tWO models. Because
more countries are included in the first model, our discussion of hypotheses 5 through
8 will be based on the results of Table 5.6. In accordance with hypothesis 5, women
show a stronger tendency than men to support public care services. Old age does
not affect support in the way we expected. We argued that old age would increase
dependency on welfare state provisions leading to stronger support. However, the
results show that it has no impact whatsoever. Also, other sources of dependency on
public health care contribute only marginally to explaining support. The unemployed
show a stronger tendency to support public health care than the employed. The level
of support among pensioners and disabled people does not differ from the support
of the employed. Moreover, support actually increases as household income rises,
though only the highest income group is significantly more supportive than the lowest
income group. Long-term illnesses, health problems or handicaps have no significant
effect on one's support. Only those who rate their health as very good show lower
levels of support. All in all, we find little support for hypothesis 6 that dependency on
the welfare state increases support for public health care. With respect to the impact of
people's ideological position, the results confirm that a left-wing political orientation
goes hand in hand with a higher level ofsupport for public health care. The second part
of hypothesis 7, which states that the more highly educated would be more in favour
of public health care, receives little support. Finally, hypothesis 8 cannot be confirmed
because public opinion on health care support appears unaffected by personal opinions
on the adequacy or inadequacy of the health care system. In conclusion, with reference
to the modeled variance of 5 %, the individual level variables provide a significant,
though limited contribution to the explanatory power of our model.
5.7   Conclusions and discussion
The conclusions drawn in this final section, must be preceded by a short discussion of
some of the usual methodological reservations concerning this kind of cross-national
social survey research. The first objection is in regard to a measurement problem
with respect to response behaviour. Do respondents in the different countries of the
European Union mean the same thing when they give the same response to the same
question? The actual answers to this question in the methodological literature deal
with the whole range of possible answers. Some authors, at the ideographic extreme,
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answer this question in the negative. Others, at the nomothetic extreme, answer in
the affirmative (van de Vijver and Hutschemaekers, 1990). Still other authors take
the middle ground, assuming that cross-national comparisons are feasible providing
that there is a sufficient degree of equivalence in the concepts used (van de Vijver and
Leung,  1997). Our own position corresponds to the latter. The structure of our data
does show construct equivalence, although not necessarily full score comparability.
From a pragmatic point of view, this is sufficient to put a reasonable trust in the
validity and reliability of our comparisons.
A second objection addresses an explanatory problem: the variance explained in
cross-national survey research is often rather limited. This, however, is not so much a
problem of cross-national research,  as one of social survey research. Large proportions
of explained variance should not be expected from social survey research, especially
when dealing with value orientations (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 1999). The reason for
this failure to meet the expectations of methodologists is threefold. One reason is that
part of the variance is unexplainable. People's attitudes and behaviors have a random
component. They are, to a certain degree, the result of a coincidental combination of
circumstances. Because we do not know how large the random component is, we can
never be certain whether or not an explanation is adequate. Another reason for trailing
other sciences in explanatory power is that people's behaviours and attitudes are
influenced by non-social factors - biological and psychological - which do not interest
social scientists.  We can only make informed guesses on the size of the random and
non-social components. Such 'guestimates', however, are not sufficient. There is a
final reason why the explained variance of survey research about value orientations
lags behind. Whatever goes on in people's minds is much more volatile and fickle than
their behaviour. Therefore, value orientations and attitudes are much more difficult to
explain than behaviour. Given these explanatory limitations of social survey research
an explained variance of 20% - as we found in our analyses - can be considered quite
satisfactory.
Ifwe consider the 'messy' impact that the previously-mentioned measurement and
explanatory problems will have had on our findings - and if we realise that, in spite of
the 'mess', we obtained convincing results - then we are justified in concluding that
we have been able to observe and explain satisfactorily, the reality of attitudes towards
public health care arrangements in the European Union. This means that we can now
proceed to draw substantial conclusions from our analyses.
The objectives of this chapter are to explore attitudes towards public health care
in the European Union member states and to identify the factors that might explain
the public opinion scores. We also examine the effects of welfare state regimes, typical
features of the national care system and individual characteristics.
The results unequivocally show overwhelming support for public health care
services within Europe. In all countries, positive attitudes towards public health care
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prevail, demonstrating a general preference for a universal health care system with a
broad range of health care services. Cross-national variation appears limited, although
our analyses reveal some important factors that perform relatively well in explaining
the divergence in people's preferences for public health care.
First of all, evidence was found for the presumed relationship between the various
types of welfare states - as identified by their degree of conservatism, liberalism
and social-democratism - and support for public health care. Support appears
particularly linked to the social-democratic attributes of welfare states; support drops
with increasing degrees of liberalism and conservatism. Apparently, the moral
considerations embedded in these welfare state attributes influence public opinion.
In addition, the highly positive attitudes towards public health services in the young
Mediterranean welfare states, suggest that remedial development of the welfare state
operates as a strong motive for supporting solidary care arrangements.
Second, similar commitments to the public nature of care are revealed in the
relationship between national health care arrangements and people's preferences.
Support for public health care proves to be associated with with wider coverage and
public funding instead of higher health care expenditures. Once again, the level of
development of the welfare state turns out to be important.  Only in countries with
fewer consolidated national health care services is the preference for public health
care higher than in countries where health care is financed by means of social security
payments. Upon examining the supply of social care services and the caring capacity
of the family, self-interest proves to be just as strong a motive for supporting solidary
care arrangements as moral considerations. Large numbers of women entering paid
employment - exchanging their traditional role of care-giver for a position in the
active labour market - lead to strong support for the widespread supply of health care
services. We find high levels of public support particularly in countries with a lack of
social care services for the elderly. Moreover, this also holds true for countries with
few services for young children.
Third, upon examining individual characteristics, we found remarkably little
evidence that self-interest oriented motives affect the preference for solidary health
care arrangements. With respect to the transfer classes, only the unemployed appear
more in favour of public health care provisions than the employed.  Notably, the
preference for public health care was stronger for people in the highest income group
than for those with the lowest incomes. Dependence on health care did not seem to
have particular strong effects either; only those rating themselves very healthy were
less supportive. As expected, a left-wing political orientation was associated with
higher levels of support and women were also more supportive than men. The latter
group might be motivated by either morality or self-interest.
In conclusion, these results indicate that a moral commitment to the public good
outweighs self-interest as a motive for the overwhelming support for public health
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care services in the European Community. This is not surprising. According to
Kangas (1997), respondents tend to show a strong commitment to solidaristic values
on general level questions. However, this commitment begins to crumble quite
swiftly with more specific questions that specify particular groups of beneficiaries of
redistributive policies. The responses to general level questions in this study seem
to corroborate his results.  On the other hand, the overall preference for solidary
health care arrangements - even among the working and those with higher incomes
- may also stem from self-interest. There is a general character to health risks:
Everyone runs the risk of contracting an illness, becoming handicapped or developing
health problems which will make him or her dependent upon health care services.
Furthermore, because support is so high across all countries, there is little room left for
cross-national variation. Nevertheless, a fairly simple typology of welfare state regimes
proves to be almost as powerful in explaining variance as a rather extensive and
detailed model of institutional characteristics of health care systems. Following the
principle of model building - a model should be as simple as possible and as extensive
as necessary - we have to disagree with Papadakis and Bean (1993) that welfare state
classifications do not help to explain the popularity of welfare state services. Of course,
the amount of variance explained by the country-level indicators is rather limited.
However, large proportions of explained variance should not be expected from survey
research, especially when dealing with value orientations (Kalmijn & I<raaykamp,
1999). The attitudes  we  try to explain are influenced  by many other factors  such
as biological and psychological ones. These, however, go beyond the scope of our
research. Moreover, with large-scale opinion surveys like the Eurobarometer, all kinds
of irrelevant factors also affect the responses. Nonetheless, we agree with Kangas that
future research should make more use of particular questions about concrete actions
with respect to social policy. In this way, it will be possible to shed more light on the
social foundations of public support for solidary care arrangements in modern welfare
states.
6 Old-age Pensions:
Individual or Collective Responsibility?
An Investigation of Public Opinion
in European Welfare States
Abstract. The question of who should be responsible for the provision of retirement income
is becoming increasingly important, given the general trend of aging populations in many
European countries.  In this chapter, we study the determinants of popular preferences
concerning individual or collective responsibilities in the context of old-age pensions. Using
data from the Eurobarometer survey series, we investigate whether - and to what extent -
people's views about who should be responsible for the provision of pensions are related to
market selectivist and collectivist features of the particular welfare state regimes in Europe.
Moreover, the impact of structural characteristics of pension systems and social characteristics
of individuals on public preferences is investigated. The cross-national patterns of popular
views on responsibilities for the provision of pensions suggest a link to the specifics of welfare
state regimes, but not as decisively as one would expect. Structural characteristics of pension
systems also appear to be important determinants of public opinion. Finally, the results show
important divisions among social categories.
6.1   Introduction and research questions
The social security system is one of the core elements of the modern welfare state.
One of the central tasks of that system is the provision of old-age pensions. Nowadays,
collective old-age benefits are not only exceedingly expensive, they are also extremely
popular among the citizens of most welfare states. However, it is very likely that
the demographic trend of aging populations will put increasing pressure on these
schemes. A growing number of elderly people will become increasingly dependent
on the benevolence of the working population for the provision of their pensions,
which are often financed by a pay-as-you-go-system. To cope with this threat to the
intergenerational solidarity, far-reaching restructuring of public pension arrangements
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will be necessary. However, relatively large differences exist in the range and funding
of pension rights with respect to the public and private part of pension systems
in Europe. Consequently, these rearrangements will be less problematic in some
European countries than in others. For example, The Netherlands is a front-runner in
Europe as far as the funding ofpensions is concerned. The United Kingdom, Denmark
and Ireland also have substantial pension coverage at their disposal. However, in
France, Germany and Italy, among others, pension coverage is much less extensive.
Consequently, the urgency concerning a revision of the pension system in the latter
countries is much higher than in the former. In any case, readjustments of the public
pension system will have considerably more effect on the income position of the
future elderly population in countries with less extensive coverage than it will in The
Netherlands  (WRR,  1999).
In the light of these large differences in tenability of pension systems, the issue
of who - according to public opinion - should be responsible for the provision of
pensions is important. Here, the government, social insurance institutions (in which
employers and employees have equal representation), private insurance companies
and citizens are the most important actors.  In this chapter, our objective is to
investigate whether - and to what extent - an association exists on the country level
between these public attitudes, on the one hand, and the operating type of welfare
state regime - and more specific characteristics of the pension system - on the other.
As Esping-Andersen argues in the three worlds  of welfare capitalism, the way in which old
age benefits are financed in different types of welfare states reflects a "fundamental
link between individualism and solidarity, between the cash nexus and social rights , ,
.,(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 80). He points out that: a particularly important
element in the identification of welfare-state regimes will be related to the blend of
publicly provided social rights, and private initiative. In other words, regimes can be
compared with respect to which essential human needs are relegated to private versus
public responsibility" (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 80).
In his overview of research on welfare state regimes, Svallfors (1997) emphasises
that these studies generally fail to include regime-characteristics such as patterns of
attitudes and values of different welfare state regimes. In addition, he claims that
cross-national studies of attitude and value patterns have overlooked the potential
explanatory power of institutional characteristics of welfare states. The unspoken
premise  of his latter contention - welfare state arrangements matter to a great degree
for citizens' opinions about the welfare state - is that welfare state arrangements create
a context in which people's opinions about the welfare state are shaped (Forma,
1997b). The first objective of this chapter is to heed Svallfors' call. Specifically,
here we will investigate whether a systematic variation really exists between the
institutional organization of welfare states, as suggested by Esping-Andersen,  and the
public preferences for provision of pensions. Should they be provided by the state, by
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collective contributions from employers and employees, or by the market?.
According to Pettersen (1995), high levels of public support for collective old-age
provisions can be observed within different welfare states. However, this does not
mean that we will find consensus about the proposition that the state should be the
sole - or even the main - provider of pensions. Pettersen argues that some people
feel that they themselves should be held responsible for their own economic security
during old age by means of private savings and private insurance. Others, however,
may believe that collective insurance and tax-financing to cover the costs of old-age
provisions may be more appropriate. Pettersen, therefore, expects that public opinion
concerning the preferred range and intensity of government intervention in the field
of pension provision may very well differ among social categories. Accordingly, the
second aim of this chapter is to investigate whether and to what extent, differences
exist among social categories in their preferences for collective or market solutions for
the provision of old-age pensions.
6.2   Theory and hypotheses
6.2.1     Welfare state regimes and public opinion on pensions
Let us look at the public opinion on individual or collective responsibility for the
provision of pensions and assume that these opinions are embedded in a predictable
way in the different welfare state regimes.  We then wonder whether we will - as
Esping-Andersen (1990) expects - discover separate regime-clusters and not 'more
or 'less' variation around a common denominator. The reverse  of this question  is  also
relevant: Do different welfare state regimes systematically affect the public opinion
of their citizens about the preferred form of pension arrangements, and if, so, in
which direction? By answering these questions we not only answer the first research
question in this chapter, but also acknowledge what Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 141)
has called the current challenge for comparative research: the study of welfare states
as explanatory variables.
Institutional characteristics of welfare states in the field of pensions are, to a
certain extent, the crystallization of public preferences about the question, on whether
or not the welfare state should leave the responsibility for pensions to individual
or collective initiatives.  They also constitute restrictions with which citizens of
these welfare states are confronted. Consequently, the welfare state is a normative
context, in which certain opinions are reinforced and differences of interest are solved.
Mau (1997) points to two explanations for cross-national differences in opinions on
redistributional issues, which bear reference to these variations of normative contexts.
The institutional hypothesis postulates that developments of ideologies and opinions
are directly influenced by structural characteristics of societies. According to this
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hypothesis, social institutions play an important role in the evolution of societal norms
and values.  Here, Mau refers to Philips (1983, p. 318), who argues that "what
most people find fair, just, equitable or legitimate in regard to distribution is generally
consistent with the actual distribution of rewards or outcomes". This proposition
concurs with Homans' observation "what is, is always turning into what is right".
Thus, this hypothesis understands differences in attitudes as a direct consequence of
the stratification system (which is a part of the welfare state)  and the various principles
of allocation which are incorporated in this structure.
However, cultural sociology suggests a second explanation for the cross-national
variations in attitudes about distributional problems. The ideology hypothesis states that
societies are characterised by specific cultural relations and traditions, which have a
bearing on the development of these attitudes. This hypothesis assumes that values
are relatively homogeneous within societies. Values of certain religious, ideological
and cultural traditions have found their way into the social institutions, which are
concerned with distributional issues. Becker (1996) discusses Esping-Andersen's
typology from this perspective. He argues that they comprise political and economic
principles of regulation, which correspond to welfare cultures and other cultural
patterns within societies, and are expressed empirically in habits, values and attitudes.
For example, when a liberal or social-democratic set of principles is dominant, it will
also be reflected  in the institutions  of the welfare state  (1996,  p.   20). This means
that policymakers and a large portion of the population take this set of principles for
granted. Essentially, as he argues, without these specific cultural underpinnings, it
is not possible for a certain regulatory principle to be dominant in a society. Thus,
following the institutional hypothesis - as well as the ideology hypothesis - it is plausible
to expect that the arrangements of the welfare state really matter.
As already stated, Esping-Andersen assumes that welfare state regimes can be
compared on a qualitative dimension: The essential human needs that are left for
mitigation to the individual initiative or to collective responsibility. Also Van Oorschot
(1997a) argues that social security can ideally be based on a collective solidarity model
or a selective market model.  In the first model, collectivization of social security is
attained by using the principle of solidarity. Social risks are pooled over broad parts
of the population, in addition to which risks are balanced within that population. The
principle of solidarity must ensure people are protected by institutional arrangements
against social risks against which the market offers no insurance and which are both
affordable and accessible. This model applies to the level of the state as well aS to
the level of social insurance institutions in which employers and employees have equal
representation.
The second, alternative model starts from the economic-rational logic of insurance
and is based on the principle of equivalence. The selective market model discriminates
between social risks and insurance premiums. This selectivity can cause a lack of
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coverage for certain social risks (e.g. unemployment) by the market, whereas existing
insurance is either too expensive or inaccessible to the general population. However,
the law of supply and demand among individual citizens, employees and employers,
on the one hand, and private insurance companies, on the other, creates a greater
freedom of choice and an alleged better price-quality ratio for the former group to
insure itself against social risks. It goes without saying that, in real welfare states, we
will almost always find a mix of elements from both models.
It can, therefore, be assumed that the model of collective solidarity - as well as the
model of market selectivity - will, to a certain extent, be embedded in the different
welfare state regimes, as distinguished by Esping-Andersen. One application of this
idea is given by Goodin et al. (1499), who refer to Schmidtz and Goodin (1998).
They distinguish among welfare states, depending on the role of the state in social
security (active or passive) and on the relative responsibilities which welfare state
regimes appoint to the state or the individual. Liberal welfare state regimes place the
responsibility for social security primarily on the individual and assign a very passive
role to the state. The corporatist welfare state regime envisages a more active state,
but it still assigns the primary responsibility for social security to the individual. Here,
individual are organised into social units such as families, guilds, corporations, etc.
Finally, the social-democratic welfare state regime attributes an active role to the state,
and also holds the state solely responsible for promoting social security of its citizens.
These general differences can be applied to institutional differences in the pension
systems of welfare state regimes. Thus, the market predominates either social security
- and/or civil servant's privileges - in liberal welfare states. Here, pensions of employees
are often arranged through private insurance companies. Citizens can only appeal to
a supplementary pension provision by the state if they demonstrate personal need.
The selective market model is clearly applicable to this type of welfare state regime.
Countries which belong to the corporatist welfare state type often have a system of
old-age insurance, in which status plays an important role. Social security is strongly
differentiated along occupational groups, with substantial privileges for civil servants.
For example, occupational pension plans, to which both employers and employees
contribute, play a significant role in the pension system of a corporatist welfare state
such as Germany (Steinmeyer, 1991). The state fills a fairly important role in the
provision of public pensions, but private pension arrangements are - in contrast
to the liberal welfare regime - of only minor importance in the corporatist welfare
state regime. Finally, social-democratic, universalist welfare states are characterised by
social rights which apply to all citizens and which go beyond the market or privileges of
status. In this case, the collective solidarity models gives substance to the institutional
structure of welfare states which belong to this type of regime.
If we assign the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) to
a separate type of welfare state regime - as several authors have argued (see Chapter
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Table 6.1: Welfare state regimes and the relevance of models of social security.
Model of social security in the pension system
Model of Model of
collective solidarity market selectivity
Role of the State Role of Role of private
Welfare state regime employerslemployees insurance compagnies
Liberal Modest Reasonably important Very important
CorI)oratist Reasonably important Very important Modest
Social-democratic Very important Modest Modest
Mediterranean Marginal Reasonably important Marginal
2) - the immature social security system in which the state plays an insignificant role
and similar social and familial structures become apparent. Apart from that, the role
of the private market in old age provision is substantially limited. One salient detail
is that these countries offer the most generous pension benefits in Europe, albeit only
for those who performed paid labour in the regular labour market. However, for those
individuals who are active in the non-regular labour market (which makes up a notable
part of the economies of the Mediterranean countries) old-age provisions are rather
poor in comparison to most other European countries. Here, the Mediterranean
countries clearly distinguish themselves from the corporatist welfare states (Ferrera,
1996).
Thus, the model of collective solidarity - and especially the model of market
selectivity - appear to be less strongly developed in the Mediterranean countries
than   in the mature corporatist welfare states. Therefore, we expect   that a shared
responsibility between employers and employees will, to a certain degree, also be
preferred in the Mediterranean welfare states. Research by Roller (1995) and our
own findings in Chapter 3 show that citizens of immature welfare states in Europe are
more in favour of collective solidarity, whereas the citizens of more mature welfare
states have a more reserved attitude in this respect. In other words, in countries in
which little is spent on social security, people endorse a higher expenditure, but in
countries which spend a relatively high amount on social security, people are prepared
to accept less expenditure, especially ifthe level of taxation to finance the welfare state
is high. Therefore, we expect that the citizens of the Mediterranean welfare states will
prefer old-age arrangements via the state or via joint contributions from employers
and employees.
In short, welfare states are characterised by a variation in the extent to which the
model of collective solidarity and the model of market selectivity are chrystallised in
the institutional structure of welfare states. In Table  6.1, we present an overview  of
the association between welfare state regimes and the relevance of models of social
security.
Based on the argument presented above, we propose the following hypothesis,
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which predicts how public opinion concerning individual or collective responsibility
for pension provision is related to the different welfare state regimes:
Hypothesis  1: In liberal  welfare  states,  people  will  mainly   hold  the  individual
responsible for his or her old age pension (preference for the model of market
selectivity),  whereas  the  citizens  of social-democratic welfare  states  will  show  a
stronger endorsement of pension provision by the state.  In corporatist welfare
states, people will predominantly give preference to pension arrangements to
which both employers and employees Contribute, whereas in the Mediterranean
welfare states the support base for collective pension arrangements by the state
will be strongest.
As shown in the previous chapters, the empirical proof of an association between
public opinion and the institutional structure of welfare state regimes is not always
convincing. After all, the classification into liberal, conservative and social-democratic
welfare states is based on ideal-types, which do not exist in the real world and which
are only approximated by pure typeS. Actual welfare states encompass elements of
each of these three ideal-types (Taylor-Gooby, 1991). Because typologies  are  not
necessarily a reliable mirror-image of reality, their explanatory power for substantial
societal phenomena can be limited. Therefore, we also investigate how more specific
characteristics of pension systems can explain the differences in public preferences
concerning the responsibility for the provision of pensions, alongside to the more
general classification of welfare states by Esping-Andersen.
Several characteristics of pension systems may be relevant here. Previous research
(see Gevers et al., 2000) suggests that, as social security arrangements are more
universally oriented, more generous and more publicly financed, citizens will give more
support to these arrangements and there will be a greater consensus concerning public
responsibility. This proposition is based on the idea that, as universalism and collective
responsibility are more a matter of priority within the institutional arrangements of a
welfare state, moral considerations will become an important motive to contribute to
social security. Moreover, the public support base for collective arrangements will be
stronger. On the other hand, selective arrangements will be more differentiated along
social categories, which will induce greater self-interest in the expression of opinions.
Based on these considerations, we expect the following hypothesis to hold true:
Hypothesis 2: As pension systems are more generous and more public(v
financed, citizens will give more preference to state-provided pensions.
Since private pension provisions are more differentiated along social classes, we
also expect that:
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Hypothesis 3: As private pension arrangements are more important in a
welfare state, citizens will not hold the state or the employers and employees as
responsible as the individual for the provisions of pensions.
A final, significant characteristic is concerned with the second pillar of pension
systems, which in most European countries consist of supplementary pension ar-
rangements to which both employers and employees contribute. Here, we expect
that:
Hypothesis 4: As the insured contribute more to social security, citizens will,
for reasons of self-interest, appoint the responsibility for the provision of pensions
to the employers or to the state.
Hypothesis   5:    As the contribution   of  employers   to   social  security   increases,
citizens will be more likely to appoint the responsibility for the provision of
pensions to the employers.
Moreover, enlightened self-interest will dictate the responsibility for the provision
of old-age pensions. After all, in countries where contributions are high, people will
be very willing to pass the burden of funding old-age provisions to the employers or
the state.
6.2.2      Social position and  opinions  about  old  age provisions
Different types of welfare states are characterised by different cultural ideas. In time,
these ideas have crystallised into specific welfare state arrangements and have shaped
the specific values and opinions of their citizens. The question is whether citizens are
guided by these ideas when they form an opinion about the preferability of government
intervention, or whether other factors play a more important role. Ifwe listen to Weber
(1922/1968) we assume that people are directed by material and ideal interests, and
not by ideas. However, ideas do determine, as a kind of gatekeeper, the direction of
the dynamics of interests.
Therefore, following Huseby (1995), we argue that existing opinions about the
responsibility for old-age provisions in European welfare states can be explained to
an important extent by ideology, on the one hand, and self-interest, on the other.
Moreover, it is assumed that ideology and self-interest are articulated within the
context of a specific welfare state regime with its specific culture and institutional
arrangements. The ideology thesis postulates that differences in the opinions among
citizens with respect to government intervention are a direct consequence of differences
in their general socio-political orientations and political preferences. It cannot be
easily denied that disagreement on the responsibilities of the state is traditionally an
important ingredient for ideological disputes. However, the self-interest hypothesis
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postulates that different social positions generate different interests in the institutions
of welfare states. The extent to which people use the services of the welfare state
determines their interest in the range of state intervention within social security.
In order to explain the correlation between someone's social position and his or
her socio-political beliefs, it is assumed that the direct effects of social position on
opinions about government intervention are mediated by socio-political beliefs. In
Chapter 3, we formulated a number of hypotheses on the direct effects of social
position and socio-political beliefs on opinions of citizens of European welfare states
concerning the extensiveness and intensity of state intervention in social security.  In
this chapter, we will use the same individual characteristics as a control. As Pettersen
(1995) remarks, there is no consensus within European countries about the role of
the state concerning the provision of old-age pensions. Controlling for country and
regime characteristics, we, therefore, expect that differences among social categories
will come to the forefront in the opinions about individual or collective responsibility
for old-age pensions.
6.3 Data, operationalization and method
6.3.1 I)ata
To test the formulated hypotheses, we used data from two modules of the Euro-
barometer survey series. 'We first analysed data from Eurobarometer 37.1 (Reif & Melich,
1992), which was fielded in April-May of 1992. This data-set contains measurements
of opinions about social security, unemployment, pensions and the elderly. Further-
more, data were analysed from Eurobarometer 44.0 (Reif & Marlier,  1995), collected
in October-November  1995. This data-set contains various questions concerning the
preferred extent ofgovernment intervention and the operation of the market pertaining
to pensions and care for the elderly. In both data-sets, there is also limited information
on several of the respondents' social-demographic characteristics.
The data of Eurobarometer 37.1 were collected in the following 14 countries:
France, Belgium, The Netherlands, West Germany, East Germany, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Greece, Spain and
Portugal. In Eurobarometer 44.0, additional information is available on Finland,
Sweden and Austria. Because of sample size considerations, we merged the data of
Northern Ireland with the data of Great Britain. Finally, we omitted Luxembourg
and East Germany from the analyses, because the sample size of Luxembourg was
relatively small and, furthermore, because East Germany could not be classified into
a specific welfare state regime. Esping-Andersen's classification does not cover post-
communist states. We, therefore, ultimately analyse data from  11  countries on the
basis of Eurobarometer 37.1 and from 14 countries on the basis of Eurobarometer
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44.0. Both data-sets are pooled in the analyses.
Every national sample was re-weighted to a standard sample size of N=1000.
These nation weights also incorporate post-stratification adjustments based on cross-
tabulations of national populations by gender, age, region and size of localityl.
6.3.2      Operationalization
As the dependent vanables of this study, we use the following two items from Eu-
robarometer 37.1 and from Eurobarometer 44.0, which each measure the public
preference for either individual or collective responsibility for the provision of old-age
pensions:
Eurobarometer 37.1:  How do you think that pensions should be provided?   (one
answer only)
• Mainly by the authorities, financed from contributions or taxes.
· Mainly by employers, financed from their own and their employees' con-
tributions.
· Mainly by private contracts between individual workers and pension com-
panies.
Eurobarometer 44.0:  For a good number of years, people have been having fewer
children and are living longer. So there will be more and more elderly people.
In your opinion, who should be responsible for pensions: the state only or the
individual only?
• The state only.
• The individual only.
•The two together.
The explanatoly variables at the country-level were operationalised as follows.
Welfare state regimes were indicated by three dummy-variables. We classified
countries, for the most part, according to the typology of welfare states of Esping-
Andersen (1990), based on the de-commodification criterion.  (in casu liberal:
Ireland and the United Kingdom; corporatist: Finland, France and West Germany;
Social-democratic: Sweden, Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands and Denmark).
Furthermore, we added a fourth, Mediterranean type of welfare state regime which
' Unweighted sample sizes vary from minimally N=1000 to maximally N=1062 in Eurobarometer  37.1
and from minimally  N=995 to maximally  N= 1358 in Eurobarometer  44.0. To ensure that countries  with
a clearly greater sample size do not have a positive overweight in the analyses, we adjusted every national
sample size to a standard N=1000, using a weighting factor provided by Eurostat.
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consists of Italy2, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Based on this classification, three
dummy-variables were constructed for the corporatist, social-democratic and the
Mediterranean type of welfare state regime. We chose the liberal type as the
comparison group. For each country, dummy-variables were also included to control
for country-specific effects. Here, West Germany was taken as the omitted category.
The generosity of the pension system of a country was measured by the net
replacement ratio: the percentage of the original income that is replaced by the
pension. These data come from Pacolet et al. (1999).  The size of public pension
arrangements was measured by public pension spending as a percentage of GDP. In
addition, the importance ofprivate pension arrangements was indicated by the private
pension fund assets as a percentage of GDP. These data were collected by Palacios
and Pallards-Miralles (2000). Finally, we used data from Dixon  (1999) and Eurostat
(1996) to operationalise the relative share which employers and protected persons
contribute to the financing of social security.
The individual-level variables we control for were operationalised as follows. As an
indicator of one's social position we use, first of all, 'education'.  This was measured
by using the age at which an individual completed his or her schooling. Unfortunately,
Eurobarometer surveys do not include information about the educational attainment
in terms of educational levels.  In both data-sets, the completed length of education
was measured by tWO dummy-variables:  aged  16 to 19 years old and aged 20 years or
older, at completion of education. Respondents who were still in education and who
were younger than 22 years old at the time of the survey, were given their present age
as the year in which they had completed their education. Those who were no more
than 15 years old at completion of their training were taken as the comparison group.
Moreover, we use 'occupation' as an indicator of social position, measured by
one's social class. We classified occupations using Goldthorpe's nominal class scheme
with the following four dummy-variables: skilled workers, petty bourgeoisie, routine
non-manual workers and service class. Here, unskilled workers are the comparison
group. The unemployed, old age pensioners and the disabled were given the class
score of their last occupation. Social position was also operationalised by four dummy-
variables indicating subjective class position: those who assign themselves to the lower
middle class, the middle class, the upper middle class and the upper class. People
who identified with the working class were taken as the comparison group. Note that
this variable was not available in Eurobarometer 44.0. Three dummy-variables were
used to asses the effect of belonging to a transfer class: those not in the labour force,
the unemployed and the old age pensioners/disabled. The employed were taken as
2Notice thar Esping-Andersen assigns Italy to the group of corporatist welfare states. However,
according to several authors, Italy belongs to a separate Mediterranean type of welfare state regime (see,
for an overview,  Arts & Gelissen, 1999a). Hence, Italy is analysed here along with the Other Mediterranean
welfare states.
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the comparison group. Those with the lowest income were also counted among the
transfer classes. For that purpose, we included a dummy-variable, which indicates
whether one belongs to the lowest income quartile.
To indicate 'ideology', we also included subjective left-right placement, measured
on a scale ranging from 1 'left' to 10 'right'. Similarly, a four-point scale of post-
materialism was included, with a higher score indicating a stronger post-materialist
value orientation. Union membership is a dummy-variable, where the score 1 denotes
respondents as union members. Unfortunately, the latter two variables were also
not available in Eurobarometer 44.0. Age effects were determined using five age
groups: 15-24,25-34, 35-44,45-54 and 55-64 years old. Those aged 65 and older
are the comparison group. Finally, the gender of the respondent was indicated by a
dummy-variable, using men as the comparison group.
6.3.3    Method
We performed several multinomial logiStiC regression analyses on both dependent
variables to determine the effects ofwelfare state regimes, characteristics of the pension
system and individual characteristics. In these models, we choose the category of
'complete provision of pensions by the state' as the comparison group. First, we
estimated a multinomial regression model on both pooled data-sets with indicators
for the corporatist, social-democratic and Mediterranean welfare state regime. Then,
the impact of characteristics  of the pension system was assessed3. Moreover,  in a third
step, the effects of the dummy-variables for the different countries were estimated. In
the final step, we added the individual-level variables we control for. In all models,
negative coefficients indicate a stronger preference for complete provision of pensions
by the state, given the values of the explanatory variable.
6.4 Results
In order to provide an overview of the public opinion concerning the provision of
pensions in European welfare states, we present the distribution of responses to both
dependent variables in Table 6.2.
3 In  these two models, observations are specified  to be independent across groups (countries),  but  not
necessarily within groups. This procedure yields robust standard errors, which significantly reduce the
probability of committing a type I error when contextual factors are disaggregated to the individual level.
Table 6.2: Opinions about individual and collective responsibility for old age pensions.
How do you think  that pensions should be provided?  (Eurobarometer  37.1)
Liberal Corporatist Social-democratic Mediterranean
IRL UK FIN F WG A B N L S W D M I S P G
Mainly by the authorities, financed from 56.4 52.3 55.7 37.0 65.1 38.6 59.9 62.6 76.3 81.6 74.4
contributions or
taxes                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Mainly by employers, financed from their 32.3 33.9 28.0 54.9 22.4 39.2 28.8 27.5 17.4 9.7 16.1    8
own and their employees' contributions                                                                                                                                                                                          E
3
Mainly by private contracts between in- 11.4 13.8 16.3 8.1 12.4 22.3 11.3 9.9 6.3 8.7 9.5
dividual workers and pension companies                                                                                                                                                                        c
In your opinion, who should be  responsiblefor pensions: the state only or the individual only.1 (Eurobarometer 44.0.)                                                                                                                                                    9
1
The state only 53.7 56.2 52.6 47.3 40.4 32.0 55.4 27.9 49.7 47.9 43.0 74.6 67.1 66.0               E
2
The individual only 3.9 8.9 5.9 9.6 11.8 10.7 5.3 14.6 6.0 7.2 7.6 4.0 1.6 7.0
The tWO together 42.4 34.9 41.5 43.1 47.8 57.3 39.3 57.5 44.3 44.9 49.4 21.5 31.2 26.9
Note: IRL=Ireland; UK=United Kingdom; FIN=Finland; F=France; WG= West Germany; A=Austria, B=Belgium; NL=The Netherlands; SW=Sweden; DM=Denmark;
I=Italy; S=Spain; P=Portugal, G=Greece
Pearson  Chi-Square  =  975.3,  (If==20,  p<.000 for  independence  test among  countries  and first  dependent 'uariable




The first part of this table shows that, with the exception of West Germany and
The Netherlands, the support base for state pension provision is relatively high in
European welfare states. As is the case in West Germany, people generally prefer
shared responsibility between employers and employees instead of private pension
arrangements. This also applies to The Netherlands, although a considerable part
of the population (about 22%) also prefers private pension contracts. Thus, the
opinions of Dutch citizens appear to be not completely in accordance with the
characterization of The Netherlands as a social-democratic welfare state.  This  is not
surprising. Recently, Esping-Andersen (1999) characterised The Netherlands as "the
Dutch enigma": a welfare state with social-democratic and corporatist (as well as
liberal: J.G.) features. As expected, citizens of Mediterranean welfare states generally
prefer state pension provision. However, shared responsibility between employers
and employees and, in particular, private pension contracts do not appear to be very
popular. Another striking result is that citizens of liberal welfare states (for example
Ireland and the United Kingdom) do not really hold 'liberal' views in comparison
to the other countries concerning the provision of pensions. In these countries,
citizens tend to prefer state pension provisions. Similarly, a considerable portion of
the population of these countries (about 32 and 34%) prefers shared responsibility
between employers and employees.
The second part of Table 6.2 presents the response to the other indicator of
preferred responsibility for pension provision.  Once more, the citizens of Spain,
Portugal and Greece mainly hold the state responsible for the provision of pensions.
An interesting finding is that Italy has - in comparison to these countries - a less
extreme position. Again, this is not surprising, because Italy is the most mature
welfare state in this group and it has been a member of the EU/EEC since the
beginning. Moreover, citizens of West Germany, Austria and, especially, of The
Netherlands are less prone to hold the state solely responsible for the provision of
pensions. In comparison to the other countries, the individual is held responsible
for providing his or her own pension. Austria and The Netherlands are also notable
for the appreciable portion of the population which advocates shared responsibility
between the individual and the state (about 57%). What is more, in Ireland and the
United Kingdom we  do not  find the pattern of public opinion which we would expect
citizens of liberal welfare states to express: The majority of the citizens prefer state
pension provisions, whereas individual responsibility for pensions is not preferred as
much as we expected. Finally, the citizens of Sweden, a country which represents the
social-democratic welfare state par exce#ence, do not clearly give preference to a shared
responsibility with respect to the provision of pensions, as we would have expected
according to Esping-Andersen's classification of welfare states.
To what extent are opinions concerning the responsibility for pensions actually
explained by the different welfare state regimes, characteristics of the pension systems
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and differences among social categories? The results of the multinomial regression
analyses on the first dependent variable (Table 6.3) provide an answer to this question.
The effects of the dummy-variables for the different welfare state regimes (model
1) are only partially as we expected in hypothesis 1. Contrary to our expectation, there
do not appear to be many differences among welfare states in their citizens' views
about the responsibility for the provision of pensions.  To the extent that differences
exist, we see that the Mediterranean welfare states clearly opt for state provision of
pensions. Moreover, citizens of social-democratic welfare states do not differ from
citizens of liberal welfare states in their preference for private pension arrangements.
In model 2, we examine the extent to which characteristics of the pension system
exert influence on public preferences concerning the provision of pensions.  In
accordance with hypothesis 2, we find that the more generous the pension system, the
more the provision is seen as a responsibility of the state. However, as expenditures
on pensions increase, people are more prone to leave the responsibility to individual
employees and pension companies. This indicates that, in the more mature welfare
states, the support base for government intervention is weaker. Furthermore, hypothesis
3, which predicted that the more important private pension arrangements are in a
country, the stronger the preference will be for these arrangements, need not be
rejected. The parameter estimates of model 2 show further that, the more employers
contribute to social security, the more people feel that the provision of pensions is a
matter of the government. Conversely, as the personal share of contributions to social
security increases, people prefer to either share the burden of old age provision with
the employers or to conclude private pension arrangements.
We suspect that these unexpected effects are caused by differences in the maturity
level of welfare states, which have consequences for the support base for government
intervention. In the less mature welfare states, employers contribute a relatively large
amount to social security and the state contributes relatively little. Because the call
for government intervention is stronger in these countries, we find that the share that
employers contribute to social security has a negative effect.  On the other hand, in
the mature welfare states, the insured themselves will contribute relatively more to
social security than in immature welfare states. Therefore, people prefer less state
intervention and are more willing to either share the responsibility for pensions with
the employers or to opt for private pension contracts. In short, both explanatory
variables also implicitly measure, to a certain degree, the maturity of a welfare state.
Table 6.3: Multinomial logit regression of the public preference for individual or collective responsibility for pensions. -Ul
00
Dependent 'variable: Model 1 Model 2  lodel 3 Model 4
'How do you think thar Employer Priv. contr. Employer Priv. contr. Employer Priv. contr. Employer Priv. contr.
pensions should he provided?' VS. VS. VS. VS. VS. VS. VS. VS.
State State State State State State State State
Country-level:




Net replacement ratio -.02t -.01 ttt
Public pension spending as percentage of GDP .11 .09tt
Private pension fund assets as percentage of .00 .01 ttt
GDP
Employers' contribution as % of total current -.03ttt -.02ttt
social protection receipts                                                                                                                                                                                       nProtected persons' contribution as % of total .03t .02ttt
current social protection receipts                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             11Country(Ref: West Germany)
France -1.08* * * .21 -1.01.  I I .29 0\
Belgium -1.53* * * -.13 -1.55* * * .06
The Netherlands -.35* * * 1.02* I * -.40* * * 1.13* * *
Italy
-.16 -1.20* ** -.10
-1.21* * * -.27 -1.17* ** -.19
Denmark -1.13* * *
Ireland -1.02* * * -.06 -1.00* * I .00
United Kingdom - .8 7*   * * .15 -.73*** .37*
Greece -1.95* • * -.56* * * -1.95* * * -.57* * *
Spain -1.92*** -,89* * I -1.55* * * -.87* * *
Portugal -2.60* * 4 -.75* * * -2.49* * * -.76* * *
commued M next page
Table 6.3: continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Individual level:
Age of finishing education (Ref: 15 years old or
younger)
16-19 years old .06 .06
20 years and older .22** -.01
Occupation(Ref: Non-skilled workers)
Skilled workers .01 .00
Petty bourgeoisie -.02 .52* * *
Routine non-manual workers .15 .07
Service class _.02 .82***                    
Subjective social class (Reft Working class)
Lower middle class                                                                                                                                                                    .06                .20                                   2
Middle class .07 .38* * *
Upper middle class .39** * .76***                   .-Upper class .16 .51*
Transfer classes (Ref: Working)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Not in the labour force .21 -.06                             0
Unemployed -.13 -.50...          a
Old-age pensioners/disabled .10 -.37**
Low income -.14 .18
Sex (Ref: Men): -.27* * *
..38* * *                   ' Age-groups (Ref: 65 years and older)
15-24 years old                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
.42* * * .47 **
25-34 years old .24 .54* * *
C/D
35-44 years old .30** .25
45-54 years old .43* * * .38*
55-64 years old .27** .19
Subjective left-right placement .08*** .13** I
Post-materialism -.05 .03
Union membership (ref: Non-member) .19* * * -.20*
continued on next page
-
Ul0
Table 6.3: continued -g
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept -.50ttt -1.42ttt -.09 -2.00#t 0.44* * * -1.47*** -.28 -2.78* * *
Pseudo R3 .029 .031 .054 .079
Number ofCases 9867 9867 9867 6418
WatdCh,2(df) 33.97(6) 824.79(8) 782.57(20) 775.74(66)
Ref = Reference category
Ht   p   <   ·01 (test based on robust standard
errors for clustering on countries; one-tailed
test)
ftp   55 ·025(test based on robust standard  er-
rors for clustering on countries; one-tailed rest)
t p s ·05(test based on robust standard errors
for clustering on countries; one-tailed test)
* * *P S .01(test based on normal standard
errors; one-tailed test) n
* *P S .025(test based on normal standard
errors; one-tailed test)
*PS.05(test based on normal
standard  er-                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                      
           <
M
rors; one-tailed test) 0\
Source: Eurobarometer 37.1
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Model 3 reproduces the differences among the various countries found in Table 6.2.
Greece, Spain and Portugal differ most strongly from the clear preference for collective
responsibility between employers and employees, which is typical of West Germany.
Also, the citizens of France, Belgium, Italy, Denmark and Ireland are more likely
to hold the state responsible for the provision of pensions rather than the employers
and employees, albeit to a lesser degree than in the Mediterranean countries. Finally,
the United Kingdom and The Netherlands differ significantly from West Germany
as far as the shared responsibility between employers and employees is concerned.
However, the difference is smaller than in the other European countries. Moreover,
the Dutch show - in comparison to the West German public - a clear preference
for private pension arrangements. However, the distinction between collective and
private pension arrangements is not an issue in the views of the citizens of most other
European countries. Here, Greece, Spain and Portugal take an exceptional position
once more, by showing a stronger preference for state pension provision. Note that,
in comparison to the previous tWO models, the explained variance is high, but still
relatively low in an absolute sense.
Finally, model 4 shows the effects of several individual-level social characteristics on
preferences for the provision of pensions, controlling for differences among countries.
These results are predominantly in accordance with the findings of previous research
(see, for example, Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Gelissen, 200Ob). Those with the most
lengthly education are more likely to opt for shared collective responsibility between
employers and employees than those with less education. In addition, the members
of the petty bourgeoisie and of the service class are, compared to the unskilled
workers, more likely to prefer private pension arrangements. Those who consider
themselves upper middle class show a stronger preference for shared responsibility
between employers and employees than those who consider themselves working class.
However, those who consider themselves to be middle class, upper middle class and
upper class clearly opt for private pension arrangements.
Being a member of a transfer class is only significant as far as the choice between
private pension contracts and state pension provision is concerned. As expected, the
unemployed and old age pensioners are, compared to the employed, more likely to
prefer pension provision by the state. Furthermore, women approve more of state
pension provision than men do. In addition, those  aged  15-24,  35-44,  45-54  and
55-64 show a stronger preference for a shared responsibility between employers and
employees, whereas  we  also  find that those  aged   15-24  and  25-34 - compared  to
those of the oldest age group - are characterised by a stronger preference for private
pension arrangements. Finally, we find that the more to the right of the political
spectrum people are, the stronger the preference for either shared responsibility
between employers and employees or private pension arrangements. Union members
show, in comparison to non-union members, a stronger preference for either shared
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responsibility between employers and employees or fur state provision of pensions.
In Table 6.4 we present the results of the multinomial regression analyses on the
second dependent variable: Whether one holds the state solely, solely the individual
or the two together responsible for the provision of pensions.
Contrary to our expectations (hypothesis   3), the citizens of corporatist welfare
states are more often inclined to hold the individual and the state responsible for
the provision of pensions than the citizens of liberal welfare states (model 5, Table
6.4). These findings also apply to the citizens of social-democratic welfare states.
Presumably, the level of maturity of welfare states is again the determining factor.
Surprisingly, citizens of the Mediterranean welfare states do not, at this time, differ
Significantly in their preferences from citizens of liberal welfare states.
As we expected, here, as well, several characteristics of the pension system appear
to matter for differences in popular views about the responsibility for pensions. As
expenditures on public pensions increase, people are more likely to hold the individual
citizen solely responsible for the provision of old-age pensions. The results of model
6 further suggest that, as employers contribute more to social security, pension
provisions are more often seen as a responsibility of the state. However, as the
contributions of the insured to social security increase, either solely the individual or
a combination of the individual and the state are more frequently held responsible
for the provision of pensions. These effects are in accord with the effects which were
estimated in model 2. Presumably, the same explanation applies here.
The most striking results of model 7 are that, in The Netherlands in comparison
to West Germany, the preference for individual responsibility is clearly prevalent.
However, in the other countries - with the exception of Austria, which does not
Significantly deviate from West Germany - the state alone is more frequently held
responsible for the provision of pensions. Furthermore, in The Netherlands and in
Austria, the provision of pensions is more often seen as a responsibility of the citizen
and the state than in West Germany. In the other countries - with the exception of
Italy, which does not significantly differ from West Germany - pension provision is
seen as exclusively a state matter. Here, the explained variance is higher in comparison
to the preceding models. However, judging absolutely, the explained variance by these
inter-country differences is still  low.
Table 6.4: Multinomial logit regression of the public preference for individual or collective responsibility for pensions.
Dependent uariable: Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
'In your opinion, who should be Individual State & individual Individual State & individual Individual State & individual Individual State & individual
responsible for pensions: the VS. VS. VS. VS. VS. VS. VS. VS.
State only or the individual only?' State State State State State State State State
Country-level:
Welfare state regime (Ref: Liberal)
Corporatist .46 .3 ltt
Social-democratic .52 .50#
Mediterranean -.41 -.29
Net replacement ratio .00 ..01                                                                     F
Public pension spending as percentage of .18ttt .07
GDP                                                                                                           1Private pension fund assets as percentage .06 .00 (/D
of GDP                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    2
Employers' contribution as  % of total cur- -.03ttt ..01
rent social protection receipts
Protected persons' contribution as % of .07ttt .04tH
total current social protection receipts                                                                                                                                                                                                                          0-
Country(Ref: West Germany) a
France -.36 ** -.26* * * -.41** -.29
***      4Belgium -1.10* ** -.51* * * -1.52* * * -.55 *
The Netherlands .58***
.5 1* * *                                ' 
.58** * .56* * *
Italy -.50* * I -.03 -.61** * -.04
D...
Denrnark -.65* * * -.23*** -.97*  * *
-.63***             Ireland -1.40* * * -.40* * * -1.30* * * .40   *
United Kingdom -.62* * * -.64* * * -.54* * * -.52* * *
Greece -1.01* * * -1.06* * * -1.20*** -1.02* * *
Spain -1.70* * * -1.41* * * -1.38..* -1.30* * *
Portugal -2.48* * * -.93* * * -2.65* * * -.85***
Finland -.94* * * -.41 *  * * -1.36*** -.69* * *
Sweden -.89* * * -.28*** -1.07* * * -.49* * *
Austria .14 .41 *** .20 .49* * *
contlnued on next page
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Table 6.4: continued                                                                                           e
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Individual level:
Age of finishing education (Ref: 15 years
old or younger)
16-19 years old
20 years and older
.41* * * .28* * *
.72* * * .76**.
Occupation(Ref: Non-skilled workers)
Skilled workers -.23 .13
Petty bourgeoisie -.28 .18
Routine non-manual workers -.69* * * -.46* * *
Service Class -.68* * * -.10
Transfer classes (Ref: Working)
Not in the labour force -.16 .15*
Unemployed -.51* -.27*
Old-age pensioners/disabled -.57*** -.19
Low income -.24** -.28
***      11Sex (Ref: Men): -.12 -.08
Age-groups (Ref: 65 years and older)                                                                                                                                                                                                      +
15-24 years old -.03 -.20
Ch
25-34 years old -.31 -.11
35-44 years old .09 -.08
45-54 years old -.41** .01
55-64 years old -.34* .08
Subjective left-right placement .18*** .08***
continued on next page
Table 6.4: continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept -2. lottt -. 37ttt -4.05ttt -.53 -1.23*.. .17* * * -1.60* * * -.20
Pset:do  R 2 .016 .024 .039 .067
Number of Cases 14017 14017 14017 9032
Wald Ch,2 (dfl 15.88(6) 236.04(10) 789.07(26) 864.03(60)
Ref = Reference category
1 tt  P  S  ·01 Crest based on robust standard
errors for clustering on countries; one-
tailed test)
ftp 5 ·025(test based on robust
standard                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Nerrors for clustering on
countries; one-                                                                                                                 tailed test)
fps.05(test based on robust
Standard                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
errors for clustering on countries; one-
tailed test)
* * *P S.0 1(t e s t based on normal  stan-
dard errors; one-tailed test)
* *P S .025(test based on normal stan-                                                                                                                                                                             -
dard errors; one-tailed test)








Here as well, according to the final model 8, the effects of social characteristics
- controlling for differences among countries - are mostly in accordance with the
findings of previous research. As educational attainment is more extensive, people
are less inclined to hold the state solely responsible for providing pensions. Routine
non-manual workers and members of the service class are more likely to hold the state
solely responsible. An explanation for these unexpected effects is not easily given.
Perhaps the members of these upper classes are more often in public service, which
brings about a stronger preference among these groups for state pension provision.
Furthermore, old age pensioners - and especially those who belong to the lowest
income group - are more likely to hold the state solely responsible for the provision of
pensions. Insofar as differences among age groups exist, these occur predominantly
when the choice is between individual or state responsibility. In this case, those aged
45-54 and 55-64 are more likely than the members of the oldest age group to hold the
state responsible for the provision of pensions. Finally, we find that, as people place
themselves more to the right of the political spectrum, they are less likely to view the
state as the only responsible agent for the provision of pensions.
6.5   Conclusion and discussion
In this chapter, we describe and explain cross-national differences in public opinion
concerning the individual or collective responsibility for the provision of old-age
pensions. Explanations were sought in differences among welfare state regimes -
distinguished in Europe according to the existing seminal classification of Esping-
Andersen - in specific characteristics of the pension system of countries and in
variations among social categories.
In the first place, the results show that the citizens of most European welfare states
widely endorse provision of pensions by the state. Nevertheless, some differences
among regime-clusters - as well as among countries within regime-clusters - exist.
As far as these differences exist, we find only partial support for Esping-Andersen's
thesis: Welfare state regimes in general and pensions in particular are significantly
related to individualism and solidarity. These values are, to a certain extent, reflected
in the beliefs of citizens concerning the individual or collective responsibility for the
provision of pensions. Citizens of corporatist welfare states showed - compared to
citizens of liberal welfare states - more frequent preferences for a shared responsibility
for the provision of pensions between employers and employees. However, in the less
mature Mediterranean welfare states, the general public expects relatively much from
the state despite - or, perhaps, even because of - the rather limited role of the state in
social security in these countries.
According to Esping-Andersen (1999), the Mediterranean welfare states are merely
"corporatist welfare states   in the making". He argues that there   is no reason   to
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assume that these countries constitute a "Mediterranean fourth world" within the
worlds of welfare capitalism. However, the results of this chapter show that a
separate Mediterranean regime-cluster can be distinguished, at least as far as public
preferences for the provision of pensions are concerned. If Esping-Andersen's theory
of "corporatist welfare state in the making" were to hold true, we would expect to
find a considerably stronger endorsement of shared responsibility between employers
and employees, as is, for example, the case in West Germany. Even Italy - which
Esping-Andersen always lists under the corporatist regime-cluster - shows more public
support for shared responsibility between employers and employees than the other
Mediterranean welfare states. However, in comparison to the other European welfare
states, public support for this method of providing pensions is still relatively limited.
Moreover, preferences of the citizens of social-democratic welfare states were not,
as we expected, in comparison to the preferences of the citizens of liberal welfare
states more towards pension provision by the state. Although The Netherlands is
often labelled as a social-democratic welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; see also
Goodin et al., 1999), here, it appears once again to be a mixed case. The results
suggest that The Netherlands could be more easily labelled as a liberal welfare state,
as far as public preferences concerning the provision of pensions is concerned.  In
comparison, the Dutch relatively strongly endorse individual responsibility.
Secondly, we investigated whether - and to what extent - characteristics of the
pension system matter for the public's beliefs about the responsibility for the provision
of pensions. Moreover, we examine whether these characteristics better account for
cross-national differences in these beliefs than Esping-Andersen's typology. Here,
we discovered the effects of the generosity of the pension system, of the level of
public pension expenditures,  of the importance of private pension arrangements in a
country and ofthe employers' and insured people's share of contributions to financing
social security. The interpretation of these effects was, to a considerable degree,
dependent on the maturity of the welfare states, because this is important for the
public commitment to state intervention in social security.
Previous research (Gelissen, 200Ob) suggests that citizens of mature welfare states
prefer less state intervention in social security, whereas citizens of immature welfare
states tend to expect more of the state. This explains why we find less support for
state provision of pensions as public expenditure on pensions increases. The level
of maturity of welfare states also has consequences for the share of employers' and
insured persons' contributions to social security. Because of this, public endorsement
of pension provision by the state is stronger as employers contribute more to SOCial
security, and weaker as the insured persons' share of contributions to social security
increases.
There is another important finding, which also explains the exceptional position
of The Netherlands: As private pension arrangements increase in importance in a
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country, people are more likely to opt for private pension contracts. Internationally,
The Netherlands ranks among the top in assets of private pension funds.  This
illustrates the importance of private pension arrangements in this country. Finally, we
must realise that these characteristics of pension systems reproduce,  to a large degree,
differences among welfare state regimes. Because of this, the explained variance of
the models in which welfare state regimes are controlled for, is relatively close to the
explained variance of the models in which characteristics of the pension systems are
controlled for.
Third, we examined whether and to what extent, differences among social cate-
gories exist concerning the individual preferences on collective or market provision
of pensions. The results pointed to enlightened self-interest - rather than moral
considerations - as a more important determinant of opinions concerning respon-
sibility for pensions. People are more likely to opt for either individual or shared
collective responsibility for pension provision as the duration of education increases.
Furthermore, the members of the petty bourgeoisie - as well as those who consider
themselves to be middle class and upper middle class - show a stronger preference for
private pension arrangements. On the other hand, old age pensioners, women and
those with the lowest incomes more often prefer state pension provision.
In addition, the results suggest that differences among social categories significantly
add to the explanatory power of the models, but that differences among European
welfare states still explain relatively more of the variance in the public preferences
about pension provision. Pettersen's hypothesis, which presumes that differences
within countries are more significant than differences among countries, was not
answered in the affirmative.  This is probably a consequence of the small number of
individual characteristics and socio-political orientations which were included in the
models. Inclusion of other - and perhaps better - indicators of social position and
ideology would probably considerably enhance the explanatory power of the models.
Unfortunately, we were limited by the data.
Naturally, the results of this chapter must be seen in the light of the usual
methodological limitations which apply to this kind of cross-national survey research
and its consequences for the explanatory power of models. After all, the question
remains whether respondents in the different European welfare states mean the same
thing when they give the same answer to the same question. Anybody who is only
slightly familiar with the organization of pension systems of European welfare states,
quickly realises that both dependent variables in this study - measured as separate
dichotomous items with little 'variance' - not really do justice to the complexity of
these arrangements. Therefore, in future research, scales could be developed in which
indicators for supportiveness of the various components of the pension systems are
included. In this way, it becomes easier to evaluate whether citizens ofdifferent welfare
states mean the same thing if pensions are involved. In addition, the variance which
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could be explained would increase. Similarly, more specific structural characteristics
of pension systems than the ones in this study could be used to explain differences
in opinions concerning the provision of pensions. Although we must not expect to
find high levels of explained variance in survey research on opinions, attitudes and
values (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 1999), many descriptive and explanatory questions on
welfare state arrangements in general, and pension provision in particular, remain to
be studied in cross-national opinion research.
7      Summary and Discussion
7.1 Summary
7.1.1 Introduction
'Worlds of welfare, worlds of consent?'.  Is the force of habit so strong that people en-
dorse the institutional arrangements of their welfare state whatever those arrangements
are? Is the influence of democratic decision-making so strong that the outcomes are
judged as being legitimate whatever the outcomes are? Or is the relationship between
the real worlds of welfare capitalism and the public opinion much more complex? In
any event, the scope of public consent to welfare policies constitutes an important
topic in the political and social scientific debate about the welfare state. The public's
endorsement of welfare state solidarity, mainly expressed by appointing responsibility
for the provision of collective welfare to the state - instead of leaving it to individual
responsibility - indicates the legitimacy of a welfare state. The lack of consent presents
a legitimation problem. In the absence of moral consensus, any welfare policy, in any
form, is not easily accepted.  If the policy is to be successful, a reasonable degree of
social acceptance is essential.
In this study, we have examined the extent to which the public's consent to welfare
state solidarity and its choices ofjustice principles are related to the specifics ofwelfare
state regimes, as initially conceived by Esping-Andersen (1990) and, later, extended
and amended by his critics. Also, structural characteristics of the national health care
and pension systems, as well as individual-level social characteristics, were included
in the analyses. This study elaborates on previous research addressing cross-national
variations in the levels of public support for the welfare state (Svallfors, 1997; Peillon,
1996; Roller, 1995; Papadakis & Bean, 1993). These studies have demonstrated that,
although there is generally a high level of public support for state welfare provisions,
important differences among welfare states do exist. In addition, these studies have
shown that public support for welfare state solidarity varies not only across welfare
states, but also wthin them.
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Building on the insights and findings of this research tradition, this study has fo-
cused printarily on assessing the value of applying the well-known Esping-Andersenian
welfare state typology (1990)  to the study of public consent to welfare solidarity and
choices of justice principles. The general idea of this typology is that different types of
welfare state regimes encompass qualitatively different arrangements for the provision
of welfare. Based on this, the general hypothesis was tested that citizens' attitudes
about welfare state solidarity and their choices of certain justice principles conform
to the dominant social policy frameworks and values of the welfare state regimes they
live under.
Apart from investigating the extent to which a relationship exists between welfare
state regime characteristics and public attitudes, we also examined the relevance of
other contextual characteristics for explaining differences and similarities in levels of
public support. Specifically, we investigated the impact of income inequality, welfare
effort, welfare state financing methods and structural characteristics of the national
health care and pension systems on levels of public commitment to welfare state
solidarity. This was done with a view to the notion that these characteristics might
have better explanatory power than the classification of real welfare states into welfare
state regimes, which are only approximations of ideal-typical constructs.
7.2   Answers to the research questions
7.2.1      Worlds  of welfare capitalism
The first research question addressed the discussion about the variation in and
clustering of welfare state arrangements at the national level.  It was formulated as
follows:
1.  Are there families  of real welfare states  or are  all welfare states rather unique
specimens, and, if the fonner is the case, are there three or more ideal-typical
worlds of weUare capitalism?
This research question was addressed in Chapter 2 of this study. We reviewed
the literature regarding the Esping-Andersenian classification of welfare states and
the modified versions of it. We focused, in particular, on extended and amended
classifications of welfare states by his critics, in order to deal with four alleged
shortcomings which have been indicated in this influential work:
1.   the misspecification ofthe Mediterranean welfare states as immature continental
or corporatist;
2. the classification of the Antipodean welfare states as belonging to the liberal
regime-cluster;
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3.  the neglect of the relevance of the gender-dimension in his typology;
4.  the misconception of the position of East-Asian welfare states, in particular the
position ofJapan.
We reconstructed several typologies of welfare states which deal with these short-
comings. In this way, we focused on whether real welfare states are quite similar to
each other or whether they can better be seen as unique specimens. In addition, we
used the critics' arguments raised in these typologies, and the empirical evidence of
the testing of the Esping-Andersenian three-way typology to assess whether there are
three - or more - ideal-typical worlds of welfare capitalism.
In accordance with Esping-Andersen's original position, we concluded that certain
families of real welfare states can be distinguished. However, based on the theoretical
arguments and empirical evidence put forward by his critics, we concluded that there
is good reason to increase the original three families of welfare states to five or even
six, without loosing too much analytical parsimony. Furthermore, we argued that the
Esping-Andersenian theory of welfare state regimes must be elaborated upon to yield
more precise hypotheses. However, we finally concluded that, for the time being, the
empirical results of previous research - focusing on the explanation of cross-national
variation in attitudes and behaviour and their consequences by means of welfare state
regimes - provided sufficient reason to continue the work with the extended welfare
state typology. In accordance with this previous research, we chose to focus on the
empirical assessment of the extended typology's explanatory value.  We did this in the
following chapters.
7.2.2     Popular support for the welfare state
The second research question addressed cross-national variations and similarities
in popular support for achieving welfare state solidarity by means of government
intervention. It was phrased as follows:
2.   To  what  extent  do  citizens   of  different  welfare   states   support  institutionalised
solidarity? To what extent can differences among individuals and societies in this
support be explained by differences among welfare state regimes, in welfare effort,
income inequality, tax regime and, at the individual level, by social position and
socio-political beliefs?
This research question was answered in Chapter 3, where the effects ofwelfare state
regimes, social expenditure, income inequality, methods of welfare state financing and
several individual-level social characteristics were studied. Variations in levels ofpublic
support for an extensive or intensive welfare state among eleven European welfare
174 Chapter 7
states in 1991 were studied. A distinction was made among a liberal, social-democratic,
conservative, and Southern type of welfare state regime.
Although significant differences in levels of support were found among welfare
state regimes, the direction of these effects was not in accordance with our expecta-
tions. Specifically, contrary to expectations, liberal welfare states were characterised
by the highest levels of support, whereas the social-democratic welfare states had
unexpectedly low levels of popular support. Two explanations may be given for these
unexpected effects. First, as was shown in Chapter 4, citizens take a relatively positive
stance towards the guaranteed meeting of basic needs in both the immature, Southern
welfare states and the mature, liberal welfare states. As Kluegel and Miyano (1995,
p. 101) show, these countries still differ in the implications concerning the choices
of justice principles for public support, although all capitalist countries produce a
similar pattern of justice beliefs (also illustrated  by the results in Chapter  4).   Thus,
if we assume that preferences for justice principles do shape aggregate differences in
support for welfare state solidarity, the high levels of support in Southern and liberal
welfare states can be explained by the strong preference for the need principle in
these countries. Secondly, because the extent of government intervention in achieving
welfare state solidarity in Southern and liberal welfare states is more limited, these
citizens may have more to gain from more government intervention than those of
social-democratic and conservative welfare states. In the former, people may be
predominantly focused on the benefits of increased state intervention whereas, in the
latter, they may be more aware of the costs incurred. Consequently, levels of support
will be higher in Mediterranean and liberal welfare states than in the other typeS.
We also investigated the impact of income-inequality, level of social expenditure
and the financing method of the welfare state (operationalised as the ratio between
tax-financing   and Value Added Taxes to finance public expenditures). All these
factors showed clearly negative effects on the levels of public support for the welfare
state. With respect to the effects of individual-level social characteristics, we found
that a higher educational attainment, trade union membership, a left-wing political
orientation, a post-materialist value-orientation and membership in a transfer class
lead to more support for an extensive or intensive welfare state. Assuming that the
first four variables are indicators of moral commitment to the welfare state - and
membership in a transfer class is an indicator of self-interest - the importance of
moral commitment appears to be paramount over the importance of self-interest in
supporting the welfare state. In addition, we also found some slight differences among
the classes. Finally, significant interaction-effects between educational attainment and
socio-political orientations (political orientation and post-materialism) were found.
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7.2.3      Notions  of solidarity  and  choices  of justice  principles
The third research question not only investigated the extent to which support for
government intervention to achieve welfare state solidarity is related to the specifics
of welfare state regimes, but also the extent to which different welfare state regimes
lead to different public preferences concerning distributional issues. This research
question was formulated as follows:
3.   To  what  extent  do  citizens  of  different  welfare  states  ha·ue  different  notions
of solidarity and do they choose different justice principles?  To what extent
can differences among individuals and societies in these notions and choices
be explained by differences among welfare state regimes, social position and
socio-political beliefsg
This research question was answered in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we analysed
the extent to which differences in public support for welfare state solidarity and
attitudes about fairness are associated with differences in frames of solidarity initiated
by different welfare state regimes. Specifically, we compared data from  1996 and  1999
on preferences concerning government intervention in the field of social protection
and attitudes about distributional issues of citizens in 20 welfare states.
As expected, we found that citizens of the immature Mediterranean welfare states
show a strong consent to welfare state solidarity. This was principally explained on the
basis of self-interest: Citizens of the Southern welfare states - characterised by a less
well-developed socio-economic context and relatively little government intervention
- were expected to gain more from government intervention than citizens of other
welfare states. Moreover, citizens of social-democratic welfare states or states that are
strongly statist or social-democratic - expected to create a frame of strong solidarity -
showed a stronger propensity to support welfare state solidarity than citizens of liberal
welfare states. However, the citizens of liberal, radical, conservative and South-East
Asian welfare states showed relatively less consent to welfare state solidarity through
government intervention. This finding was in line with the hypothesis that liberal
welfare states would give rise to a normative frame that comes close to the weak
solidarity type, whereas the other types of welfare states would give rise to mixed
normative frames.  Thus, the results of this analysis showed a relatively close match
between the expected ordering of countries on the public's preferred level of solidarity
and the frames of solidarity emphasised by the various welfare state regime types.
As far as citizens' choices of justice principles are concerned, we also found an
ordering of countries which was relatively close to the Esping-Andersenian three-way
classification. However, the association was not as clear-cut as in the case of level of
support for welfare state solidarity. Citizens of all typeS of mature welfare states are
in favour of income levelling but, at the same time, they accept income inequality.
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However, citizens of immature welfare states appeared to be more in favour of equality.
With respect to the preference for the need-principle, the most important result was
that this principle was of primary importance for citizens of all types of welfare states.
Preference for the equity and equality principle was also strong in the mature welfare
states. In Mediterranean welfare states - Spain, Portugal, and Greece - however,
the principle of equality was more highly preferred. Upon examining the public's
preference for the equity principle, we found - in line with our expectations - that
citizens of liberal welfare states tend to show a stronger preference for the equity
principle than citizens of conservative and social-democratic welfare states.
Controlling for these differences among different welfare state regimes, we also
found important differences among individuals and social groups in their preferred
level of welfare state solidarity and their choices of justice principles. Higher edu-
cational attainment and a higher income level independently lead to less consent to
welfare state solidarity and equality. Finally, women appear to be more supportive
of welfare state solidarity than men; as are the unemployed in comparison to the
employed.
7.2.4     Public support for health care systems
The fourth research question dealt with the factors which might account for intra-and
inter-country variations in levels of public support for national health care systems.
Specifically, this research question was formulated as follows:
4.  To what extent are citizens  of different welfare states supportive of their health
care system? To what extent can differences among individuals and societies in
their commitment of the national health care system be explained by differences
among weUare state regimes, structural characteristics of the health care system,
social position and socio-political beliefs?
This research question was answered in Chapter  5. We estimated the effects  of
belonging to different welfare state regimes, of several characteristics of the national
care system and of individual-level social characteristics.  This was done on the basis
of 1996 survey-data from 13 countries.
Evidence was found for a relationship between the various types of welfare states,
as identified by their degree of conservatism, liberalism and social-democratism, and
their citizens' support for public health care. Support appeared to be particularly
linked to social-democratic characteristics of welfare states, whereas support dropped
as liberal and conservative characteristics featured more prominently. In addition,
national health care arrangements were found to affect public preferences for solidary
health care arrangements. Specifically, support for public health care was significantly
related to wider coverage and public funding. Moreover, higher levels of support were
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found in countries with fewer social services for children and the elderly, as well as
in countries with a larger proportion of female (part-time) employment. The effect
of the supply of social services for children and the elderly could be a consequence
of the fact that countries with a less mature health care system also often do not
have well-developed formal social care services, and therefore draw heavily on family
support. An increasing appeal to the family may put a strain on family relations which
may lead, in turn, to a stronger call for public health care and public social services.
With respect to the effect of female (part-time) employment, we argued that social
care services relieve women from their caring duties. Therefore, in countries with a
larger proportion of female (part-time) employment, the level of support for a public
health care system is expected to be higher, as this gives women more time for paid
employment.
We also came across significant effects of individual characteristics.  The unem-
ployed appeared to be more in favour of public health care provision than those in
paid employment. Notably, support for public health care was stronger for people in
the highest income group than for those on the lowest incomes. Presumably, those
in the highest income group are also the ones who are confronted with high costs
for private health care insurance, which may lead them to prefer a more collectively
oriented health care system. Furthermore, those who rated themselves as very healthy
were less supportive ofpublic health care. Finally, we found that those with a left-wing
political orientation were more supportive of public health care. Also, women consent
more strongly to public health care provision than men.
7.2.5      Responsibility  for  old-age  pensions
The fifth and final research question dealt with the cross-national differences and
similarities among welfare states in the public's support for government intervention
in yet another important area of social policy: old-age pensions. This research question
was formulated as follows:
5.  To  what  extent  do  citizens  of different  welfare  states  endorse  different  ways  of
providing old-age pensions? To what extent can differences among individuals
and societies in these preferences be explained by differences among welfare state
regimes, structural characteristics of the national pension system, social position
and socio-political beliefs?
This research question was answered in Chapter 6. The effects of welfare state
regimes and structural characteristics of the national pension system - as well as of
individual-level characteristics - were studied across eleven and fourteen European
countries, respectively.  Data were from  1992  and  1995.
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We estimated the effects of the different welfare state regimes, structural character-
istics ofthe national pension system and individual-level social characteristics. Welfare
state regimes only marginally affected the level of support for government responsi-
bility in the field of old-age pensions. When choosing between state responsibility,
shared employer/employee responsibility or private responsibility for the provision
of old-age pensions, only citizens from Mediterranean welfare states were clearly in
favour of exclusive state responsibility. Citizens of corporatist and social-democratic
welfare states were more in favour of joint responsibility between the individual and
the state, rather than sole state responsibility.
However, structural characteristics of the national pension system were also
found to affect public attitudes concerning the responsibility for the provision of
old-age pensions. Specifically, we found effects of the generosity of the pension
system, the level of public pension expenditures, the importance of the private
pension arrangements in a country and the employers' and insured persons' share of
contributions to finance social protection. We argue that the interpretation of these
effects iS, to a considerable degree, dependent on the maturity of the welfare states
concerned.  This is of consequence for public consent to state intervention in social
protection.
Finally, with regard to individual-level effects, the findings indicated that people
are more likely to opt for either individual or shared collective responsibility for
pension provision as the duration of education increases. Apparently, where old-age
pensions are concerned, those with a higher level of education are led either by
self-interest (those with a higher level of education may expect to benefit less when
pensions are provided solely by the state. Therefore, they opt for private pension
arrangements) or by moral commitment (those with more education see the need
to accept shared responsibility together with the state for the provision of old-age
pensions). Furthermore, the members of the petty bourgeoisie - as well as those who
consider themselves to be members of the middle class or upper middle class - showed
a stronger preference for private pension arrangements. The groups concerned are
principally the self-employed - who generally do not endorse state intervention - or
managerial and professional workers - who are better protected against the vagaries
of the market because of their contractual relationship with private or government
organizations. On the other hand, old-age pensioners, women and those on lower
incomes more often preferred the state provision of pensions.
7.3 Conclusion
In this section, we will present the main conclusions based on the findings summarised
in the previous section. The most significant question to be answered here is whether
different worlds of welfare tend to generate different worlds of public consent to
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welfare state solidarity and fairness. We dealt with this question mainly in Chapters 3
to 6 and,  in the following, we will predominantly avail ourselves of the findings in those
chapters to reach the main conclusions. Therefore, we will start with a discussion
concerning the relevance of the extended regime-classification and other contextual
factors, which were also included in our analyses of cross-national variations in public
attitudes. Finally, we will draw the main conclusions with respect to the findings at
the individual level.
The results of the cross-national comparisons of levels of public support for the
welfare state in this study show a nearly universally high to very high commitment,
as well as a strong public dedication to redistributive justice in the sense of income
levelling. This is also often found in other studies. There seems to be more variation in
support within countries than among countries. The first question is whether welfare
state typologies are useful for a better understanding of cross-national variations and
similarities in public attitudes. When answering this question, we must take into
account the fact that support predominates overwhelmingly. Therefore, little variation
among countries can be distinguished. We summarise our findings with respect to this
question in Table  7.1.
In general, the following can be concluded here.  In many instances, clear
differences among clusters of countries emerge when these countries are grouped
according to an extended version of the Esping-Andersenian typology of welfare
states. However, when we evaluate how well these typeS of regimes predict cross-
national differences in levels of support for welfare state solidarity and fairness, it can
be concluded that both the original three-way classification as well as the extended
welfare state regime typology (proposed in Chapter 2) perform relatively well in
accounting for the cross-national variation in public attitudes. The direction of
proposed differences among regime-types was sometimes found to be different from
the direction of the estimated effects. However, the results of the analyses in the
previous chapters show that - in terms of explanatory power - this rather simple
typology proved to be almost as powerful in explaining variation in public attitudes
as the inclusion of several societal-level structural characteristics. Again, we like to
stress that, since all the countries we included in the analyses are welfare states in
different stages of development - and qualitatively different - large variations in levels
of public commitment could not be found. All types of welfare states serve sorne
common values - such as the achievement of solidarity and equality - and this is
reflected in people's attitudes. Where differences among countries exist, they merely
reflect differences in the priorities given to the realization of these values.
Table 7.2 presents the main findings of this study with respect to the effects of these
structural factors. We also investigated whether more specific structural characteristics
of the national health care and pension system,  as well as societal-level characteristics -
i.e. income inequality, the level of social expenditure and the manner of financing the
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Table 7.1: Main findings concerning the relationship between welfare state regimes and public
attitudes.
Differences among welfare state regimes? Differences as predicted?
Research question 2:
Public support for institutionalised solidarity
Citizens of liberal welfare states support the welfare state more than No
citizens of social-democratic welfare states. Citizens of Mediterranean
welfare states also give strong support.
Research question 3:
Public support for welfare state solidarity and justice principles
Citizens of social-democratic and Mediterranean welfare states are more Partially
in favour of state intervention to achieve welfare state solidarity than
citizens of liberal welfare states. Citizens of social-democratic welfare
states are more willing to accept income inequality than citizens of liberal
welfare states, citizens  of Mediterranean  wel fare states  less.
Research question 4:
Public support for national health care system
In social-democratic and in Mediterranean welfare states citizens give Partially
strong support to the national health care system. Citizens of corporatist
welfare states are even less supportive of public health care. Position of
liberal welfare states is not clear-cut.
Research question 5:
Public support for state provision of old-age pensions
Citizens of Mediterranean welfare states give more support for state Partially
intervention for the provision of pensions than citizens of liberal welfare
states. Citizens of social-democratic and corporatist welfare states are
more in favour of joint responsibility for old-age provisions between state
and individual.
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Table 7.2: Main findings concerning the effects of structural characteristics on public attitudes.
Hypothesis: Confirmed?
Research question 2:
Public support for institutionalised solidarity
The higher the level of income inequality, the stronger the support for the welfare state. No
The higher the level of social expenditure, the weaker the support for the welfare state. Yes
The higher the visibility of the method of financing the welfare state, the weaker the Yes
support for the welfare state.
Research question 3:
Public support for welfare state solidarity and justice principles
Effects of structural characteristics not studied (comparable data on income inequality
and welfare state financing not available)
Research question 4:
Public support for national health care system
If a country has a universal public health care system, the level of support for public     Yes
health care will be higher.
When health care services are largely privately funded, the level of support for public Yes
health care will be lower.
Support for public health care will be higher in countries with higher total health care No
spending.
Support for public health care will be higher in countries with a NHS system than in No
countries with a social security type of health care system.
Support for public health care will be higher in countries with fewer social service for Yes
children and the elderly.
Support for public health care will be higher in countries where the dependency ratio Yes
is higher.
Support for public health care will be higher in countries with a large share of female Yes
(part-time) employment.
Research question 5:
Public support for state provision of old-age pensions
As pension systems are more generous and to a greater extent publicly financed, citizens Yes
will give more preference to provision of pensions by the state.
As private pension arrangements are more important in a country, citizens will not so Yes
much hold the state or the employers and employees responsible for the provisions of
pensions, but rather opt for private responsibility.
As the insured contribute more to social security, citizens will appoint the responsibility No
for the provision of pensions to the employers or to the state.
As the contribution of employers to social security increases, citizens will be more likely No
to appoint the responsibility for the provision of pensions to the employers.
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welfare state - could account for cross-national differences in public attitudes. We have
summarised the findings concerning the effects ofthe latter societal-level determinants
in Table 7.2. For example, it was hypothesised that a higher level of income inequality
would generate more support  for the welfare state.   This is because,  when  a  high
level of income equality is already achieved in a country, people are less Willing to
contribute more to achieve an even higher level. However, this hypothesis has not
been confirmed. When controlling for the level of social expenditure - a measure
of the maturity of a welfare state - we found that, as the income distribution of a
country is more characterised by inequality, people were less supportive of the welfare
state. Presumably, a high level of income inequality in a country indicates a lack of
social cohesion which, in turn, is reflected in lower levels of support to achieve welfare
state solidarity. In general, although the predicted effects were often found, the more
parsimonious regime-typology often appeared to be - in terms of explained variance
- at least as powerful as these more extensive and detailed societal characteristics.
Therefore, we conclude that, although the level of public support for welfare state
solidarity and for certain justice principles across countries only partially coincides
with the specifics of welfare state regimes, the use of an extended typology may be
quite useful to grasp cross-national variations in public attitudes. In the introduction
to this study, it was suggested that a typology of welfare state regimes might be an
important explanatory factor of cross-national differences in public attitudes.  The
findings of this study suggest that this is indeed the case.
In Table 7.3, we present the main findings concerning differences at the individual
level. We distinguished among three kinds of explanatory variables here. It was stated
that explanatory variables concerning social position and demographic characteristics
would affect support for the welfare state mainly due to motives of self-interest.
However, socio-political explanatory variables were expected to affect consent to
welfare state solidarity because of moral or ideological motives. The analyses showed
that most of the individual-level explanatory variables had a direct effect on people's
willingness to support welfare state solidarity and their choices of justice principles.
Although both self-interest and a moral commitment to the welfare state appeared to
affect public consent, the results of our analyses indicated that moral commitment
often seems to outweigh self-interest at the general level of welfare state support.
Furthermore, the importance of self-interest appeared to vary in the areas under
study: Self-interest appeared to be more important where the provision of old-age
pensions was concerned, whereas moral commitment to the common good was
more salient with respect to public health care. Finally, we observed that this
moral commitment decreased only when more specific questions were asked, which
confronted respondents with the costs of greater solidarity.  Then, more significant
differences emerged among social groups having differing interests in the welfare state
(see Chapter 3).
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Table 7.3: Main findings concerning the effects of individual-level characteristics on public
attitudes.
Effects of social position on public attitudes about welfare state solidarity
With respect to educational attainment:
·  The longer the duration of people's education, the more they consent to welfare state solidarity.
Socialization to democratic values, as measured by years of formal education, evokes greater
commitment to social rights and generates more support for the welfare state.
•  The higher the level of people's educational attainment, the less they consent to state-intervention
to achieve a high level of welfare state solidarity. The higher educated expect to benefit less from
social security provisions than persons with lower educational levels.
With respect to (objective and subjective) class position:
·  The higher people's class position, the less they consent to welfare state solidarity.
· The higher people's class position, the more they prefer individual responsibility in the case of
old-age provision.
With respect to transfer classes:
·    If people belong to a transfer class,  they are more likely to consent to welfare state solidarity.
Effects of socio-political orientations on public attitudes about welfare state solidarity
With respect to political left-right self-placement:
• The more people place themselves to the right on the political continuum, the less they consent to
welfare state solidarity.
With respect to post-materialism:
· The more people have a post-materialist value-orientation, the more they consent to welfare state
solidarity.
With respect to union-membership:
·   Members of a union are more likely to consent to welfare state solidarity than non-members.
Effects of demographic characteristics on public attitudes about welfare state solidarity
With respect to gender:
•  Women are more likely to consent to welfare state solidarity than men.
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7.4 Discussion
In this final section, we will discuss the scientific and societal relevance of the findings
of this study. Moreover, we will discuss a few shortcomings of the approach we have
taken here. With these and other considerations in mind, we will offer some prospects
for future research in the field of public commitment to welfare state solidarity.
7.4.1       Scientific  relevance
A main aim of this study was to explain differences and similarities in levels of
public support for welfare state solidarity and fairness.  We used the idea that
institutional arrangements, operationalised as welfare state regimes - and as structural
characteristics such as the national health care and pension system - matter in how
people think about the role of the government in the achievement of welfare state
solidarity and justice.
Generally speaking, this study has made a systematic effort to relate attitudes
to aspects of the social context and to indicators of location in the social structure.
Thus, this study is tied in with a large body of research in sociology and social
psychology, which has focused on the investigation of the links between attitudes and
social structure (Kiecolt, 1988). Because contextual variables are usually not included
in cross-national opinion surveys, the impact of social context on an individual's
attitudes is often not systematically assessed. This study is among the first to rectify
this, at least in the present area of research. First, one important contribution is the
formulation of specific hypotheses concerning the impact ofwelfare state arrangements
on public consent to the welfare state. Previous research exercised restraint in this
respect (Ullrich, 2000, p. 146). Secondly, this study has added country-level
characteristics to individual-level data and has used multilevel analysis to model the
effects of contextual-level and individual-level explanatory variables on an individual-
level outcome. We have shown that individual-level attitudes concerning support for
welfare state solidarity and fairness are related to welfare state arrangements. In this
respect, this study has contributed significantly to previous cross-national studies on
welfare state support, as a larger number of countries were included in the analysis
and hypotheses could be tested more systematically.
In addition, this study has contributed to previous comparative social policy
research, by examining the usefulness of one of the most important concepts in the
comparative social policy literature of the last decade: Esping-Andersen's notion of
welfare state regime. In particular, we scrutinised his typology of welfare state regimes
and formulated an extended version of it.  Then, we used this extended typology as
an explanatory variable, as Esping-Andersen (1990) himself proposed to do.  This
study has contributed to the debate on the usefulness of welfare state typologies by
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showing that they indeed have heuristic - and when underlying theoretical notions
are made more explicit - even some explanatory value. Even though real welfare
states are just approximations of ideal-typical constructs, we have shown that they can
contribute to a better understanding of differences and similarities in public attitudes
among countries. However, we also believe that typologiSing should not be taken
too far. Empirical refinement should not be at the expense of analytical parsimony.
Furthermore, the results have also shown that a lot ofvariation remains to be explained,
as far as the levels of support for welfare state solidarity are concerned. Thus, future
research should also search for other explanatory factors on the country-level.
In this respect, this study has also contributed to previous research, by showing that
contextual-level factors - i.e. income inequality - also contribute to our understanding
of cross-national differences. We have shown that alternative indicators - such as the
contribution rate of the insured and of employers, as suggested by Kangas (1995) -
have strengthened the findings on the basis of the regime-typology and have made
them easier to interpret. This is in addition to aggregate-level measures such as the
level of social expenditure, which is often used as an explanatory variable because it
is easily available. These findings have also shown that the level of development of a
welfare state is an important factor in determining cross-national variations in levels of
support. Thus, this study has also shown that more accurate, disaggregated measures
can add to our understanding of cross-national differences in public attitudes.
To interpret the effects of welfare state regimes, the notions of framing, learning,
and habit formation, introduced in Chapter 4, were discussed. The following idea
proved to be applicable. The effect of institutional arrangements on attitudes is
mediated by cognitive factors - which at the individual level - lead to differential
knowledge of distribution rules, distinctive habituation to distributive arrangements
and differences in the application of solidarity frames. This study has, therefore, also
added theoretically to previous research.
Finally, this study has also made an important methodological addition to previous
research. In the first place, whenever possible, we have not taken comparability of
the dependent variables for granted. We have constructed scales and have tested the
cross-national comparability of these scales using the multi-group analysis procedure in
LISREL. Therefore, the equivalence of scales has explicitly been examined, which has
made comparisons of levels of public support across countries more valid. Secondly,
we have shown that variable-oriented and case-oriented approaches are compatible,
contrary to Goldthorpe's (2000) assumptions. Esping-Andersen (1993) acknowledges
the same limitations of both approaches as Goldthorpe does: the problems of over-
determination and identification. However, he (1993, pp. 134-136) feels that
methodological syntheses are possible, either by moving back and forth continuously
between cases and correlations or by selecting cases to disprove established hypotheses.
Here, we have proceeded along the former strategy. We used linear-type models which
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included more or less ideal-typical cases. With respect to the country-level results,
we were always forced to examine the position of specific cases vis-A-vis the original
typology. In this way, the findings could be interpreted more profoundly.
We have also shown that multilevel analysis is certainly applicable to the study
of cross-national variations in public attitudes among welfare states. It provides a
well-suited manner of investigating the independent impact of individual-level and
contextual-level explanatory variables on an individual-level dependent variable, given
that a reasonable number of contextual-level units (i.e. countries) is available. The
technique also enables us to assess - separately - the explanatory value of variables  at
the individual and contextual level. To our knowledge, this study is the first application
of this technique to the cross-national study of public support for the welfare state.
With more large-scale survey data becoming available for more countries, we believe
that this technique can significantly contribute to this area ofresearch. It is increasingly
recognised by researchers that both within-country and between-country variations
are important to analyse, even though, as this study has shown, there appears to
be more variation in levels of support within countries than among countries, which
is presumably the effect of framing, learning, and habit formation.  As we have
shown in this study, multilevel analysis enables us to estimate effects on both levels
simultaneously, without the problems which are entailed in an analysis in which effects
are estimated on aggregated or disaggregated survey data (Snijders & Bosker, 1999).
7.4.2   Societal relevance
This study has used data from recent public opinion surveys to compare the level of
support for the welfare state across different welfare state regimes. The scope of data
which were available for analysis has forced us to focus primarily on the welfare states
of European countries. Although, at first glance, this may seem to be a limitation,
when considering a future 'social Europe', the findings of this study may actually
be of particular societal relevance. Specifically, they may give a clue as to whether
or not convergence or divergence will occur within Europe at the level of attitudes
about social policy making. Indeed, all European welfare states are confronted with
the problem of ageing populations. Alongside of this, there is also the restraining
of state spending in order to comply with the fiscal and financial demands of the
monetary union, and a diminishing willingness of EU citizens to pay more taxes or
contributions to finance expansive welfare systems (Boeri, Bdrsch-Supan, & Tabellini,
Forthcoming). Different governments  may deal with these pressures differently.   As
Taylor-Gooby (1998, pp. 57-58) argues, public attitudes may exert pressure on
European welfare states to converge on lower levels of state provision. However,
systems of social protection in different countries may, instead, begin to diverge, with
each nation adopting its own distinctive solutions. In other words, can we, on the
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basis of attitudes surveys, make an informed prediction about the future of attitudes
about social protection in Europe?
Taylor-Gooby's (1995; 1998) findings are inconclusive in this respect. In an
examination of European survey data on support for state welfare provision, he
concludes that "the findings are optimistic. Most people want more welfare spending.
They give high priority to the maintenance of the services needed to support the
demographic challenge of an ageing population - health care and pensions. There is
no evidence of popular endorsement of a multi-track European welfare system (i.e. a
European welfare system in which differences in social protection among the Member
States continue to exist  - J.G.). Indeed, the stronger aspirations of people in lower-
spending countries imply pressure for convergence" (1995, p. 33). As there are strong
parallels between Taylor-Gooby's findings and ours (high levels of support for welfare
state solidarity everywhere, with even higher levels in the immature Mediterranean
countries), it seems to be the most obvious conclusion that convergence is taking place.
Processes of adaptation to common pressures and, consequently, the development
of more similar frames of solidarity may play a significant role in this process of
convergence.
Elsewhere, Taylor-Gooby (1998) compared trends in public support for welfare
provision as a central state responsibility in  1985,  1990  and  1996 for West Germany,
Great Britain, Italy and Sweden. This longitudinal analysis led him to conclude
that there was a slight common cross-national tendency over time against the view
that health care, pensions, and unemployment benefits should be the responsibility
of government. Consequently, differences among countries continue to exist over
time, and the anticipated convergence of European public attitudes - due to common
pressures on welfare provisions - has not taken place.
Although we have not examined changes over-time in public attitudes in this
study, we believe that the results still indicate whether convergence or divergence
will occur in the future. Throughout this study, we tested the general hypothesis
that the institutional arrangements of the welfare state matter decisively for people's
attitudes about welfare state solidarity and distributive justice. The empirical evidence
indicates that this is indeed the fact, as we found significant relationships between
clusters of countries (based on the extented typology of welfare states) and public
attitudes. Likewise, we found significant associations between public attitudes and
structural characteristics of national health care and pension systems, levels of income
inequality, social expenditure, and manners of financing the welfare state.  The
differences which exist in the institutional arrangements of European welfare states
have remained despite the common pressures which these welfare states have faced.
As van Kersbergen (1999) observes, welfare states appear to be quite obstinate in
resisting change, although the possibility of institutional change cannot be ruled out.
According to van Kersbergen (1999, pp. 9-13), two theories have emerged which
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try to explain this reluctance. The first proposes that citizens have become attached
to the provisions of their own welfare state. Also, governments of national states try to
cherish the loyalty of their citizens by providing to them social and economic security.
Loyalty is an important source ofpolitical power. Therefore, those with political power
cling to the welfare state because of its electoral value. The second theory deals with
institutional and political mechanisms which are to the advantage of the status quo.
This historical-institutional explanation of resistance to change points to mechanisms
as path-dependency, 'lock-in' and the electoral risks of welfare state retrenchment.
For example, Pierson (1994) points out that the politics of retrenchment in the
United States and Great Britain encountered strong resistance by groups of voters
and interested parties, either because they were dependent on the welfare state or
even because their subsistance depended on it. Also Esping-Andersen's work is based
on the assumption that national social policy traditions embedded in institutional
arrangements persist, despite the pressures they face.  If a welfare state adapts to
change, it only does so on the basis of its own institutional legacy, policy traditions
and vested interests. The manner in which social policy is adapted depends on the
institutional characteristics of the specific welfare state regimes.
Taking into account the findings of this study, we can say that convergence of
public opinion will hardly occur. Citizens of welfare states will hold on to their own
routines and practices or will be influenced by the specific institutional arrangements
of their own welfare state regimes. We believe that - in the long-run - when national
social policy becomes increasingly dependent on EU social policy decisions, some
general trends of convergence in public attitudes concerning the welfare state will
become visible. First, however, the welfare laggards in Europe will have to reach
maturity, equalising the level of development within European welfare states.  Only
then will common EU social policy have, in the long run, its own distinctive impact on
the public's support for the welfare state. However, the effect of national welfare state
arrangements on public attitudes about welfare state solidarity will probably prove
hard to change.
7.4.3        Some  shortcomings  and  prospects  for  future  research
This study has addressed the question of the extent to which a relationship exists
between the level of support for the welfare state,  on the one hand,  and the specifics o f
welfare state regimes, on the other. In the following, we will discuss some shortcomings
which can be identified in this study.  On the basis of these shortcomings, we will also
discuss some prospects for future research.
A first critical remark concerns the operationalization of welfare state regime
characteristics in this study. Throughout this study, welfare state regimes have been
operationalised as dummy-variables to indicate separate clusters of countries which
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can be classified into a specific welfare state regime. Our goal was to test whether a
specific clustering of nations yields meaningful results. Of course, in using such an
approach, we run the risk of measuring something other than the effect of 'welfare
state regimes'. Ideally, other societal-level variables should have been added to the
analyses to control for omitted variable bias. Given the number of available degrees
of freedom at the country-level, this was not always feasible. Moreover, it is not
immediately clear which control variables should have been included. Eventually,
we think that future research on the impact of regime characteristics should look
for a better operationalization of the regime concept which is applicable in empirical
research. One could think of the construction of a de-commodification index for a
greater number of countries, which will make it a more valid explanatory variable for
differences among countries.
Another shortcoming is concerned with the extent to which welfare states - and
in particular hybrid cases - could not always be treated in the same way in the
analyses presented in the previous chapters. This was caused by the fact that different
aspects ofwelfare states were addressed in the different chapters. Consequently, some
aspects of the institutional arrangements of welfare states were more salient than
others in the discussion about the impact of institutional characteristics. For example,
in the analyses of levels of support for welfare state solidarity and justice principles
across different welfare state regimes - presented in Chapter 4 - the social-democratic
characteristics of the Dutch welfare state were emphasised. In contrast, in Chapter
6, where public preferences for old-age pension provision were at issue, we put
more emphasis on the liberal features of the Dutch pension-system. The necessity
for this approach is one drawback in applying a typology. This problem with the
interpretation of hybrid cases only underscores the fact that, when a typology is used,
it is still necessary for the researcher to have some basic understanding of the specific
welfare state arrangements of countries in the social policy area under examination.  Of
course, when many countries are included in the analyses, this may become an almost
impossible task. However, we believe that some basic knowledge of the welfare states
under study will benefit future studies on the relation between welfare state regimes
and attitudes about the welfare state.
Throughout this study, it has been assumed that the institutional context created
by a welfare state matters, to a decisive degree, for people's attitudes about welfare
state solidarity and fairness. As Ullrich (2000) observes, the reason that researchers on
public attitudes have exercised restraint in the formulation of hypotheses concerning
this relationship, is that there is a lack of aggregated, long-term cross-national time
series - or even more ideally, cross-national panel-data - on these attitudes. Such a
longitudinal design would be necessary to test the hypothesis that change in opinion
follows from change in regime-characteristics, which is the position we have taken
here. In addition, it has also been proposed that opinion changes may bring about
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changes in policy (Papadakis, 1992; Shapiro & Young, 1989). At best, the findings of
this study make it plausible that there is an effect of institutional context on individual
attitudes. However, a final appraisal of the direction of causality can only be made on
the basis of cross-national replications over time.
Another critical comment to this study is concerned with the lack ofspecification of
causal relationships among individual-level variables and among macro-level variables.
To the extent that causal relationships were specified among individual-level variables,
these were mainly according to the self-interest and ideology-theses. The former
holds that a direct relationship exists between one's attitudes and one's position
in the stratification structure. The latter, however, proposes that there is no direct
relationship between people's position in the stratification structure and their attitudes,
but that this effect is mediated by people's ideological position. The objective of this
study was not to explicitly model causal relationships among individual-level variables
relating to welfare state support. This has already been done by, for example, Cnaan
et al. (1993) and Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989). We have, therefore, limited the
analysis to the evaluation of direct effects ofindividual-level variables on public consent
to welfare state solidarity.
Furthermore, this study has included only some of the societal-level and individual-
level characteristics considered to be of major importance in the literature on public
attitudes towards the welfare state and the literature on social justice research. For
example, at the individual level we did not include voting behaviour or political party
preference as an explanatory variable. The construction of a comparable variable
across the many countries included in the analyses would have been difficult. Data
on party preference were sometimes missing for complete countries. Therefore, we
chose political left-right self-placement as an indicator for political preference, as it
was available in most surveys and for most of the countries we analysed.
To the extent that we wished to evaluate the importance of different motives to
support welfare state solidarity, we could only do so implicitly. Throughout this
study, we assumed that these motives were, to a certain extent, reflected in people's
location in the social structure or their socio-political beliefs. Direct measurements
of the different motives to support solidarity were generally lacking in the data.  As
van Oorschot (2000) points out, it has been quite common to deduce these motives
from the direct effects that certain 'interest indicators' and 'value indicators' have on
support for welfare state solidarity. He warns, on the basis of his findings, that this
approach can lead to "grossly misleading conclusions". The interpretation of the
results in this study has shown that 'gleaning' certain motives from variables, which
were actually included in the analysis to measure something completely different, can
be quite tricky. Therefore, we agree with van OorschOI, and we would argue for the
inclusion of measurements of the different motives into future cross-national attitude
surveys on this topic.
Summary and Discussion 191
Because we only included a limited number of contextual-level variables, we
focused exclusively on their direct impact on public support for the welfare state and
for certain justice principles. Future research, however, should address these issues,
as important differences in causal effects at the individual-level among countries may
emerge. Note that, in this respect, one of the more exciting applications of multilevel
analysis involves the specification of models in which the variation in effects across
groups is seen as dependent on certain characteristics of these groups.  In this way, it
could be tested, for example, whether different regime types tend to create different
cleavage structures (Svallfors, 1997). Using multilevel-analysis, future research could,
on the basis of a larger sample of countries, address this kind of cross-level interactions
more extensively. It could go beyond the explanation of tile variation in average levels
of support for the welfare state across countries, as has been done in this study.
Where the dependent variables related to specific areas of social policy, we surveyed
only attitudes about support for public health care and about the responsibility for
the provision of old-age pensions. These two areas of social policy lie at the heart of
welfare states everywhere. However, most welfare states provide not only some type of
income maintenance in old-age and health care for the sick and the disabled, but are
also more or less actively involved in the provision of benefits to the unemployed  (see
Fridberg and Ploug (2000) for an examination of the relationship between European
welfare state regimes and public attitudes about unemployment) and those who are
unable to work because of, for example, family responsibilities. The scope of the
welfare state is much wider than this study could cover, given its aim to go beyond
simple descriptions of frequency distributions of questions to measure the public's
consent to welfare state solidarity. Therefore, future research could also address
the relationships among welfare state arrangements in the areas of unemployment
benefits and social assistance, for example, as well as public attitudes concerning these
provisions.
7.5 Concluding remarks
This study on the impact of welfare state arrangements on public attitudes about
welfare state solidarity and preferences for justice principles has focused only on a very
general level ofsupport. To a large degree, this is the consequence ofthe cross-national
data which are, at present, available. To our knowledge, no cross-national survey exists
which probes more deeply into the attitudes of citizens about specific arrangements
for social protection across different welfare state regimes.  As we argued in the
previous chapters, the high level of support for the welfare state found everywhere
may simply be caused by the general questions we ask in these surveys. Perhaps more
specific questions - which confront the respondent with the fact that a higher level
of welfare state solidarity will most likely also involve an increase in costs - about
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particular welfare arrangements, may cause, as Kangas (1997) has shown, this high
level of support to wither away. Typically, only national surveys, specifically designed
to measure people's opinions, perceptions and attitudes regarding the welfare state
in general and the system of social protection in particular, are available and include
questions with a cost-benefit frame (see for The Netherlands the TISSER Solidarity
Study (van Oorschot, 1998a)).  The national particularity of these data makes it
very difficult to use these data to make cross-national comparisons, as measurement
instrument equivalence will obviously cause serious problems. Because arrangements
for social protection are so different across welfare states - even within Europe - making
comparisons will be even more difficult. The concentration on public attitudes about
the national system of social protection has resulted in far more knowledge of micro-
level variation than of macro-level differences in attitudes about support for the welfare
state in general and for specific social policy areas in particular. Therefore, we argue
- as Gijsberts (1999, p.  151) does for future analysis of justice evaluations - that
a larger number of countries should be included and more replications should be
conducted. We believe that this is the only way in which explanations of country-level
and over-time differences in levels of public consent to welfare state solidarity can
be quantitatively addressed, thus adding to our understanding of some of the issues
mentioned above.
Despite these tremendous problems, we believe that the future of research on
public support for the welfare state and for support of specific areas of social
protection lies in cross-national and longitudinal studies. Systematic comparisons
among large numbers of welfare states and, especially, changes over time are still
in their infancy. Formulating specific questions, which less easily elicit support for
welfare state arrangements, may cause more cross-national differences to emerge than
we currently detect.
References
Abel-Smi£h, B., & Mossalios, E. (1994). Cost containment and health care reform.
Health  Policy, 28(2), 89-132.
Alber, J. (1984). Transfer classes in the welfare state. Considerations and data on
the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany. Kdlner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie
und Sozialpsychologie, 36(2), 225-251.
Alber, J.  (1995).  A framework for the comparative study of social services. Journal of
European Social Policy, 5(2), 131-149.
Anttonen, A., & Sipilii, J. (1996). European social care services: Is it possible to
identify models? Journal of European Social Policy, 6(2), 87-100.
Ardig6, A. (1995). Public attitudes and changes in health care systems: A confronta-
tion and a puzzle. In 0. Borre & E. Scarbrough (Eds.), 77:e scope of government:
Beliefs in govennent 0101.3, p. 388-409). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Arts, W. A.  (1985).  To each his due: Ideas of social justice and Dutch income
(re)distribution policy. The Netherlands Journal of Sociology, 21(23, 140-149.
Arts, W. A. (1995). Prinzipien der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit. Die theoretische Rekon-
struktion der soziologischen Zugangsweisen. In H. Muller & B. Wegener (Eds.),
Soziale Ungleichheit und soziale Gerechtigkeit (p. 107-131).  Opladen: Leske &
Budrich.
Arts, W. A., & Gelissen, J. (1999a). Verzorgingsstaten in soorten: Op zoek naar
ideaal- en reifle typen. Mens & Maatschappij, 74(2), 143-165.
Arts,  W.  A., & Gelissen, J. (1999b, August). wefare states, solidarity, and justice
principles: Does the type reaUY matter? Paper presented at the Third European
Sociological Association Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
193
194 References
Arts, W. A., & Hermkens, P.  (1994). De eerlijke verdeling van huishoudelijke taken:
Percepties en oordelen. Mens & Maatschappij, 69(2), 147-168.
Arts, W. A., Hermkens, P., & van Wijk, P. (1995). Justice evaluation of income
distribution in East and West. In J. R. Kluegel, D. S. Mason, & B. Wegener
(Eds.), Social justice and political change:  Public opinion in capitalist and post-
communist states (p. 131-150). New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Arts,   W.  A.,   &  van der Veen,   R. (1992). Sociological approaches to distributive
justice and procedural justice. In K. R. Scherer (Ed.), Justice: Interdisciplina,y
perspectives (p. 143-176).  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.
Baldwin, P. (1996). Can we define a European welfare state model?  In B. Greve
(Ed.), Comparative welfare systems: The Scandinavian model in a period of change
(p. 29-44). London: MacMillan Press LTD.
Barr, N. (1993). The economics of the welfare state (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Bayertz, K. (1998). Solidaritat. Begriff und Problem. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Becker,   U.     (1996).    Over de typologie van welvaartsbestellen. Esping-Andersens
theorie in discussie. Beleid &' Maatschappij, 23(1), 19-30.
Berger, J., Fisek, R. Z., Norman, R. Z., & Wagner, D. G. (1985). Formation of
reward expectations in status situations.  In J. Berger & M. Zelditch (Eds.),
Status, rewards and influence. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Berger, J., Zelditch, M., Anderson, B., & Cohen, B. P. (1972). Structural aspects of
distributive justice. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch, & B. Anderson (Eds.), Sociological
theones in progress 801.2). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
Blalock, H. M. (1984). Contextual effects models: Theoretical and methodological
issues. Annual Re·view of Sociology, 10, 353-372.
Boeri, T., B6rsch-Supan, A., & Tabellini, G. (Forthcoming). Would you like to
shrink the welfare state? The opinions  of European citizens. Economic Policy.
Boje,   T. (1996). Welfare state models in comparative research:    Do the models
describe the reality? In  B.   Greve (Ed.), Comparative welfare systems: The
Scandinavian model in  a period of change (p. 13-27). London: MacMillan Press
LTD.
Bonoli, G. (1997). Classifying welfare states: A two-dimension approach. Yournal of
Social Policy, 26(3), 351-372.
References 195
Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit.  In
K. A. Bollen & J. Scott Long (Eds.), Testing structural equation models. London:
Sage.
Bryk, A. S., & Raudenbusch, S. W. (1992). Hierarchical linear models: Applications and
data analysis methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Bryk,  A.  S.,  Raudenbusch,  S.  W.,  &  Congdon Jr.,  R.  T.   (1990). HLM: Hierarchical
linear and nonlinear modeling with the HLMIL2 and HLMIL3 programs.  Chicago:
Scientific Software International Inc.
Byrne, B. M. (1998). Structural equation modeling with LISREL, PRELIS, and
SIMPLIS:  Basic  concepts,  applications  and programming.  Mahwah,NI:'Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Castles, F. G. (1993). Introduction. In F. G. Castles (Ed.), Families  of  nations:
Patterns of public policy in Western democracies. Aldershor Dartmouth Publishing
Company.
Castles, F. G. (1996). Needs-based strategies of social protection in Australia and
New Zealand. In G. Esping-Andersen (Ed.), welfare states in transition: National
adaptations in global economies. London: Sage.
Castles, F. G., & Mitchell, D. (1993). Worlds of welfare and families of nations.
In F. G. Castles (Ed.), Families of nations:  Patterns of public policy in Western
democracies. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company.
Cnaan, R. A.  (1992).  Three worlds of welfare capitalism. Acta Sociologica, 35(1),
69-71.
Cnaan, R. A., Hasenfeld, Y., Cnaan, A., & Rafferty, J. (1993). Cross-cultural
comparisons of attitudes towards welfare state programs: Path-analysis with
loglinear models. Social IndicatOrS Research, 29(2), 123-152.
Coughlin, R. M. (1980). Ideology, public opinion and welfare policy. Berkeley, CA:
University of California: Institute of International Studies.
Daly, M., & Lewis, J.  (2000). The concept of social care and the analysis of
contemporary welfare states. British Journal of Sociology, 51(23, 281-298.
d'Anjou, L., Steijn, A., & Aarsen, D. van. (1995). Social position, ideology and
distributive justice. Social,lustice Research,  8(4),  351-384.
Deutsch, M. (1975). Equity, equality, and need: What determines which value will be
used as the basis of distributive justice? Journal of Social Issues, 31(3), 137-150.
196 References
Dixon, J. (1999). Social security in global perspective. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Doreian,  P., & Fararo,  T.  J.   (1997).   77:e problem of solidarity: 77:eories and models.
Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach.
Durkheim, E. (1996). 77;e division   of  labour   in   society (G. Simpson,  Trans.).   New
York: The Free Press. (Original work published   1893)
Eckhoff, T. (1974). Justice. Its detenninants in social interaction - sociology, law and legal
theory. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press.
Elola, J. (1996). Health care systems reforms in Western European countries: The
relevance of health care organization. International Journal of Health Services,
26(2), 239-251.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). 77ze three worlds of welfare capitalism. Oxford: Polity
Press.
Esping-Andersen,  G.   (1993). The comparative macro-sociology of welfare states.  In
L. Moreno (Ed.), Social  exchange  and welfare  development Cp. 123-136). Madrid:
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1994). Welfare states and the economy. In N. J. Smelser &
R. Swedberg (Eds.), The handbook of economic sociology (p. 711-732). Princeton
& New York: Princeton University Press/Russel Sage Foundation.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1996). Welfare states without work: The impasse of labour
shedding and familialism in Continental European social policy. In G. Esping-
Andersen (Ed.), Welfare states in transition (p. 66-87). London: Sage.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1997). Hybrid or unique? The Japanese welfare state between
Europe and America. Journal  of European  Social  Policy, 7(3), 179-189.
Esping-Andersen,  G. (1999). Social foundations of post-i,idustrial economies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Esping-Andersen, G. (2000). Present and future ofthe welfare state: The sustainability
of welfare states into the twenty-first century. International Journal of Health
Services, 30(1), 1-12.
Esping-Andersen, G., & Korpi, W. (1984). Social policy as class politics in post-war
capitalism. In J. Goldthorpe (Ed.), Order and conflict in comtemporary capitalism.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ester, P., Halman, L., & de Moor, R.  (1994). The individualizing socie): Value change
in Europe and North America. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
References 197
Eurostat. (1996) . Social portrait of Europe (Tech.  Rep.).    Luxembourg:   Office  for
Official Publications of the European Communities.
Eurostat. (1998). Analysis  of  income  distribution  in   13   EU  Member States (Statistics
in Focus: Population and Social Conditions  No. 11). Luxembourg: Eurostat:
Directorate E: Social and Regional Statistics and Geographical Information
System.
Fenwick, R., & Olson, J. (1986). Support for worker participation: Attitudes among
union and non-union workers. American Sociological Review, 51 (4), 505-522.
Ferrera, M.  (1996).  The 'southern' model of welfare in social Europe. Journal of
European Social Policy, 6(1),  17-37.
Flora, P.  (1983). The growth of mass democracies and welfare states (Vol. 1). Frankfurt
am Main: Campus Verlag.
Flora, P. (1986). Grozuth to limits: The Western European welfare states since World War
II. 5 volumes. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Flora, P., & Heidenheimer, A. J. (1981). The development of welfare states in Europe
and America. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
Forma, P. (1997a, August). Does the model matter.; Public opinion on redistribution in
16 countries. Paper presented at the Second European Sociological Association
Conference, University of Essex, United Kingdom.
Forma, P. (1997b). The rational legitimacy of the welfare state: Popular support for
ten income transfer schemes in Finland. Policy and Politics, 25(3), 235-249.
Forma, P., & Kangas, 0.  (1999). Need, citizenship or merit: Public opinion on
pension policy in Australia, Finland and Poland. In S. Svallfors & P. Taylor-
Gooby (Eds.), The end Of the we(fare state.1 Responses to state retrenchment (Vol. 3).
London: Routledge/ESA Studies in European Society.
Fridberg, T., & Ploug, N. (2000). Public attitudes to unemployment in different
European welfare regimes. In D. Gallie & S. Paugam (Eds.), Welfare regimes and
theexpenenceof unemployment in Europe (p. 334-348). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Gallie, D. (1983). Social inequalities and class radicalism in France and Britain.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gelissen, J. (1999). Publieke steun voor geinstitutionaliseerde solidariteit: Een
vergelijking tussen Europese verzorgingsstaten. Sociale IFetenschappen, 42(4),
1-37.
198 References
Gelissen, J. (2000a). Ouderdomspensioen: Individuele of collectieve verantwoorde-
lijkheid? De publieke opinie in Europese verzorgingsstaten onderzocht. Mens &
Maatschappij, 75(3), 203-226.
Gelissen, J. (200Ob). Popular support for institutionalised solidarity: A comparison
among European welfare states. Ii,temational Jountal of Social welfare, 9(4),
285-300.
George, V., & Taylor-Gooby, P. (1996). European welfare policy: Squaring the welfare
circle. London: MacMillan Press LTD.
Gevers, J., Gelissen,  J.,  Arts,  W., & Muffels,  R. (2000). Public health  care  in  the
balance: Exploring popular support for health care systems in the European
Union. International Journal of Social Welfare, 9(4), 301-321.
Gijsberts, M. (1999). Re legiti,nation of inequality in state-socialist and market societies,
1987-1996. Doctoral dissertation, Utrecht University, Utrecht.
Goldthorpe,  J.  H.    (2000). On sociology: Numbers, narratives, and the integration of
research and theog. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goodin, R. E., Heady, B., Muffels, R., & Dirven, H.-J. (1999). The real worlds of
welfare capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goodman, R., & Peng, I. (1996). The East Asian welfare states: Peripatetic learning,
adaptive change, and nation-building. In G. Esping-Andersen (Ed.), weifare
states in transition (p. 192-224). London: Sage.
Gornick, J. C., & Jacobs, J. A. (1998). Gender, the welfare state, and public
employment: A comparative study of seven industrialized countries. American
Sociological Review, 63(5), 688-710.
Greenleaf, E. A. (1992). Measuring extreme response style. Public Opinion Quarterly,
56(3), 328-351.
Greve, B.  (1996).  Ways of financing the welfare State and their distributional
consequences. In B. Greve (Ed.), Compamtive welfare syste)its. The Scandinavian
model  in  a  period  of  change (p. 13-27).  London: MacMillan Press LTD.
Gundelach, P. (1994). National value differences: Modernization or institutionaliza-
tion?  Inteniational Journal of Comparative Sociology, 35(1-2), 37-58.
Halman, L. (1996). Individualism in individualized society? Results from the
European Values Surveys. International  Journal  of  Comparative  Sociology,  37 (3-
4), 195-214.
References 199
Halman, L., & Moor, R. de. (1993). Comparative research on values. In P. Ester,
L. Halman, & R. de Moor (Eds.), Tlze indiuidualizing society: Value change in
Europe and North A„terica (p. 21-36). Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
Hasenfeld, Y., & Rafferty, J. A.  (1989). The determinants of public attitudes towards
the welfare state. Social Forces, 76(4), 1027-1048.
Hechter, M. (1987). Principles of group solidarity. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Hegtved, K. A. (1992). When is a distribution rule just? Rationality and Society, 4(3),
308-331.
Hemerijck, A. C., & Bakker, W. E. (1994). De pendule van perspectief. In
G. Engbersen, A. C. Hemerijck, & W. E. Bakker (Eds.), Zorgen in het Europese
huis  (p. 21-58). Amsterdam:  Boom.
Hempel, C. G. (1965). Typological methods in the natural and the social sciences.
In C. G. Hempel (Ed.), Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the
philosophy   of  science (p. 155-172). New Yort London: The Free Press/Collier-
MacMillan. (Original work published   1952)
Hicks, A.   (1991).  The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Contemporary Sociology,
20(3), 399-401.
Hill, M. (1996). Social policy: A comparative analysis. London: Prentice Hall/Harvester
Wheatsheaf.
Huseby, B. E. (1995). Attitudes towards the size of government.  In 0. Borre &
E. Scarbrough (Eds.), The scope of government:  Beliefs in govennent 901.3, p.
87-118). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Inglehart, R. (1977). 77:e silent revolution: Changing values and political styles among
Western publics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Janowitz, M. (1976). Social control of the welfare state. New York: Elsevier.
Jasso, G.  (1989). The theory of the distributive justice force in human affairs:
Analyzing the three central questions. In J. Berger, M. Zelditsch, & B. Anderson
(Eds.), Sociological  theories  in  progress (p. 354-387). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Jasso,  G., & Wegener,  B. (1997). Methods for empirical justice analysis:   Part  1.
Framework, models, and quantities. Social Justice Research, 10(4), 393-430.
Johnsen, E. C. (1998). Structures and processes of solidarity: An initial formalization.
In P. Doreian & T. Fararo (Eds.), Tlze problem of solidarity: Theories and models
(p. 263-302). Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Publishers.
200 References
JBreskog, K., & S6rbom, D. (1993). LISREL 8. Structural equation modeling with the
SIMPLIS command language. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Kahneman,  D., & Tversky, A.   (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology
of choice. Science, 211, 453-458.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choice, values and frames. American
Psychologist, 39(4), 342-350.
Kalmijn, M., & Kraaykamp, G. (1999). De verklaarde variantie verklaard: Een
vergelijking van sociologische onderzoeksartikelen  in de periode 1975-1998.
Mens  &  Maatschappij, 74(2), 166-179.
Kangas, 0. E.  (1994). The politics of social security: On regressions, qualitative
comparisons, and cluster analysis. In T. Janoski & A. M. Hicks (Eds.), Tlie
comparative political economy Of the zoefare state (p. 346-364). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Kangas, 0. E. (1995). Interest mediation and popular will. In S. Svallfors (Ed.), In
the eye  of the beholder:  Opinions  on welfare and justice in comparative perspective (p.
52-59).  Sweden: The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.
I<angas,  0.  E. (1997). Self-interest  and the common  good: The impact of norms,
selfishness and context in social policy opinions. Journal Of Socio-Economics,
26(5), 475-494.
Katrougalos, G. S.  (1996). The South European welfare model: The Greek welfare
state in search of an identity. yourn at ofEuropean Social Policy, 6(1), 39-60.
Kempski, J.  von. (1972). Zur Logik der Ordungsbegriffe, besonders in den
Sozialwissenschaften. In H. Albert (Ed.), Theorie und Realitdt. Ausgewalte
Aufsatze   zur   Wissenschaftslehre   der  Sozialwissenschaften   Cp. 1 15-138). Tubingen:
J. c. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Kersbergen, van, K. (1995). Social capitalism:  A study of Christian Democracy and the
wefare state. London: Routledge.
Kersbergen, van, K. (1999). De weerstand van de verzorgingsstaten tegen verandering.
Tildschrij) voor Sociologie, 20(1), 5-24.
Kiecolt, K. J. (1988). Recent developments in attitudes and social structure. Annual
Review of Sociology, 14, 381-403.
Kim, J., & Mueller, W. (1978). Introduction to factor analysis: What it is and how to do
it. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications. (Sage University Paper Series
on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences 07013)
References 201
I<lant, J. J. (1972). St)elregels Toor economen. Leiden: Stenfert Kroese.
Kluegel, J. R., & Miyano, M. (1995). Justice beliefs and support for the welfare state
in advanced capitalism. In J. R. Kluegel, D. S. Mason, & B. Wegener (Eds.),
Social justice and political change:  Public opinion in capitalist and post-communist
states. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Korpi, W. (1980). Social policy and distributional conflict in the capitalist democraties:
A preliminary framework. West European Politics, 3(3),296-316.
Korpi, W. (1983). The democratic class struggle. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Korpi,   W., & Palme,  J.    (1998). The paradox of redistribution and strategies  of
equality: Welfare state institutions, inequality and poverty in the Western
countries. American Sociological Review, 63(5), 661-687.
Leibfried,  S. (1992). Towards a European welfare state? On integrating poverty
regimes into the European Community. In Z. Ferge & J. E. Kolberg (Eds.),
Social policy in a changing Europe. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.
Lenski, G. (1994). Societal taxonomies: Mapping the social universe. Annual Review
of Sociology, 20, 1-26.
Leventhal, G. S.  (1976). The distribution of rewards and resources in groups and
organizations. In L. Berkowitz & E. Walster (Eds.), Equity theoTy: Towards a
general theog Ofsocial interaction (p. 91-131). New York: Academic Press.
Lewis, J.  (1989). Lone parent families: Politics and economics. Journal of Social
Policy, 18(4), 595-600.
Lewis, J. (1992). Gender and the development of welfare regimes. Journal of European
Social Policy, 2(3), 159-173.
Lindenberg, S. (1989). Choice and culture: The behavioural basis of cultural impact
on transactions. In H. Haferkamp (Ed.), Social structure and culture. Berlin/New
York: Walter de Gruyter.
Lindenberg, S.  (1990). Homo socio-economicus: The emergence of a general model
of man in the social sciences. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,
146, 727-748.
Lindenberg, S. (1993). Framing, empirical evidence, and applications. In Jahrbuch
fur neue  politische  Oekonomie  B. 1 1-38). Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Lindenberg, S. (1997). Solidarity: Its micro foundations and macro dependence. A
framing approach. In P. Doreian & T. J. Fararo (Eds.), Tlze problem  of solidarity:
Theories and models. Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach.
202 References
Marshall, G., Swift, A., & Roberts, S. (1997). Against the odds? Social class and social
justice iii industrial societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marshall, G., Swift, A., Routh, D., & Burgoyne, C. (1999). What is and what ought
to be: Popular beliefs about distributive justice in thirteen countries. European
Sociological Review, 15(4), 349-367.
Marshall, T. H.  (1950). Citizenship and social class and other essays. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Marshall, T. H. (1963). Sociology at the cross-roads and other essays. London:
Heinemann.
Marshall, T. H. (1965). Social policy. London: Hutchinson.
Marshall, T. H. (1981). 77:e right to welfare and other essays. London: Heinemann.
Matheson, G., & Wearing, M. (1997, August). Political values, work status and welfare
regimes: A comparison of public attitudes on state welfare and equality in Australia,
West Germany, Norway and the United States. Paper presented at the European
Sociological Association Conference, University of Essex, United Kingdom.
Mau, S. (1997). Ideologischer Konsens und Dissens im Wohlfahrtsstaat: Zur Bin-
nenvariation von Einstellungen zu sozialer Ungleichheit in Schweden, Gro bri-
tannien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Soziale Welt, 48(1), 17-38.
Mayhew, L. (1971). Society: Institutions and activity. Illinois: Glenview Press.
Miller,  D. (1976). Social justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Miller,   D. (1992) Distributive justice:    What the people think. Ethics, 102(3),
555-593.
Misztal,  B.  M. (1996). Trust in modern societies: The search for the bases of social order.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Mommsen,  W.  J.   (1981). The emergence of the welfare state in Britain and Germany.
London: Croom Helm.
Munday,   B. (1996). Social  care  in the Member States  of the European Union:
Contexts and overview. In B. Munday & P. Ely (Eds.), Social care in Europe.
London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Nakagawa,  Y.    (1979).   Japan  the  welfare super-power. Journal   of  Japanese   Studies,
5(1), 5-51.
References 203
Obinger, H., & Wagschal, U. (1998). Das Stratifizierungskonzept in der Clus-
teranalytischen Oberprubing. In S. Lessenich & I. Ostner (Eds.), Welten des
Wohlfahrtskapitalismus:   Der  Sozialstaat  in  vergleichender  Perspective  (p. 109- 135).
Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag.
O'Connor, J. S. (1993). Gender, class and citizenship in the comparative analysis of
welfare state regimes: Theoretical and methodological issues. The Bntish Journal
of Sociology, 44(3), 501-518.
OECD. (1996). Social expenditure statistics of OECD members countries - Provisional
version (Labour Market and Social Policy - Occasional Papers  No. 17). Paris:
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Offe, C. (1991). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. American Journal of Sociology,
96(6), 1555-1557.
Oorschot, van, W. (1997a). Solidair en collectief of marktgericht en selectief?
Nederlanders over sociale zekerheid. Beleid & Maatschappij, 24(43,1 62-174.
Oorschot, van, W. (1997b). Nederland over solidariteit. Sociaal Bestek, 59(3), 27-32.
Oorschot,  van, W. (1998a). Dutch public opinion on social security (CRSP Series).
Loughborough: Centre for Research in Social Policy.
Oorschot,  van,  W. (1998b). Shared identity and shared utility: On solidarity and its
motives (WORC-Paper  No. 98.1 1.008/2). Tilburg: Tilburg University,  Work
and Organization Research Centre.
Oorschot, van, W. (1999). The legitimacy of welfare: A sociological analysis of the motives
for contributing to zuefare schenies (WORC-Paper No. 99.11.02). Tilburg: Tilburg
University, Work and Organization Research Centre.
Oorschot, van,  W.   (2000).  Why pay for welfare? A sociological analysis of reasons  for
welfare solidarity. The Netherlands' Journal of Social Science, 36(1), 15-36.
Oorschot, van, W., & Komter, A. (1998). What is it that ties ...3 - Theoretical
perspectives on social bond. Sociale Wetenschappen, 41(3), 5-24.
Opp, K.-D. (1995). Methodologie der Sozialwissenschaften. Opladen: Westdeutscher
Verlag.
Orloff, A. S. (1993). Gender and the social rights of citizenship: A comparative
analysis of gender relations and welfare states. American Sociological Review,
58(3), 303-328.
204 References
Pacolet, J., Bouten, R., Lanoye, H., & Versieck, K. (1999). Social protection
for  dependency  in  old  age  in  the   15  EU  Member  States  and Norway (Synthesis
Report commissioned by the European Commission and the Belgian Minister
of Social Affairs). Luxembourg: European Commission: Directorate-General
for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, Unit V/E2.
Palacios, R., & Pallards-Miralles, M. (2000). International patterns of pension provision
(Human Development Network, Social Protection Working Papers Series).
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Papadakis,  E.   (1992).   Public  opinion,  public  policy  and  the  welfare state. Political
Studies, 40,21-37.
Papadakis, E. (1993). Class interest, class politics and welfare state regime. British
Journal of Sociology, 44(2), 249-270.
Papadakis, E., & Bean, C. (1993). Popular support for the welfare state: A comparison
among institutional regimes. Journal of Public Policy, 13(3), 227-254.
Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Peillon, M.  (1996). A qualitative comparative analysis of welfare state legitimacy.
7ounial of European Social Policy, 6(3), 175-190.
Peng, I.  (2000). A fresh look at the Japanese welfare state. Social Policy e
Administration, 34(1), 87-114.
Pescosolido, B. A., Boyer, C. A., & Tsui, W. Y. (1985). Medical care in the welfare
state: A cross-national study of public evaluations. Journal of Health and Social
Behaviour, 26(4), 276-297.
Pettersen, P. A. (1995). The welfare state: The security dimension. In 0. Borre
& E. Scarbrough (Eds.), The scope of government: Beliefs in goverment (Vol. 3).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Petterson, T. (1995). Cultural change, cultural diversity and the basic grammar of
justice. In S. Svallfors (Ed.), In the eye of the beholder:  Opinions on welfare and
justice   in   comparative   perspective (p. 104-115).   Sweden:  The  Bank  of Sweden
Tercentenary Foundation.
Philips, D. L.  (1983).  The normative standing of economic inequalities. Sociologische
Gids, 30(5), 318-350.
Pierson, C. (1997). Beyond the welfare state,  Tlze new political economy Of wefare.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
References 205
Pierson, P. (1994). Dismantling the welfare state? Reagan, Thatcher, and the politics of
retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pijl, M.  (1994). When private care goes public: An analysis of concepts and principles
concerning payments for care. In A. Evers, M. Pijl, & C. Ungerson (Eds.),
Payments for care: A comparative overview. Aldershot: Avebury.
Ragin, C.  (1994). A qualitative comparative analysis ofpension systems. In T. Janoski
& A. M. Hicks (Eds.), 77te comparative   political  economy   of  the  welfare  state   (p
320-345). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reif, K., & Marlier, E. (1995, October-November). Euro-Barometer 44.0: Cancer,
education and the single European currency. Computer File. ICPSR #6721/Zen-
tralarchiv fur empirische Sozialforschung #2689. (Conducted by INRA (Eu-
rope), Brussels, on Request of the European Commission)
Reif,   K.,   &   Melich,   A.     (1992, April-May). Euro-Barometer  37.1:    Consumer  goods
and social Security. Computer File. ICPSR #9957/Zentralarchiv Uir empirische
Sozialforschung #2241. (Conducted by INRA (Europe), Brussels, on Request
of the European Commission)
Rescher, N. (1966). Distributivejustice: A constructive cntique of the utilitarian theog of
distribution. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Ringdal, K. (1992). Methods for multilevel analysis. Acm Sociologica, 35(3), 235-243.
Rogers, R. E.  (1969). Max Weber's ideal type theog. New York: Philosophical Library.
Roller, E. (1992). Einstellungen der Burger zum Wohlfahrtsstaat der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Roller, E. (1995). The welfare state: The equality dimension. In 0. Borre &
E. Scarbrough (Eds.), The scope of government: Beliefs in goverment 801.3, P.
165-197). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rostgaard, T., & Fridberg, D. (1998). Caring for children and older people: A comparison
of European policies and practices. Copenhagen: The Danish National Institute of
Social Research.
Rummel, R. J. (1970). Applied factor analysis. Evanston: Northwestern University
Press.
Sainsbury, D. (1996). Gender, equality and welfare states. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
206 References
Saris, W. E., & Kaase, M. (1997). Eurobarometer - Measurement instruments for
opinions in Europe (ZUMA Nachrichten Spezial No. 2). Mannheim: Zentrum
far Umfragen und Analysen, (ZUMA).
Schmidberger, M. (1997). Zwissenstaatliche Variationen bei Bevijlkenings-
einstellungen zur EU: ein mehrebenanalytischer Untersuchungsansatz. ZA-
Information, 41(2), 1 02-119.
Schmidtz, D., & Goodin, R. E. (1998). Social welfare and individual responsibility.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schuyt,  K.   (1998). The sharing of risks and the risks of sharing: Solidarity and social
justice in the welfare state. Ethical Theoly and Moral Practice, 1(3), 297-311.
Schwinger, T.  (1980). Just allocation of goods, decisions among three principles.  In
G. Mikula (Ed.), Justice  and  social  interaction (p. 95-125). Bern: Huber.
Shalev, M. (1996). The privatization of social policy?  Occupational welfare and the welfare
state in America, Scandinavia and Japan. London: MacMillan Press LTD.
Shapiro, R. Y., & Young, J. T. (1989). Public opinion and the welfare state: The
United States in comparative perspective. Political Science Quarterly, 104(1),
59-89.
Snijders, T., & Bosker, R.  (1994).  Modelled variancein two-level models. Sociological
Methods & Research, 22(3), 342-363.
Snijders,  T.,  &  Bosker,  R. (1999). Multilevel analysis: An introduction to basic and
advanced multilevel modeling. London: Sage.
Steinmeyer, H.-D. (1991). Federal Republic of Germany.  In M. B. Tracy & F. C.
Pampel (Eds.), International handbook on old-age insurance Cp. 75-86). Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press.
Svallfors,  S. (1993). Dimensions of inequality: A comparison of attitudes in Sweden
and Britain. European Sociological Review, 9(3).
Svallfors, S.  (1995a).  In the eye Of the beholder:  Opinions on zuelfare and justice in
comparative perspective. Sweden: The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.
Svallfors, S. (1995b). Institutions  and the comparative study of beliefs about justice.
In S.  Svallfors  (Ed.), In the eye of die behoMer: Opinions on wefare and justice in
comparati've  perspective  (p. 11 6-126). Sweden: The Bank ofSweden Tercentenary
Foundation.
References 207
Svallfors, S. (1997). Worlds of welfare and attitudes to redistribution: A comparison
of eight Western nations. European  Sociological Review, 13(3), 283-304.
Svallfors, S. (1999). Political trust and attitudes toWards redistribution: A comparison
between Sweden and Norway. European  Societies,   1 (2), 241-268.
Swaan, de, A. (1988). In care of the state: Health care, education and welfare iii Europe
and the USA in the niodern era. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Swift, A., Marshall, G., Burgoyne,  C., & Routh,  D. (1995). Distributive justice:
Does it matter what the people think?  In J. R. Kluegel, D. S. Mason, &
B. Wegener (Eds.), Social justice and political change:  Public opinion in capitalist
and post-communist states.   New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Taylor-Gooby, P. (1985). Attitudes to welfare. Journal of Social Policy, 14(1), 73-81.
Taylor-Gooby, P. (1991). Welfare state regimes and welfare citizenship. Journal of
European  Social  Policy,   1(23, 93-105.
Taylor-Gooby, P.  (1995). Who wants the welfare state? Support for state welfare
provision in European countries.  In S.  Svallfors  (Ed.), In the eye of the beholder:
Opinions on wefare and justice in comparative perspective (p. 11-51). Sweden: The
Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.
Taylor-Gooby, P.  (1996). The future of health care in six European countries: The
views of policy elites. International Journal of Health Services, 26(2), 203-219.
Taylor-Gooby, P. (1998). Commitment to the welfare state. In R. Jowell, J. Curtice,
A. Park, L. Brook, K. Thomson, & C. Bryson (Eds.), British and European social
attitudes: How Britain differs. The 15th report (1998/99 ed., p. 57-75). Aldershot:
Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Therborn, G. (1995). European modernity and beyond. The trajectory of European
societies 1945-2000. London: Sage.
Titmuss, R. (1958). Essays on the welfare state. London: Allen & Unwin.
Titmuss, R. (1974). Social policy. London: Allen & Unwin.
TBrnblom, K.  (1992). The social psychology of distributive justice.  In K. R. Scherer
(Ed.), 1ustice: Interdiscipli,lag perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Trifiletti,  R. (1999). Southern European welfare regimes and the worsening position
of women. Journal of European Social Policy, 9(1),49-64.
208 References
Turner, B. S. (1997). Citizenship studies: A general theory. Citizensh:b Studies, 1(1),
5-18.
Ullrich, C. G.  (2000). The social acceptance ofthe welfare state: A review of literature
and a new perspective. Sozzate Welt, 51(2), 131-152.
Ultee, W., Arts, W., & Flap, H. (1996). Sociologie: Vragen, uitspraken, bevindingen.
Groningen: Wolters Noordhoff.
United Nations. (1994). Human  Development  Report 1994 (Tech. Rep.). New York:
Human Development Report Office.
Vijver,  van  de,  F.,  &  Hutschemaekers,  G.   (1990). The investigation of culture: Current
issues in cultural psychology. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
Vijver,  van  de,  F.,  &  Leung,  K. (1997). Methods and data analysis for cross-cultural
research. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Visser, J., & Hemerijck, A. C. (1997). A Dutch miracle. Job growth, welfare reform and
corporatism iii the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Vogel, E. (1973). Japan as number one:  Lessons for America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Walker, A. (1993). Older people in Europe. Brussels: CEC.
Walker, A., & Maltby, T. (1997). Ageing Europe. Bristol, PA: Open University Press.
Watkins, J. W. N. (1969). Methodological individualism and non-Hempelian ideal
types. In L. J. Kimmerman (Ed.), The nature and scope of social science: A critical
anthology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.  (Original work published
1953)
Weber, M. (1968). Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre. TObingen: J.C.B.
Mohr(Paul Siebeck). (Original work published   1922)
Wildeboer Schut, J. M., Vrooman, J. C., & Beer, P. de. (2000). De maat van
de verzorgingsstaat: Inrichting en werking van het sociaal-economisch bestel in elf
Westerse la,iden (Tech. Rep. No. 2000/1). Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel
Planbureau.
Wilensky, H. L. (1975). The welfare state and equality: Structural and ideological roots of A
public expenditures. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Wilensky, H. L. (1976). Tlie 'new corporatism', centralization, and the welfare state.
Beverly Hills: Sage.
References 209
Williamson, 0. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications.
New York: The Free Press.
Wilterdink, N.   (1995). On individualization. Sociale Wetenschappen, 38(4), 4-17.
WRR. (1999). Generatiebmoust beleid (Rapporten aan de Regering No. 55). Den Haag:
Sdu Uitgevers.
Zijderveld, A. C.  (1999).  Thewaning of the welfare state: The end of comprehensive state
succor. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
r
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Inleiding
Hangt de manier waarop verzorgingsstaten zijn ingericht samen met de opvattingen
van hun burgers over solidariteit en rechIVaardigheid? Of is de macht der gewoonte zo
sterk dat burgers de institutionele arrangementen van hun verzorgingsstaat steunen,
hoe die arrangementen er ook uit mogen zien?  Of is de relatie tussen verzor-
gingsstaatarrangementen en de publieke opinie veel complexer? Hoe het ook zij, de
omvang van het publieke draagvlak voor verzorgingsstaatarrangementen vormt een
belangrijk onderwerp in het politieke en sociaal-wetenschappelijke debat over de ver-
zorgingsstaat. De publieke steun voor verzorgingsstaatsolidariteit, welke voornamelijk
tot uitdrukking komt door het toewijzen van de verantwoordelijkheid voor sociale ze-
kerheid aan de overheid, in plaats van deze over te laten aan de verantwoordelijkheid
van het individu, geeft de legitimiteit van een verzorgingsstaat weer. Een gebrek
aan steun duidt op een legitimeringsprobleem. Wil beleid succesvol zijn, dan is een
bepaalde mate van sociale aanvaarding noodzakelijk.
In deze studie hebben we onderzocht, in hoeverre de mate van publieke steun voor
de verzorgingsstaat en de voorkeur voor bepaalde rechtvaardigheidsprincipes zijn gere-
lateerd aan kenmerken van verzorgingsstaatregimes. Esping-Andersen heeft het begrip
verzorgingsstaatregimes geintroduceerd in zijn reeds klassieke boek The three worlds of
welfare capitalism (1 990). In dit boek definieert hij een verzorgingsstaatregime als het
geheel van juridische en organisatorische kenmerken die systematisch zijn ingebed in
de relatie tussen de staat en de economie. Verder heeft hij getracht het bestaan van
regimes empirisch aan te tonen, door te laten zien dat echte verzorgingsstaten zijn te
groeperen in een liberaal, conservatief of sociaal-democratisch type. Zijn typologie van
verzorgingsstaten is later uitgebreid en verbeterd door critici van zijn oorspronkelijke
werk.
In dit onderzoek hebben we gebruik gemaakt van een uitgebreide versie van een
typologie van verzorgingsstaten. Daarnaast zijn zowel structurele kenmerken van
nationale systemen van gezondheidszorg en pensioenvoorziening, alsook individuele
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sociale kenmerken in de empirische analyses opgenomen. Dit onderzoek bouwt voort
op eerder onderzoek naar cross-nationale verschillen in niveaus van publieke steun
voor de verzorgingsstaat (Svallfors, 1997; Peillon, 1996; Roller, 1995; Papadakis &
Bean, 1993). Deze studies hebben laten zien dat er, ondanks de in het algemeen zeer
sterke steun voor de voorzieningen van de verzorgingsstaat, belangrijke verschillen
tussen verzorgingsstaten bestaan. Daarnaast hebben deze studies laten zien dat er niet
alleen verschillen bestaan tusSell verzorgingsstaten, maar ook binnen verzorgingsstaten.
Op basis van de bevindingen van eerder onderzoek heeft deze studie voornamelijk
getracht om de waarde van de welbekende typologie van Esping-Andersen voor de
studie van de publieke opinie over de verzorgingsstaat en sociale rechtvaardigheid
te evalueren. Het algemene idee van deze typologie is dat verschillende soorten
verzorgingsstaatregimes kwalitatief verschillende verzorgingsstaatarrangementen om-
vatten. Op basis hiervan werd de algemene hypothese getoetst dat opinies van bur-
gers omtrent de verzorgingsstaat en hun keuzes van rechtvaardigheidsprincipes zich
conformeren aan het overheersende kader van sociaal beleid en waarden van de ver-
zorgingsstaatregimes waarin zij leven. We hebben daarnaast de relevantie van andere
contextuele kenmerken (zoals inkomensongelijkheid, uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid,
wilze van financiering van de verzorgingsstaat en structurele kenmerken van nationale
gezondheidszorg- en pensioensystemen) voor de verklaring van cross-nationale ver-
schillen en overeenkomsten in publieke opinie onderzocht. Het idee hierachter was
dat deze kenmerken een grotere verklaringskracht zouden kunnen bieden dan de
classificatie van echte verzorgingsstaten in regimes, die slechts benaderingen zijn van
ideaaltypische constructen.
In deze studie zijn daartoe de volgende vijf onderzoeksvragen onderzocht:
1.   Zijn er typen van echte verzorgingsstaten  of zijn alle verzorgingsstaten eerder
unieke gevallen, en, als het eerste het geval is, zijn er dan drie of meer
ideaaltypische verzorgingsstaatregimes? (Hoofdstuk 2)
2. In hoeverre steunen burgers van verschillende verzorgingsstaten geinstitutio-
naliseerde solidariteit? In hoeverre kunnen verschillen tussen landen en indi-
viduen hierin worden verklaard door verschillen tussen verzorgingsstaatregimes,
uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid, inkomensongelijkheid, financieringsmethode
van de verzorgingsstaat, en op het individuele niveau, door sociale positie en
sociaal-politieke voorkeuren? (Hoofdstuk 3)
3. In hoeverre hebben burgers van verschillende verzorgingsstaten verschillende
opvattingen over solidariteit en geven zi j de voorkeur aan verschillende recht-
vaardigheidsprincipes? In hoeverre kunnen verschillen tussen landen en indi-
viduen hierin worden verklaard door verschillen tussen verzorgingsstaatregimes,
sociale positie en sociaal-politieke voorkeuren? (Hoofdstuk 4)
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4. In hoeverre steunen burgers van verschillende verzorgingsstaten hun stelsel van
gezondheidszorg? In hoeverre kunnen verschillen tussen landen en individuen
hierin worden verklaard door verschillen tussen verzorgingsstaatregimes, struc-
turele kenmerken van het stelsel van gezondheidszorg, en op het individuele
niveau, door sociale positie en sociaal-politieke voorkeuren? (Hoofdstuk 5)
5.   In hoeverre geven burgers van verschillende verzorgingsstaten de voorkeur  aan
verschillende manieren van pensioenverschaffing? In hoeverre kunnen ver-
schillen tussen landen en individuen hierin worden verklaard door verschillen
tussen verzorgingsstaatregimes, structurele kenmerken van het nationale pen-
sioenstelsel, en op het individuele niveau, door sociale positie en sociaal-politieke
voorkeuren? (Hoofdstuk 6)
Deze onderzoeksvragen zijn beantwoord met behulp van internationaal-vergelijken-
de surveyprojecten, zoals de Eurobarometer-surveys, het International Social Survey
Project en het European Values Survey Project. Hieronder worden de belangrijkste
conclusies met betrekking tot deze onderzoeksvragen samengevat.
Antwoorden op de onderzoeksvragen
Drie of meer verzorgingsstaatregimes?
Overeenkomstig Esping-Andersens oorspronkelijke positie concluderen we in Hoofd-
stuk 2 dat bepaalde typen van echte verzorgingsstaten kunnen worden onderscheiden.
Op basis van de theoretische argumenten en het empirisch bewijs die naar voren
zijn gebracht door Esping-Andersens critici, concluderen we echter ook dat er goede
redenen zijn om het oorspronkelijke door hem onderscheiden aantal typen uit te
breiden tot vijf of zelfs zes, zonder teveel aan analytische spaarzaamheid in te boeten.
Verder betogen we dat Esping-Andersens theorie van verzorgingsstaatregimes moet
worden uitgebreid om meer nauwkeurige hypothesen te genereren. De uiteindelijke
conclusie is echter dat, zolang theoretisch onderzoek dit doel nog niet heeft bereikt, de
empirische resultaten van eerder onderzoek - dat zich heeft gericht op de verklaring van
cross-nationale verschillen in houdingen en gedrag aan de hand van verzorgingsstaat-
regimes - voldoende redenen geven om het onderzoek met de Uitgebreide typologie
voort te zetten. Naar aanleiding van dit eerder onderzoek kiezen we ervoor om de
verklarende waarde van de uitgebreide typologie empirisch te beproeven, hetgeen in
de vervolghoofdstukken aan bod komt.
 
Steun voor gernstitutioniseerde solidariteit
Hoewel de analyses in Hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat er significante verschillen in niveaus
van steun bestaan tussen liberale, sociaal-democratische, conservatieve en Mediterrane
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verzorgingsstaten, stemt de richting van de gevonden effecten niet overeen met
onze verwachtingen. Liberale en Mediterrane verzorgingsstaten worden gekenmerkt
door hoge niveaus van steun, terwijl sociaal-democratische verzorgingsstaten worden
gekenmerkt door onverwacht lage niveaus van publieke steun. Een verklaring hiervoor
wordt gezocht in de omvang van het overheidsingrijpen in de sociale zekerheid in deze
landen: In landen waar de rol van de overheid beperkt is, profiteren burgers meer van
toenemend overheidsingrijpen, terwijl burgers van landen waarin de overheid reeds een
grote rol speelt, zich bewust zijn van het kostenplaatje dat aan een uitgebreid stelsel van
sociale zekerheid hangt Verder vinden we duidelijk negatieve effecten van contextuele
kenmerken zoals het niveau van inkomensongelijkheid, uitgavenniveau aan de sociale
zekerheid en de financieringsmethode van de verzorgingsstaat. Op het individuele
niveau worden effecten aangetroffen van indicatoren van moreel engagement met
de verzorgingsstaat (langere opleidingsduur, vakbondslidmaatschap, linkse politieke
zelfplaatsing en een postmaterialistische waarden-ori8ntatie) en van welbegrepen
eigenbelang (behoren  toI een zogenaamde transferklasse en klassenpositie).
Opvattingen over solidariteit en rechruaardigheid
Uit de analyses van Hoofdstuk 4 blijkt dat burgers van Mediterrane verzorgingsstaten,
zoals verwacht, in grote mate instemmen met verzorgingsstaatsolidariteit. Daarnaast
blijken ook de burgers van sociaal-democratische verzorgingsstaten meer steun te
geven aan verzorgingsstaatsolidariteit dan de burgers van liberale verzorgingsstaten.
De burgers van liberale, radicale, conservatieve en Aziatische verzorgingsstaten geven
daarentegen relatief weinig steun voor verzorgingsstaatsolidariteit. De resultaten
van deze analyse bevestigen daarmee de verwachte ordening van landen op de
solidariteitsschaal.
Wat de keuze van rechtvaardigheidsprincipes betreft vinden we ook een ordening
van landen die relatief sterk samenhangt met de classificatie van Esping-Andersen.
Burgers van alle soorten volgroeide verzorgingsstaten zijn v66r inkomensnivelle-        1
ring, maar tegelijkertijd accepteren ze ook inkomensongelijkheid. Burgers van de
onvolgroeide, Mediterrane verzorgingsstaten hebben daarentegen een grotere voorkeur
voor het gelijkheidsprincipe. Verder wordt het behoefte-principe door burgers van
alle soorten verzorgingsstaten als zeer belangrijk gezien. Tenslotte geven de resultaten
aan dat het billijkheidsprincipe meer wordt geprefereerd door de burgers van liberale
verzorgingsstaten dan door de burgers van conservatieve en sociaal-democratische
verzorgingsstaten.
Op het individuele niveau zijn de belangrijkste resultaten dat een hoger oplei-           
dingsniveau en een hoger inkomen onafhankelijk van elkaar tot minder steun voor
verzorgingsstaatsolidariteit en gelijkheid leiden; verder dat vrouwen meer steun geven
dan mannen en werklozen meer steun geven dan werkenden.
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Publieke steun voor het stelsel van gezondheidszorg
De resultaten van Hoofdstuk 5 laten zien dat er een relatie bestaat tussen de ver-
I schillende soorten verzorgingsstaten en de publieke steun voor het nationale stelsel
van gezondheidszorg. Een hoge mate van steun blijkt dan vooral samen te hangen
met sociaal-democratische kenmerken van verzorgingsstaten, terwijl steun lager is
als liberale en conservatieve kenmerken pregnanter naar voren komen. Daarnaast
1        blijken ook nationale gezondheidszorgarrangementen samen te hangen met de pu-
blieke voorkeur voor solidaire gezondheidszorgarrangementen. Steun is sterker als de
dekking breder is en de financiering meer publiek geregeld. Steun is ook groter in
landen met minder sociale voorzieningen voor kinderen en ouderen, en in landen met
een groter aandeel van vrouwelijke deeltijdarbeid.
Ook werden significante effecten van individuele kenmerken gevonden. Werk-
lozen geven meer steun dan werkenden. Verder geven degenen in de hoogste
inkomensgroep meer steun dan degenen in de laagste inkomensgroep, waarschijnlijk
omdat de eerstgenoemden worden geconfronteerd met de hogere kosten van private
ziektekostenverzekeringen. Daarnaast staan degenen die zichzelf als zeer gezond
beschouwen minder positief tegenover een publieke gezondheidszorgstelsel. Tenslotte
geven de resultaten aan dat vrouwen dn degenen met een linkse politieke oriEntatie
meer steun geven.
Publieke opinie omtrent de verannuoordelijkheid voor de pensioenvoorziening
De resultaten van hoofdstuk 6 laten slechts een geringe samenhang zien tussen het
niveau van steun voor overheidsverantwoordelijkheid voor pensioenverschaffing en
verzorgingsstaatregimes. Slechts de burgers van Mediterrane verzorgingsstaten zijn
duidelijk v66r exclusieve overheidsverantwoordelijkheid op het gebied van pensioen-
verschaffing. Burgers van conservatieve en sociaal-democratische verzorgingsstaten
blijken een grotere voorkeur te hebben voor gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid tussen
de individuele burger en de overheid, dan alleen voor exclusieve overheidsverant-
woordelijkheid.
Structurele kenmerken van het nationale pensioenstelsel blijken ook samen te
hangen met de publieke voorkeur omtrent de verantwoordelijkheid voor de pensioen-
voorziening. Zo zijn er effecten van de mate van generositeit van het pensioenstelsel,
het uitgavenniveau aan het publieke pensioenstelsel, het belang van private pensioen-
regelingen en het premie-aandeel van werkgevers en verzekerden in de bekostiging van
de sociale zekerheid. De verklaring van deze effecten is sterk afhankelijk van de mate
van ontwikkeling van verzorgingsstaten, aangezien dit een belangrijke deterrninant is
van de publieke voorkeur voor overheidsingrijpen.
Tenslotte worden ook hier belangrijke verschillen tussen sociale groepen en indi-
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viduen gevonden. Naarmate men langer is opgeleid, geeft men meer de voorkeur aan
individuele of gedeelde collectieve verantwoordelijkheid voor de pensioenvoorziening.
Verder geven leden van de middenklasse of hogere middenklasse meer de voorkeur
aan private pensioenregelingen. Daarentegen geven gepensioneerden, vrouwen, en
degenen met een lager inkomen meer voorkeur aan verschaffing van pensioenen door
de overheid.
Conclusies
In hoofdstuk 7 vatten we de belangrijkste resultaten naar aanleiding van de vijf
voorgaande onderzoeksvragen samen. Daarna worden de conclusies van deze studie
getrokken. Deze conclusies hebben enerzijds betrelking op verschillen tussen verzor-
gingsstaatregimes en anderzijds op verschillen tussen individuen. Wat de verschillen
tussen verzorgingsstaatregimes betreft, kan worden geconcludeerd dat wanneer landen
worden geclassificeerd volgens een uitgebreide versie van Esping-Andersens typologie
van verzorgingsstaten, er duidelijke verschillen tussen deze clusters naar voren komen.
Zowel de oorspronkelijke driedelige typologie, alsook de uitgebreide typologie kunnen
relatief goed verschillen in de publieke opinie verklaren. De verwachte richting
van de effecten kwam niet altijd overeen met de richting van de geschatte effecten.
Desondanks kan worden geconcludeerd dat deze relatief eenvoudige typologie van
verzorgingsstaten - in termen van verklaringskracht - bijna net zo belangrijk is als
verschillende structurele kenmerken om cross-nationale variaties in de publieke opinie
te verklaren.
Met betrekking tot de effecten van verklarende variabelen op het individuele
niveau kan worden geconcludeerd dat zij belangrijke directe effecten hebben op de
mate van steun voor de verzorgingsstaat en de keuze van rechtvaardigheidsprincipes.
Dit geldt zowel voor indicatoren van eigenbelang, als voor indicatoren van een moreel
engagement met de verzorgingsstaat. Moreel engagement blijkt vooral relevant als
het gaat om algemene steun voor de verzorgingsstaat. Indien meer specifieke vragen
worden gesteld, die de respondent confronteren met de potentiele kosten van grotere
solidariteit, blijkt eigenbelang een grotere rol te spelen.
Hoofdstuk 7 wordt afgesloten met een discussie van de wetenschappelijke en
maatschappelijke relevantie van deze studie. Mede aan de hand van enkele theoretische
en methodologische aspecten, waaraan deze studie geen aandacht kon besteden,
worden tenslotte suggesties gedaan voor verder cross-nationaal onderzoek naar de
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